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MEMOIRS

OF THE

WAR IN SPAIN.

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MARSHAL SUCHET
DUKE D'ALBUFERA

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FROM 1808 TO 1814,

BY

MARSHAL SUCHET,

DUKE D'ALBUFERA.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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INTRODUCTION.

MARSHAL SUCHET wrote his Memoirs during the latter period of his life, when the return of peace enabled him to indulge without restraint in the meditations of his riper years. He had caused numerous extracts to be made from his official correspondence, and personally superintended the selection; by so doing he not only reviewed the principal facts, but the details with which they were connected, in order to record every circumstance deserving of notice. As competent a judge of the plan of action as at the time when he had an immediate control over it, he held the thread of his operations, placed them in their proper light, exhibited their real motives, developed their results, and bestowed a due meed of praise upon all who had distinguished themselves under his orders. His Narrative was principally written for military men; and we should fail in giving a just description of his character, were we to omit noticing, as a peculiar feature in it, that whilst penning these Memoirs, he always had present to his mind the individuals composing

the army of Arragon. No chief ever displayed so ardent a wish to extol the merits of those who seconded his views. His narrative teems throughout with an earnest anxiety to do justice to every one acting under his orders. This may have occasioned a certain prolixity, of which the reader may perhaps complain when he finds the series of events interrupted by the detail of partial engagements. In justice, however, to the author, he should bear in mind the following points:

1st.—Marshal Suchet was perpetually annoyed by a petty warfare on his flanks and in his rear, in the midst of those important operations which drew off his attention during the progress of the sieges and battles in which he was engaged; and that his narrative, whilst retracing this incessantly reviving opposition, the bare perusal of which excites the reader's impatience, exhibits a picture, which from that very circumstance, bears a closer affinity to truth.

2ndly.—The marshal only succeeded in conquering that difficulty by instilling into every individual belonging to the army under his orders the feelings by which he was animated. The Spanish war was more calculated than any other to develop, in the inferior ranks of the service those talents which lead to celebrity, because it often compelled military men to depend upon

their own resources. It will be seen from these Memoirs that the commander of the army of Arragon, after having formed so many valuable officers, could not resist the impulse which induced him to record their praises, and that his grateful heart was acquitting a kind of debt by associating them with the narrative of his campaigns. This is what he expresses in an affecting manner at the commencement of the 7th chapter, in the following language: "If some of those petty actions appear to have lost much of the interest that belonged to them, it should be remembered that the commander-in-chief endeavoured to persuade every individual in his army, that on whatever station he was employed, and whatever duty he was called upon to perform, a degree of importance was necessarily attached to his conduct, the eyes of others were upon him, and his services were duly observed and appreciated; nor was he disappointed in the object of his endeavours. He takes a delight, even at the present day, and after so long a lapse of time, in making known that he has not forgotten his companions in arms, and that their services are ever present to his mind." We venture to hope that many of those who may read these reflections will feel disposed, through a feeling of kindred justice or benevolence, to excuse and even applaud the part adopted by mar-

shal Suchet of recording in his Memoirs the names of many officers, and the particulars of many trifling engagements.

The Memoirs of marshal Suchet are as much the offspring of his own mind as the campaigns which he describes: the spirit in which they were composed may be gathered from what we have just premised. He derived enjoyment and relaxation from the task; his active imagination delighted in the recollection of the past, amidst the pleasing distractions of a domestic life, and during the painful intermission of his last illness. His intimate friends drew from his conversation a faithful commentary on his work; he pointed out the final modifications to be made, which rather consisted in curtailments from than in additions to it, and he sought with their assistance the explanatory documents that were to accompany the publication. Much time was required for effecting this careful revision, for checking the accuracy of figures and dates, drawing up statements, and appending notes or documents intended to elucidate, explain, or develop the text.

The perusal of the work cannot fail to justify the general regret occasioned by the death of marshal Suchet. Nothing is left of the exploits which have illustrated the whole of his career beyond the recollection of them; but this will endure the longer as it is connected with the remembrance of the many virtues that have adorned

his character. To history will devolve the task of treasuring up the memory of our hero; it will record that he owed his elevation solely to his merit; that every mark of distinction which he acquired was strictly his due; that having been unexpectedly forced to adopt the career of arms, at the period when the youth of France were summoned to the defence of its territory, he brought to the profession that natural aptitude which is always a sure presage of distinguished talents; that having already reached the rank of chef de bataillon during the campaign in Italy, he was a colonel at twenty-six years of age, chief of the staff at twenty-seven, and lieutenant-general at twenty-nine; that his name was connected with the glorious achievements on the banks of the Var and the Mincio, in the fields of Austerlitz and Jena, under the walls of Lerida, Saguntum, and Tarragona, which achievements he sometimes ratified with his blood; that, always skilful and fortunate, successful in fields of battle and in sieges, he attained by a series of brilliant deeds the very first rank in the army. History, however, whilst recording those deeds, will not fail to exalt their splendour, and to stamp a peculiar lustre upon them in the eyes of philosophy and humanity, by adding that, wherever he carried his arms, he successfully exerted his endeavours to mitigate the calamities of war. Without at any time losing sight of the principal object of a

commander-in-chief, that of leading his soldiers to victory, his first care was to procure them the means of subsistence (a task often attended with serious difficulties,) and to provide for their wants. In return, however, he enjoined the strictest observance of discipline; and by maintaining order in his army, easily brought the inhabitants of the country to a sense of justice. This was the aim of his praiseworthy endeavours, which were accordingly crowned with success. He was no sooner appointed commander-in-chief, than he manifested the soundness of his judgment and his elevation of soul by the character of his government. He was directed to feed the war by the war; and his mission was to vanquish and conquer. He did more: he increased his power by the prudence of his measures, and diminished the obstinacy of resistance by the justice which guided him in the prosecution of them. The most enlightened Spaniards were selected to exercise public functions in their respective provinces. Land-owners, deputies from chapters, merchants, lawyers, all met together for the purpose of decreeing and apportioning with the strictest impartiality the burdens entailed by the war; and every year, when fresh demands were made, a statement was invariably presented of the appropriation of the preceding contributions, which was always guided by the rules of justice, prudence, and economy, and super-

intended by the commander-in-chief. By this course of proceeding, which afforded the clearest indication of a well regulated mind, he applied the system of budgets to a victorious army and a conquered country; carried conviction to all the inhabitants, and persuaded them to refrain from further resistance. It may therefore be said that whilst carrying on the war in Spain he had succeeded in conquering the esteem and winning the hearts of the people, a triumph which is even more honourable to him than the conquest of Arragon and of the kingdom of Valencia.

Marshal Suchet has confined his Memoirs to his campaign in the Spanish Peninsula. Although his whole career exhibits a series of brilliant achievements, it is more particularly deserving of notice since he acted in the capacity of commander-in-chief. A military man who never attains the highest rank, does no more than obey the orders of his superiors; he can never claim as his own those acts, the first impulse of which originates in the mandates of another. His life, unless it be considered in some peculiar point of view, seldom affords examples sufficiently striking to serve as a lesson and a model to all, or to entitle him to hold a distinguished place in the pages of history. Marshal Suchet was never wholly unfettered in his actions until he found himself placed at the head of the army of Arragon; he then had it in his power fully to develop his

talents and his character, which had not yet been displayed in all their brilliancy. Nevertheless, his fame stood already conspicuous in the list of French heroes; his first outset had afforded a presage of what time would bring to light. At the period of the campaign in Italy, he had, in his capacity of chef de bataillon in the 18th regiment of the line, taken part in almost every celebrated engagement at Loano, Castiglione, Lonato, Rivoli, Trent, Bassano, and Arcola. Raised to the rank of colonel after the passage of the Tagliamento and the engagements at Tarvis and Neumarkt, he shortly afterwards accompanied general Brune, the commander-in-chief, to Helvetia, was the bearer of twenty-three pair of colours to the directory, was raised to the rank of a general officer, and although appointed to accompany the expedition to Egypt, was sent back to Italy as chief of the staff of general Brune, at a moment when fresh preparations of war were in progress against Austria.

Suwaroff, the hero of Russia, was at this time on his way to join the Austrian army in Italy, whilst another Russian corps d'armée was on the point of co-operating with the English army in Holland. General Brune was withdrawn from the south to encounter in the north the duke of York, whom he completely routed at Alkmaër at a later period; and general Joubert supplied the place of

general Brune in Italy. Each of these officers was to have been accompanied by his own staff; Joubert, however, who had arrived at Milan without any retinue, was in momentary expectation of being overtaken by his staff; and pressed by circumstances, requested that general Brune would allow general Suchet to remain for the present, in attendance upon him. A few days were sufficient to enable him to form a just estimate of that officer's merits; he was not long in discovering his talents, his activity, his thorough knowledge of the country and of the army, and requested of the directors that he might be allowed to keep him near his person as a man whose services were indispensable in that field of action. He succeeded in his application; soon afterwards, however, having been found in direct opposition to some of the views of government, he was punished in his capacity as chief of the staff. By a decree of the directory, Suchet received orders to return to France within three days, under pain of being included in the list of emigrants; a measure hitherto unexampled towards a military man who was exposing his life in defence of his country: he had no other course left but to obey. Joubert resigned his command, and was relieved by general Scherer.

The campaign of the year VII or of 1799, although it turned out extremely disastrous to France, was conceived on a bold and compre-

hensive plan, the basis of which was the occupation of Switzerland. This measure, which was rather of a military than a political character, entered into the course of defence which it became incumbent on the republic to adopt, feeling as it did how incompatible was its existence with that of the rest of Europe. The Swiss alone had a right to complain of that measure; and yet they have been divided in opinion on the subject: in spite, however, of the censure which has been heaped upon it, even by some Frenchmen, it is easier to account for it than to justify the assassination committed at Radstadt, or the burning of the fleet at Copenhagen. Our two grand armies were to oppose the Austrians in the plains of Swabia and Italy, whilst other corps were to proceed from the country of the Grisons and of the Valteline, and to take possession of the sources of the Inn and of the Adige, with a view to command the position of the Tyrol, and to threaten the flank and rear of the Austrian forces, previously to the arrival of the Russian army. Two generals were chosen for that important operation, general Lecourbe, one of our officers, who was celebrated for his skill in carrying on a mountain warfare, and general Dessolle.*

* The Valteline had acquired celebrity in the days of the duke de Rohan, at the commencement of the seventeenth century. Towards the close of the eighteenth, general Dessolle raised a

Both generals fulfilled, in a most brilliant manner, the tasks assigned to them. But the loss of the battle of Stockach and of two battles fought on the Adige, completely overturned the original plan of campaign. The consequence of this was, the loss of Germany and Italy; and had it not been for Massena's vigorous defence in Switzerland, France itself must have been invaded at that early period.

General Suchet having been summoned to Paris, felt no difficulty in refuting the frivolous accusations brought against him; he was sent to the army of the Danube, thenceforward called the army of Helvetia. Massena appointed him to the command of a brigade, on a detached service in the country of the Grisons, where he

trophy to the renown of our army. He penetrated, at the head of a brigade of 4,500 men, through almost inaccessible mountains as far as Tauffers, where Laudon was intrenched with a strong division. General Dessolle did not hesitate to attack the Austrian general, out-manœuvred him with great skill, cut off his retreat upon Glurens, and compelled him to quit the valley of the Adige, after leaving his artillery and upwards of 4,000 prisoners in the hands of the French. Prince Charles, our enemy, who was a good judge in these matters, alluded to this achievement in the following words, in his work on the campaign of 1799: *The boldness displayed by general Dessolle in the execution of his plan corresponded with the soundness of his judgment, and manifested the determination of a man, who entertaining no doubt of success, proceeded in full confidence to the accomplishment of the object he had in view.*

resolutely defended the positions of Davos, Bergen, and Splugen, which the enemy attacked in regular succession. But the loss of the fort of Luciensteig having separated him from the rest of the army, he was surrounded by superior forces, and threatened to be enclosed in the valley of Dissentis without any prospect of effecting his retreat. His resolution and firmness extricated him from this dangerous position. He crossed a frozen lake at Ober Alp, re-entered the valley of Urseren, restored the communications with Lecourbe's division at Airola, which had been interrupted, and brought back into line with the army his detachment which had, for several days been looked upon as completely destroyed. *I felt quite confident,* exclaimed Massena, *that Suchet would bring me back his brigade;* shortly afterwards, Chérin, the chief of the general staff was killed; Suchet was appointed to take his place, and thus became in a brief space of time, to second an officer who then held the command of the principal French army.

By a plan of operations on as splendid and comprehensive a scale as that of Dumourier in Champagne, though far more rigorous in its mode of execution, Massena, from the position he occupied in Switzerland saved France and broke the coalition by winning the battle of Zurich, and defeating general Suwaroff. Suchet had not the good fortune to share in that brilliant

triumph. An internal revolution which went by the name of the 12th floreal, brought about a change in a portion of the directory. Joubert was immediately appointed to command the army of Italy. His first condition was, that Suchet, his chief of the staff, should be restored to him with the rank of general of division. Suchet hastened to join his friend, and reached Genoa in his company. Moreau, whose modesty kept pace with his talents, had fought under Scherer's orders, and happily for the safety of the army, had received the command of it on the field of battle of Cassano at the moment of its being defeated, and on the point of being utterly annihilated, had not a more skilful hand undertaken to direct its movements. Providence was once more placing it in the power of the same man, and under precisely similar circumstances, to rescue the army of Italy from impending ruin. Joubert had orders to fight a battle. Moreau, whose services were deemed indispensable by the directory, was on the point of returning to Paris, where a new command was held in reserve for him, and where his advice was eagerly looked for. Joubert was a man of too noble and too elevated a mind to entertain any views that had not the welfare of France for their object. He urged his predecessor to remain in Italy and retain the command. Moreau, who was at all times prepared to

devote himself for the sake of his country, consented to serve by the side of his colleague in the character of his aid-de-camp until the close of the engagement. This contest of generosity proved a fortunate circumstance for the service, general Joubert having been killed by the first fire of musketry from Novi. On the occurrence of this event the whole army, without any previous order or concert, applied to general Moreau for instructions for its guidance; he maintained the honor of our arms; Gouvion Saint-Cyr secured the retreat; the defeated army resumed its position, and retained possession of Genoa.

General Suchet paid the tribute of regret to the memory of his friend, general Joubert, and received orders, in his capacity of chief of the staff, to await the arrival of general Championnet, who was appointed to command in Italy. During the interval of a month, which elapsed until the appearance of the latter, general Moreau found himself in immediate and daily intercourse with Suchet; instantly discovered in him those qualities which had won the esteem of general Joubert a twelvemonth before, and said, with evident satisfaction, to a friend of Suchet, for whom he entertained a regard: *Your general is one of the first staff officers in the French army.* This encomium possessed a peculiar value, as it emanated from the distinguished chief who was then on the point of proceeding to take the command of the

army on the Rhine, with which he performed such wonderful achievements the following year, and whose chief of the staff was general Dessolle, an officer who holds so conspicuous a place in our military annals.

Championnet had scarcely reached the river of Genoa, when he died at Antibes of a contagious disorder; heart-broken at witnessing the state of utter destitution and misery to which the army was reduced. The soldiers were not only in want of pay, clothing, and shoes, but even of bread and ammunition. Whole regiments were completely disorganized; the men were deserting in a body, leaving unprotected and alone, at the advanced posts in front of the enemy, their officers and subalterns, who, from a sense of honor still clung to their colours. They then repaired to the frontier of France, to demand the means of subsistence, and observed the strictest discipline on the road, listened without a murmur to the voice of their generals who exerted themselves to check them in their progress, but continued their march with a sombre resolution, muttering these expressions: "Give us shoes, bread, and cartridges, and we are willing to return." Such were the last difficulties general Suchet had to contend with at the close of the painful campaign of the year VII. The accession of Napoleon to power, and Massena's mission to Italy with fresh

troops, had the effect of arresting the discouragement which that state of affairs had produced, and soon brought about a change of fortune.

At this period the army witnessed, for the first time, the appointment of lieutenant-generals who were to be placed in command of several divisions. General Suchet, chief of the staff of generals Joubert and Championnet, finding himself, in consequence of their death, free from all military duties, was returning to France, when the conqueror of Zurich arrived from Switzerland to assume the command of the army of Italy, with general Oudinot as his chief of the staff. Massina met Suchet at Frejus; he had long been acquainted with the latter, and he now kept him under his orders, by giving him the command of the centre, whilst he was on the point of proceeding with his right to shut himself up in Genoa, the defence of which city he protracted in a manner that redounded so much to his glory. Lieutenant-general Suchet found himself at the head of two or three weak divisions, which were scarcely adequate, in point of numbers, to an efficient one, and was directed to defend the river of the Ponent, and the French territory. There was every reason to apprehend that a reverse of fortune would bring the Austrians to our frontier, an event which actually came to pass. The lieutenant-general commanding the centre, was separated from Genoa and his commander-in-

chief, and had to sustain, during a whole month, the attacks of the numerous Austrian corps of troops under general Elnitz, who, after several hard-fought engagements, succeeded in occupying the principal positions, and compelled the French to evacuate Nice. General Melas, the commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces, deemed this a favorable opportunity for penetrating into France, and advanced in person to the Var. General Suchet having been thrown back upon that point, could no longer receive any assistance, except from the reinforcements that might be sent to him from the left wing, or the corps d'armée of the Alps; he lost no time in applying for them to the first consul ;* and also resolved to defend, to the last extremity,

* His aid-de-camp, Ricard, (now a lieutenant-general), who was the bearer of despatches for Paris, was under the necessity of going to Dijon, Geneva, and Lausanne, in quest of the first consul. At length he was enabled to fulfil, at the latter place, the object of his mission, and described the perilous position of the weak corps which protected the department of Provence from invasion. The army of reserve was already in full march to cross the Saint-Bernard. Relying upon Suchet's determination to defend the Var, Napoleon saw, with evident satisfaction, that Melas was penetrating more and more into the maritime Alps, and leaving the plains of Lombardy open to him. He folded the despatch, and listened to the aid-de-camp's report with the utmost composure. A minister having entered the apartment at this moment, Napoleon came up to him saying, with a smile, *I hold Melas in my pocket.*

the defile of the bridge of the Var against all the enemy's forces. His corps scarcely amounted to 7 or 8,000 men; but they were for the most part well disciplined and well officered. He had under his orders generals Clausel, Pouget, Rochambeau, Garnier, Beaumont, Bardenet, Dambarrere, the gallant Jablonowski, Seras, Campana, Roguet, and Sémélé; colonel Préval was chief of the staff, and general Campredon directed the operations of the engineer department. A tête-de-pont was hastily constructed on the left bank of the Var, armed, and placed in a state of defence; batteries were erected on the right bank, and mortars placed near the entrance of the river, where English vessels were anchored. Having assumed this defensive attitude, general Suchet boldly awaited the attack of the Austrians. Three desperate attempts, which were obstinately repeated, and assisted by the formidable means of annoyance at the enemy's command, proved wholly abortive; the enemy could make no impression upon our intrenchments, or upon the firmness of our troops. The attacks suddenly ceased, and the fleet sailed. General Suchet had left a garrison in the fort of Montalban, an elevated point which has a full command of Nice, and by the successful trial of a resource, which had not yet been generally adopted, kept up a telegraphic correspondence with the commandant of the fort. He was

thus soon apprized of the movement of the Austrian army, which was resuming the road to Piedmont. Unconscious, as yet, of the cause of this unexpected retreat, his natural penetration suggested to him, that this was the moment for striking a blow. He followed in close pursuit of general Elnitz, succeeded, by the rapidity of his movements, in attacking and defeating him on several occasions, occupied the river of Genoa, crossed the mountains, and entered the valley of the Bormida, after having taken six standards, thirty-three pieces of cannon, and nearly 15,000 prisoners. Genoa was in the act of surrendering at this time, after the most heroic resistance; but the good fortune of France was at the same moment triumphing on the field of Marengo. The advanced guard of general Suchet proceeded as far as Acqui; Melas being thus threatened in his rear, was under the necessity of detaching a corps of troops in that direction, a fact which is borne out by the Austrian reports. Meanwhile, the commander-in-chief, general Massena, who was on his return to France in pursuance of the convention agreed upon at Genoa, issued formal and repeated orders for the central corps of the army to re-enter Savona. That corps was sent thence to resume possession of the city of Genoa, which had fallen into the hands of the French subsequently to the battle. The defence of the

Var formed a conspicuous event in the life of marshal Suchet; the minister Carnot, who held the seals of the war department, wrote to congratulate him upon his conduct, and compared the defence of the bridge of the Var to that of Thermopylæ. He had, in fact, saved the south of France on this occasion, and contributed his full share to the immortal victory which restored to our arms the ascendency in Italy.

The following year still found him in command of the centre, consisting of Gazan's and Loison's divisions; lieutenant-general Dupont was stationed on his right, with the divisions of generals Monier and Watrin. General Brune, the commander-in-chief, contemplated to cross the Mincio in presence of the Austrian army, under the orders of general Bellegarde. The preparations for effecting the passage were masked from the enemy by various demonstrations along the line, and were definitively laid down at Monzambano. A bridge was constructed at this place, in front of Salionzo, on the 24th of December 1800.* The whole army was ordered to assemble at Monzambano at day-break. The advanced guard, the left wing, and the reserve, were at a very short distance from that place; the centre was to over-

* That was the day on which the infernal machine blew up at Paris. The 25th December 1800, corresponds with the 3rd nivose, year 9.

take them on breaking up from its position on the Volta, and on its march to make a feint attack upon Borghetto. The right alone, instead of following the general movement, was to relieve the centre in front of the Volta, throw a bridge across the river, and effect a passage at the point opposite Pozzolo, with a view to divide the enemy's attention. These preparatory arrangements were punctually carried into effect; owing, however, to some cause which has never been properly ascertained, the whole movement was arrested, when near its completion, by a counter-order which directed the troops to resume their positions until the following day. It happened, fortunately for us, that our marches and counter-marches were partly concealed from the enemy by a thick cloud. General Suchet, on passing a second time before Borghetto, brought away the troops which he had left engaged against the enemy at that place, and resumed the road towards the Volta with his two divisions. A sharp firing along the borders of the Mincio attracted his attention; he rode up to general Dupont and informed him of the counter-order. The latter, in conformity with the first arrangements laid down, had effected a passage; all his troops were engaged with the enemy on the left bank, and were threatened by the main body of the Austrian army, the latter having hastened to the spot for the purpose of

opposing the charge, which was at first intended as a feint, but had been subsequently converted into a real attack. General Dupont represented to his colleague, that so far from having it in his power to retire, he stood in need of support to extricate himself from the hazardous position in which he found himself. There are instances upon record of general officers having, on the plea of want of instructions, or even in spite of formal orders, hesitated to compromise their safety in an attempt to relieve their comrades from imminent danger. General Suchet, however, was too much attached to his country to behold, without emotion, his fellow countrymen exposed to the enemy's attacks, and remain a mere spectator of the scene, when he could act a useful part in it. He promised general Du pont that he would never desert him; they mutually agreed to communicate the state of affairs to the commander-in-chief, urging him to repair to the spot, or to send his orders to them, and concerted measures for resolutely withstanding the approaching attack. One of the brigades of the centre had scarcely reached the opposite bank of the Mincio, when the Austrians made a desperate attack against the bridge, the object of which was defeated by our artillery on the heights of the right bank. This was the critical moment; the loss of the bridge would have compelled the whole of the French troops

on the left bank to rush into the water, or lay down their arms. The above-mentioned brigade was followed by two more; and although general Dupont was still inferior in numbers, notwithstanding these reinforcements, he not only opposed a successful resistance to the enemy's forces, but compelled them to retreat after leaving us in possession of the field of battle and of 4,000 prisoners. It would be difficult to form an idea of the friendship which the soldiers of the right and of the centre contracted for each other on this occasion, and which subsisted during the remainder of the campaign and of the war.

Raised to the rank of lieutenant-general before he had attained his thirtieth year, marshal Suchet had already begun to act the part of commander-in-chief; for the rank of lieutenant-general was equivalent to that of general in command of the wing of an army. It has already been seen that whilst he previously acted in the capacity of general of brigade and general of division, he had been chief of the staff under the successive orders of Brune, Joubert, Moreau, Championnet, and Massena. General Suchet was possessed of all the qualities requisite in a major-general; when, therefore, he was appointed commander-in-chief, his duties as chief of the staff were considerably lightened. He was, however, more particularly

distinguished by the possession of two qualities, which are either opposed to each other, or seldom found combined in the same individual. He who is bound to defer to the ideas of another, and merely fashions them to his own views, cannot be said to possess the most energetic of human faculties, that of originating a measure and of giving it effect. To remain thus habitually in the second rank, is not the way to attain the first; and in the case of a man of ordinary capacity, it might eventually be the means of unfitting him for it. Nature had implanted in General Suchet that ambition which is the leading stimulus in every profession in life, and may often be characterized as the instinct of talent feeling confident in its own strength. He knew that the capacity to command an army is the first requisite in the art of war, that duty affording the only field for the species of instruction which is founded upon facts, as well as the most signal opportunities for obtaining celebrity. After having acted, towards the close of the first war, as chief of the staff to the armies of Italy and Helvetia, and as inspector-general of infantry of France during the interval of the first peace, he wished to forget that he had been a lieutenant-general, and on a footing of equality with his chiefs, and solicited the command of a division. Marshal Soult had just been appointed to the chief command of the army at the camp of Boulogne; Suchet's division

was particularly noticed by its appearance, its excellent discipline, the correctness of its evolutions in the midst of an army which might be considered as a model, and had secured to itself an ample share of the triumphs of the grand army in Germany and Poland. That division consisted of five regiments of infantry, the 17th light regiment, the 34th, 40th, 64th, and 88th of the line, led by colonels Vedel, Dumoustier, Legendri, Chauvel, and Curial, and successively commanded by generals Compans, Valhubert, Beker, Claparede, Reille and Girard. It afterwards ranked as the 1st division of the 5th corps, under the orders of marshal Lannes, duke de Montebello, in whom the emperor reposed his chief confidence on the field of battle. General Suchet had long possessed the esteem of marshal Lannes; and proved himself well worthy of it by his gallant conduct at the head of his division against the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies.

At Ulm, when the French army, which had by the most skilful manœuvre concentrated itself round general Mack, attacked the town where this officer allowed himself and the whole of his forces to be thus hemmed in, that division carried the intrenchments of the Michelsberg, and a part of the 17th regiment, with colonel Vedel at its head, boldly penetrated into one of the enemy's advanced works.

At Austerlitz, the 5th corps constituted the left wing of the army, and forming itself into two lines of infantry, occupied the high road from Brunn to Olmutz, with the 17th regiment detached to the Santon, the hussars and chasseurs in front, and the dragoons and cuirassiers in the rear. The efforts of the Austrians, of one of the wings of the Russian army, and of the whole of the cavalry were exerted against marshals Murat and Lannes in that direction. Suchet's division perceived that the enemy's cavalry were beginning to penetrate in the intervals between his battalions, and in imitation of the Mamelukes in Egypt, were either mowed down or put to flight by the infantry who steadily awaited their attack. By a bold change of front our two marshals separated the enemy's centre from his right, which was thrown back, defeated, and pursued beyond the field of battle, whilst marshal Soult was gallantly securing the victory at the other extremity of the line.

At Saalfeld, the same division again formed the advanced guard of the 5th corps, and struck the first blow against the Prussian army by defeating the corps under prince Louis, who was killed by a private of one of our regiments of hussars.

Three days afterwards, on the eve of the battle of Jena, that division was the first to secure a position at the entrance of the narrow plateau

that we were compelled to attack in presence of the Saxo-Prussian army, which had deployed in its rear. Napoleon, like a second Archimedes, only wanted a single point whereon to rest his lever; thence it was that he shook Europe to its very foundations. At night, it became necessary to open a road for the artillery by torch-light. The emperor bivouacked in the midst of the 40th regiment; he remained for two hours alone with general Suchet, going over the lines of the advanced posts. Early on the 14th of October, he again made choice of the same division for attacking the plateau, which was defended by the whole of the enemy's advanced guard. General Suchet broke down the gates of the field of battle, if we may be allowed the expression, and the other corps d'armée followed and formed in order of battle preparatory to the general attack. On this occasion also he fought as second in command, and captured during the engagement twenty-eight pieces of cannon. Towards evening, whilst the firmness of marshal Davoust was triumphing at Auerstadt over the duke of Brunswick and the king of Prussia, who was present at the engagement, the cavalry under the grand duke of Berg came up to the emperor, and was ordered to complete the rout of the prince of Hohenlohe, who had been defeated and was in full retreat towards Weimar. The infantry under general Suchet followed this movement, and descended

into the plain. A first column of prisoners, amounting to 5 or 6,000 men, passed him on the high road, and a superior officer who marched at its head, and whose face exhibited many sabre-cuts and was covered with blood, laid hold of his boot, and addressed him in these words: "*General, I beg the favor of your answering this single question: have we fought as well as the Austrians did at Austerlitz?*"

The battle of Pultusk on the 26th of December, was one of those in which valour and consummate skill are arrested by fortune and the elements. General Beker's division of cavalry, and four regiments of Suchet's division were opposed during part of the day to 40,000 Russians commanded by general Kaminski, and succeeded in keeping them in check, whilst the emperor was marching with the main body of his army towards Golymin and Makow, for the purpose of defeating the corps under Buxhovden, and of turning the corps under Kaminski's orders. Suchet's division suffered severely in this long and unequal struggle; Gazan's division on the right, and Gudin's on the left towards evening reinforced and enabled him to maintain his ground; and the Russians commenced their retreat at night-fall. But the emperor's manœuvre had failed of success. Torrents of rain which had fallen for the preceding eight days, rendered the roads altogether impassable.

We were, therefore, unable to reach the corps under general Buxhovden; had it not been for that circumstance, the campaign would perhaps have ended on the banks of the Narew by the destruction of a whole army. Less fortunate than marshal Davoust at Auerstadt, marshal Lannes had, however, like him the honor of the fight, and of retaining possession of the field of battle: but his isolated action formed no part of a general and decisive victory, and the glory won at Pultusk was in some respects incomplete.

At Ostrolenka, Suchet's division arrived in its turn to support Gazan's division in an engagement which cost the gallant general Campan his life, and in which the son of Suwaroff was wounded as he was advancing with his troops in close columns against the battery of captain Rainder, who waited until the enemy came within a distance of twenty paces, defeated him, and put the whole detachment to flight.

The fifth corps was summoned to Spain at the close of 1808, and general Suchet again found himself under the orders of the duke de Montebello, on occasion of the siege of Saragossa; it was this marshal who pointed him out to the emperor as most worthy to hold the chief command in Arragon, on his departure for the campaign in Germany, where a glorious death awaited him on the field of Essling.

This rapid glance at the principal military achievements in the first part of marshal Suchet's career is sufficient to show what he had been previously to becoming commander-in-chief of the army of Arragon. A perusal of his own narrative of his later campaigns will afford a proper estimate of his conduct in them, and point out the extent of his claims to public esteem. The friends to military glory and to French honour will not fail to discover that the virtues which adorn a private character and the talents of a warrior were combined in his person. Whilst they admire his successes, they will not overlook the difficulties he had to contend with. On his first arrival in Arragon, every thing stood in need of being re-organised or created anew; he had in some measure to alter the composition and spirit of his army; but first of all he had to conquer the enemy and procure the means of subsistence. This two-fold necessity was perhaps the severest trial he had to undergo at the very outset. Accordingly, the battle of Maria, and the period which immediately preceded it, form the critical moment, and as it were the main difficulty among the events described in these Memoirs. The commander-in-chief found himself beset at once with all kinds of embarrassments, even before he could collect himself or become acquainted with his new duties; had he given way under those obstacles, he never could have recovered from the fall, and the career

which had just been opened would have closed upon him for ever. But his firmness was proof against the difficulty he had to encounter at setting out, and succeeded in overcoming it. This first step was decisive of his future fate; from this moment commenced the series of brilliant successes with which his operations in Spain have been uninterruptedly crowned.

It is an interesting spectacle to behold him upon achieving the conquest of Arragon, after the double victory of Maria and Belchite, securing the possession of that province by wholesome administrative measures, and thereby paving the way for the conquest of the adjoining provinces. He was accordingly prepared to move forward as soon as the emperor commissioned him to subdue the towns of Catalonia. He succeeded in taking them by means of those memorable sieges, the details of which afford information no less varied than useful. He began with an immediate investment of Lerida, after which, he quietly awaited the approach of Henry O'Donnell, who was advancing prematurely to the relief of the place; he defeated this general, and accelerated from that moment the works of the siege, carried the town by storm, and by a manœuvre no less expeditious than skilful, compelled the castle to capitulate without firing a shot. What perseverance did he not display in his preparations for the siege of Tortosa, what vigour in his operations, what boldness in

the catastrophe! his personal firmness brought about the surrender of the garrison at the very moment when it appeared ready to dispute the orders of its governor. At Tarragona, success was already half secured, previously even to the siege, by the decisive conduct of the general, who availed himself of the proper moment for advancing against the place; this was when the town of Figueras had fallen into our power. By this movement he disconcerted at one blow the garrison and the relieving army. The attack and defence of Tarragona are of a nature which borders upon the marvellous and gigantic; the operations partake of many sieges in one; they present a combination and a series of heroic efforts, of courage, perseverance, obstinacy and fury, which terminated in a splendid and terrific feat of arms, and bring to our recollection the fall of ancient Numantium. The narrative of those operations, which successively pave the way for and second each other, exhibits a combination of the highest military qualities in the chief who directed them. One of these is of a nature to shine forth on frequent occasions, and will be duly appreciated; consisting as it does in the art of rendering a first success subservient to the attainment of another. General Suchet was eminently gifted with the talent of instantly securing all the advantages which any given position held out to him. He had scarcely defeated general Blake at Maria, when he fol-

lowed in pursuit, overtook him at Belchite, and dispersed or annihilated his army. He no sooner entered Lerida, than he sent a body of troops to invest Mequinenza; and whilst this fort was still engaged in discussing the terms of capitulation, his attention was directed towards Tortosa, and he sent to occupy Morella on the frontier of Catalonia and Valencia. Thus it happened, that whilst the government on receiving the report of an operation just terminated was giving directions for undertaking a fresh one; its orders had been anticipated, and frequently even carried into effect at the moment of their arrival. From Tortosa, general Habert proceeded immediately to the col de Balaguer, took possession of the fort of San-Felipe, and cleared the road leading to the city of Tarragona. Lastly, the province of Catalonia still resounded with the report of the fall of Tarragona, taken by assault on the 28th of June, when on the 29th of the same month marshal Suchet was already on his way to Barcelona; he sent some of his columns in the direction of Vich, surrounded the Mont Serrat, carried that formidable position, and completed the submission of lower Catalonia. In holding up this mode of proceeding to public admiration, we must observe that it called for a display of skill as well as of activity. He was free from the reproach made to Hannibal, *vincere scis, victoriâ uti nescis,* and entitled himself to the

praise bestowed upon Cæsar, *Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.*

The marshal's narrative bears the stamp of truth on the face of it. When his efforts failed he was far from disguising the circumstance, but rigidly stated the facts as they occurred. On his first arrival in Arragon, he was foiled in an attempt against Alcañiz; his perseverance under this disappointment was the more creditable to him, and the success with which it was crowned was equally honourable to his character and to his military skill. He no sooner reached Saguntum than the orders which he received, induced him with reference to the time and circumstances, to attempt an immediate assault, which was frustrated by local obstacles and the valour of the besieged. General Blake, however, having advanced to offer battle, the French general defeated him as completely as he had done at Maria, owing to the superiority of his manœuvres, and compelled Saguntum to surrender. His army was as familiar with grand military evolutions as it was formidable by its courage; he surrounded and hemmed in within the walls of Valencia a whole hostile army, with a precision which was by no means the effect of chance. He purposely resorted to a bombardment, with a view to strike terror into the Valencians, and to spare himself the necessity of forcing open their gates, by compelling them to

admit us into the city. On the occasion of this victory, a circumstance occurred which shed as much lustre over his fame as the victory itself. Valencia was a rich and populous city; the soldiers of the army of Arragon had entered many places not by capitulation, but by force of arms; the conqueror felt desirous of obviating this and of making it impossible for them to commit acts of plunder. He stopped at the gates of the city, remained three days in camp with his soldiers, whilst the public authorities were consolidating themselves within the city under his immediate care and protection. As soon as he was satisfied with the result of these prudent arrangements, he made his entry at the head of his troops, and, as the just reward of his humanity, was received by the inhabitants with joyful acclamations.

The occupation of the kingdom of Valencia brought the army of Arragon into contact with an Anglo-Spanish Sicilian army; English troops effected a landing at Alicant, with a view to co-operate with the Spaniards in the movements which lord Wellington was directing against the principal French armies. Marshal Suchet eagerly sought opportunities for trying his strength against these invaders. He overtook them at Biar, and compelled them to retreat; in this engagement, he could not refrain from noticing the regularity with which they deployed, and the ra-

pidity of their firing. He attempted to surround them at Castalla on the following day, but could not succeed in his object. Fortune remained nearly balanced between both chiefs. Shortly afterwards, however, sir John Murray landed before Tarragona, and ventured to lay siege to it. Suchet followed him with extraordinary rapidity, and being seconded by a movement of the army of Catalonia, compelled him to relinquish his enterprise, to re-embark, and leave his cannon behind him. The marshal attached some value to this success; after having won many battles, and taken many places, some by capitulation, and others by force of arms; defeated armies who came to relieve them, and persisted in the sieges he had undertaken; he felt a pride in having compelled the raising of a siege. He was, nevertheless, ambitious of coming to another engagement, and defeating, on a field of battle, the English corps opposed to him. This triumph was reserved for him at Ordal; but he was detained before Villafranca, by some unexpected delays in the manœuvring of his troops; and lord William Bentinck, with whom he hoped to measure his strength, took advantage of the circumstance to avoid a general engagement.

Marshal Suchet, whilst in command of the army of Arragon, far exceeded the expectations which his fame led us to anticipate. His five campaigns invariably display the skill and penetra-

tion of a great captain. His continued series of successes forms as it were a brilliant episode, and often a striking contrast to the vicissitudes of the Spanish war. He not only deserved a civic crown from his army and his country; but he obtained one from his very enemies. Such a result was still more calculated than victory to terminate a war, the object of which was to give a new government to Spain. It is always rendering a signal service to France, to cause the French name to be respected and cherished by foreigners. This was the emperor's opinion at the time, since he had the following article inserted in the *Journal de l'Empire* of the 28th of January 1812.

"The victories achieved by marshal Suchet had no doubt afforded a presage of the fall of Valencia. But the long duration of the siege of Saragossa, and the obstinate defence of Tarragona, might have warranted an apprehension that the triumphant advance of the army of Arragon would experience a temporary check, and that a city fortified by so many works, and the asylum of so many soldiers, could only be occupied at the cost of sacrifices proportioned to its importance. The news of its fall has, therefore, excited a deep sensation in Paris.

"The capitulation of Valencia has effected, at the same time, the surrender of a whole army, the only one the insurgents could command in

the eastern provinces; it consisted of their best generals, and of all the regular troops remaining in Spain.

"The insurrectionary spirit has in consequence abated, and will very shortly disappear; a result owing not only to the success of marshal Suchet's arms, but also to the sound judgment which has marked his conduct, the moderation which has characterized his measures, and the firmness he has evinced in carrying them into effect. He has not only conquered, but pacified the provinces. His arrival in Arragon has restored to it the blessings of tranquillity. In his progress from Saragossa to Valencia, peace has constantly followed in the train of victory. No insurrection has compelled the commander-in-chief to retrace his steps; no fortress has successfully resisted his attacks. Lerida, the rock against which the efforts of a great captain had proved unavailing, opened its gates to him; Tarragona felt the weight of his well-merited vengeance; Mequinenza and Tortosa appeared to retard his progress merely to afford him leisure to husband his resources. The battle of Saguntum, like that of Almanza, brought about the submission of the kingdom of Valencia; but he did not, in imitation of the duke of Orleans, arrive the day after the engagement; and whether he was more fortunate, or more talented, than the duke of Berwick, the advantages he obtained followed

each other in more rapid succession, and exerted a more direct influence over the destinies of Spain. The campaign of the duke d'Albufera may, accordingly, find its parallel, with greater semblance of reason, in the campaign of the duke de Vendôme, although the theatre of its operations was different. Nevertheless, the obstacles encountered by the conqueror of Villaviciosa, cannot be placed in comparison with those which marshal Suchet either warded off by his prudence, or overcame by his courage. He had, indeed, long afforded proofs of his combining, in his own person, those two qualities, which are so seldom found united. His name is coupled with the most celebrated victories of his majesty's reign; at Austerlitz, Jena, and Pultusk, as well as in a countless number of actions, Suchet's division has obtained honorable mention; already, on the occasion of the siege of Genoa, this general had arrested on the Var the invasion meditated by foreign armies, and seemed to be then affording a prelude to the brilliant victories which have since gained him the admiration of his country, and the favour of his sovereign. The splendour of the dignities conferred upon him, are reflected back upon the troops serving under his orders."

During the progress of his military career, the duke d'Albufera was always ambitious of the praises of Napoleon. At the time of the campaign

in Italy, the commander-in-chief had already noticed *the chef-de-bataillon, Suchet, honorably wounded,* says the bulletin, *at Cerea, whilst fighting at the head of his corps.* He ever since followed him in his gradual rise in the service, formed a just estimate of his merits, employed him on various occasions in preference to other officers, and evinced the most friendly esteem for him. He no sooner tried him in the capacity of commander-in-chief than he congratulated himself on the selection he had made. He was repeatedly heard to bestow encomiums on his measures, his conduct, and his reports, and was wont to speak of him in these words: " *What he writes is still better than what he says, and what he does is better than what he writes; with many others, the reverse is the case.*" Ever since his first entrance into Spain, towards the close of 1808, the war kept him at a distance from Paris and from France; it was during this interval that he rose to the ranks of commander-in-chief, marshal of the empire, duke d'Albufera, colonel-general of the guard, and commander of the two armies of Arragon and Catalonia. Accordingly, when the emperor saw him for the first time after seven years' absence, he greeted him in these words: *Marshal Suchet, you are much grown since we last met.* He expressed the same sentiment at a later period, when he said, " Suchet was a man whose judgment and

character had wonderfully improved." (Extract from the Memoirs of Las Cases.)

The opinions of a great man are said to be an anticipation of those which posterity forms, and it is also said that no language is so solemn and powerful as that which is spoken by the dying. Napoleon, long before his death, was already out of the world, and as it were in an Elysium, where France and Europe passed in review before him, and where he delighted to converse of the men and events of his own times. O'Meara's Memoirs contain the following passage: "I then asked Napoleon which of the French generals was, in his opinion, the most skilful? 'I should find it difficult,' he replied, 'to decide; but I am inclined to name Suchet; Massena was formerly the most skilful; but we may now consider him as no longer in existence; Suchet, Clausel, and Gerard are, I think, the best French generals.'"

We close these quotations with an observation of Napoleon, which is related in madame Campan's Memoirs.

"He said, that if he had had two such marshals in Spain as Suchet, he not only would have conquered the Peninsula, but likewise retained possession of it. The soundness of his understanding, his conciliating disposition, his habits of business, his military skill and bravery had enabled him to achieve unheard of successes.

It is a pity, he added, that sovereigns cannot form men of that stamp."

When to such testimonies we may add those bestowed by foreigners, marshal Suchet's fellow-countrymen may well be proud of a national fame so justly acquired. Italy, the scene of his first exploits, where his talents were first brought into play, possesses imperishable recollections of them. His name has been given to a public walk in Saragossa; when the news of his death reached that city, which he inhabited for a long time, several Spaniards immediately evinced their regret at his loss, and caused a solemn dirge to be performed for the repose of his soul. When the course of events brought the French back to Spain under the command of the prince who is to inherit the throne of France which rests her best hopes upon him, they found the provinces of Arragon and Valencia still cherishing a lively recollection of marshal Suchet, and heaping every blessing upon his memory.

It is stated in the XXth chapter of these Memoirs, that after the battle of Ordal in Catalonia, marshal Suchet received a letter of thanks from general Clinton for the kind treatment experienced by the wounded British prisoners in the hospital at Barcelona. We think it right to insert in this place, the very words used by general Clinton on that occasion :

"I cannot close this letter without availing myself of the opportunity it gives me to express to your excellency the great satisfaction I felt in hearing the report made by colonel Otto, of the extremely considerate treatment our wounded soldiers, prisoners in your hands, met with in the French hospitals; a line of conduct so highly creditable to the great nation your excellency serves, and bespeaking that noble generosity of sentiment which has been the distinguishing characteristic of both our countries in our most obstinate wars, whenever the circumstances of the service have appeared to admit the alleviation of the sufferings and hardships of individuals.

"Your excellency will also be pleased to accept my acknowledgments for the great civility and attention shown by your excellency, personally, and by all those around you, to colonel Otto during his late visit to Barcelona, which the colonel has not failed to speak of in terms the most grateful."

Signed, W. CLINTON.

Tarragona, September 28th, 1813.

Nothing could be more natural and proper than the civility and attention shown at the French head-quarters to so distinguished an officer as colonel Otto. With respect to general Clinton's letter, it was clearly dictated by the report he had just received, a report which was but an echo of

the language spoken by the English soldiers to colonel Otto, as he visited them one after the other in their beds. Colonel Otto himself was warm in his expressions of gratitude on leaving the hospital and on calling to take leave of marshal Suchet; he not only returned him thanks on behalf of the wounded soldiers, but also assured him, in his own name and in that of his general, of the high sense which his government, as well as the British nation, would entertain of such generous conduct. We feel convinced that the English and French will read with equal pleasure in the above accurate extract an authentic and positive declaration, which is alike honourable to the general from whom it emanated and the general to whom it was directed.

Those testimonies of general esteem have been completed and crowned by the most august of all. In a private audience, the king condescended to address words of consolation to the family of marshal Suchet on occasion of his death, and assured them, that he felt happy at having it in his power to say that every information received from Spain proved to him how much the duke d'Albufera had deserved and won the gratitude of the inhabitants by his considerate conduct. When a warrior prematurely summoned to pay the debt of nature, after a life rendered illustrious by his exploits, descends to the tomb accompanied by

encomiums and sorrows, as unbounded as they are sincere, by the fame of his good actions and of his spendid achievements, we may venture to assert that he will live in the hearts of every friend of humanity, and of every admirer of military glory.

Marshal Suchet was born on the 2nd of March, 1770, and died on the 3rd of January, 1826, having scarcely attained his fifty-sixth year, and being yet in all the vigour of manhood. He was tall in stature, with a dignified though mild countenance; his eyes were indicative of the utmost kindness of disposition, and his physiognomy expressed the sentiments of benevolence with which his heart overflowed. He possessed great sensibility of feeling, a quick perception, and amongst other qualities, a sense of justice and a disposition which never allowed him to repay a service by ingratitude or to be inexorable for a fault committed. It may, perhaps, be said that no man ever combined in so great a degree the impulse of a tender heart with proper exercise of authority. He entertained the highest regard for his soldiers. To form a just estimate of that attachment to the service which induces a military man to undergo at all times the severest privations, and to be prepared at a day's, nay, a moment's notice, to sacrifice his life, a sacrifice which embraces every other, would require a practical and intimate knowledge of the trials of obe-

dience, of sufferings, of fatigues, and of dangers which beset him from the moment of his entering the army until that of his quitting it. The French soldier distinguishes himself by a brilliant quality which no other soldier in Europe possesses in so eminent a degree; he has a soul-stirring spirit within him. His bravery is not that of a mere automaton; it does not require the impulse of caning, or of ardent spirits; it is deeply impregnated with the moral influence of his inward feelings; and if this peculiarity is not unattended with inconvenience when fortune deserts him, it affords on the other hand the surest assistance to a chief who is familiar with the road by which he may lead him to victory. Marshal Suchet was intimately acquainted with the soldiers, by having so long lived amongst them; he sympathized in some degree in their feelings, and had the talent of persuading and of turning them to his views. He was greatly attached to them, and they were so to him in return; whether he commanded a division or a corps d'armée, all served him from affection, and readily exceeded the strict limits of their duty when it was a question of pleasing him. His soldiers no sooner saw him at a distance during the marches he performed by day, or heard and recognised his voice in the night marches, than they collected round him with the greatest eagerness, and put familiar questions to him; confidence, joy, or resignation

spread from rank to rank, on the soldiers receiving his answers, which were always lively, kind, and at the same time cheerful and full of wit. His engaging manners joined to the ascendency of his character, enabled him to lessen the rivalry subsisting among his troops, and the jealousy between nations, and to prevail upon Frenchmen, Italians, Poles, Germans, and even the Spaniards composing his army, upon all parties, in short, to concur with zeal towards the furtherance of the common object. His reputation in the French army was in some measure of a popular kind; those who were under his orders were apprehensive of leaving him; others who were acquainted with him, or had heard reports of his character, were most anxious for an opportunity of serving under him. In his domestic intercourse he was kind, and confiding; he was grateful for any mark of attachment shewn to him; the display of zeal in the service, the success of any undertaking, was treasured up in his memory and rewarded at a fitting opportunity; he felt the utmost reluctance to direct reproaches against any one; and when they were called for, he listened with patience and impartiality to any observations that might be offered. The advancement and welfare of his military family were sources of deep interest to him; he delighted in contributing to its promotion when

it had claims upon his support, a circumstance which was not productive of their mutual separation; with few exceptions, therefore, it consisted of the same officers during a long series of years; and in so far resembled his private family, as that they both lost a father when he paid the debt of nature.

MEMOIRS

OF

MARSHAL SUCHET.

CHAPTER I.

Situation of the French armies in Spain.—Departure of the 5th corps of the grand army from Silesia and its arrival in Arragon.—Siege of Saragossa.—Occupation of Jaca and Monzon.—Departure of Suchet's division for Castille.—General Suchet relieves the duke d'Abrantes in the command of the 3rd corps.—Situation of that corps.—State of Arragon.—Arrival of general Blake in Arragon and of general Suchet at Saragossa.—Attack of Alcañiz.—Retreat upon Saragossa.—Reorganization of the troops and preparations of defence.—Battle of Maria.—Battle of Belchite.—Occupation of the line of the Guadalupe and the Cinca.

In the early part of 1808, Spain was occupied by several French corps d'armée, which, having crossed the Pyrenees, established themselves in the fron-

tier fortresses and penetrated to Madrid, and even as far as Andalusia; a French squadron was at anchor in the roadstead of Cadiz, and we had likewise an army at Lisbon. At the close of the same year the greater part of the Peninsula had been evacuated in consequence of political and military events already sufficiently known; the different corps d'armée retained possession of St. Sebastian, Pampelona, Barcelona and Figueras, and were concentrated behind the line of the Ebro. They were exclusively composed of young conscripts who were not in a condition to stand the test of a first reverse of fortune, nor to combat the Spanish insurrection. Napoleon was under the necessity of detaching a portion of his veteran troops from the grand army stationed in Prussia and in Poland. He came in person with the imperial guard, in the month of November, to place himself at the head of the forces he had collected upon the upper Ebro. By a comprehensive and rapid movement with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th corps, he routed the Spanish armies at Espinosa, at Burgos, and at Somosierra, whilst marshal Lannes, with the 3rd and 6th corps, was defeating generals Castaños and Palafox at Tudela. The army of the latter general, amounting to 30,000 men, took shelter within the walls of Saragossa. Having obtained possession of Madrid, the emperor immediately directed the 6th corps to join him, in

order that he might march with imposing forces upon the English general Sir John Moore, who was advancing too late to the relief of the capital. In the situation in which Napoleon had placed himself, his coming up with an English army and destroying it on a field of battle would have been a triumph better calculated than any other to promote his interests. But he had scarcely moved in the direction of Benevento, when the warlike preparations of Austria compelled him to return to France; marshal Soult was directed to continue the pursuit of the English. Independently of the 2nd corps which was under his immediate command, the 6th corps under the orders of marshal Ney was placed at his disposal with the view to insure the success of that expedition.

In the meanwhile, the 1st corps under marshal Victor was taking possession of Estremadura, and the 4th under general Sebastiani was occupying La Mancha; marshal Moncey was in Arragon at the head of the 3rd, and general Gouvion St. Cyr in Catalonia with the 7th corps. Although king Joseph had returned to Madrid, nevertheless he held no power over the surrounding country. All the inhabitants had taken up arms at the breaking out of the insurrection; and in spite of our unexpected successes in the very first campaign, in which they had been signally

defeated, they were making fresh preparations for a general resistance; armies were forming in all directions*. Their numbers were more imposing than their discipline, and they exhibited all the defects of a precipitate organization; but they were in the highest state of excitement, and derived their chief strength from the national enthusiasm. The new king could only establish his sway by the aid of the French armies, of which he was the generalissimo, in his capacity of lieutenant of the emperor his brother. The reinforcements arrived from the grand army had just reinstated him into his capital; but it required much greater ones, and often repeated efforts, before the whole kingdom could be brought under subjection.

The 5th corps, commanded by marshal Mortier, had quitted Silesia on the 8th of September. It crossed the Bidassoa on the 1st of December, and was marching to Burgos, when it received orders to proceed to Arragon for the purpose of replacing the 6th corps. The defensive preparations carrying on at Saragossa called for various and powerful means of attack; and although marshal Moncey had with the 3rd corps under his command several troops of artillery and engineers, and a large besieging train, he stood in

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 1.

need of a more numerous body of infantry before he could attempt to invest and lay siege to so extensive and populous a city, which was well supplied with provisions, was determined to defend itself, and had arrested the progress of the French a few months before, and compelled them to retreat, although they had come up to its gates, and forced their way into the very streets and squares of the city.

The 3rd and 5th corps advanced on the 21st of December upon that capital by a combined movement. Marshal Moncey took possession of Monte-Torrero, a position which commands the whole town. Marshal Mortier caused the suburb on the left bank of the Ebro to be invested by the 2nd division of the 5th corps. The 1st division, which was under the orders of general Suchet, shared at first in the attacks on the right bank against the castle of Aljuferia or of the inquisition, and against the western side of the town. Shortly afterwards, general Junot replaced marshal Moncey in the command of the 3rd corps; and marshal Lannes came to take the chief command of both corps, and of the operations of the siege. On his arrival, he directed general Suchet to act with his division as a corps of observation, and to disperse the troops that were successively forming at Calatayud, and on various other points of Arragon. It manœuvred on both banks

of the Ebro, during the months of January and February. At Licinena, colonel Perena, who had brought together four or five thousand men in a position of some strength, experienced a signal defeat. General Suchet then drew nearer to Saragossa, which afforded a signal manifestation of Spanish obstinacy. Palafox had summoned to arms the vigorous and ardent portion of the inhabitants of Arragon. Pent up in the capital, it carried on a daily struggle from house to house, and wall to wall, disputing every inch of ground, and fighting man to man, notwithstanding the skill, the perseverance, the unbending valour of our soldiers, and of our undaunted sappers and engineers who led the way for them. The details of that memorable siege, to which no other can present a parallel, should be read in the account given of it by general Rogniat. On the 18th of February, the artillery opened a formidable and well combined fire against a convent of the suburb, which covered the entrance of the bridge. The capture of that point, of the whole suburb, and of its garrison, and our advance in another direction into the very heart of the town deprived the defenders of Saragossa of all further hope of relief or safety. The junta proposed a capitulation on the 21st of February: and was compelled to surrender at discretion. Marshal Lannes required it to take the new oath of alle-

glance, and Mariano Dominguez, the head of the junta, an old man full of energy, said upon taking it: *we have done our duty against you, by defending ourselves to the last extremity; we will henceforward keep our new engagements with no less constancy;* a highly honourable language, the sincerity of which was proved by his subsequent conduct.

It would be impossible correctly to describe the spectacle which was then presented by the unfortunate city of Saragossa. The hospitals could no longer admit any more sick or wounded. The burying grounds were too small for the number of dead carried thither; the corpses sewed up in cloth bags were lying by hundreds at the doors of the several churches. A contagious fever had created the most frightful ravages. The number of deaths in the interior of the city during the siege, including those who were killed by the enemy, has been estimated at upwards of forty thousand human beings.

With a view to take advantage of the terror and dejection to which the country was a prey in consequence of the fall of Saragossa, the adjutant commandant Fabre, chief of the staff of Suchet's division, was sent to Jaca with the 34th regiment; he took possession of that town, as well as of the citadel in the early part of the month of March. During the same month,

general Girard's divison drove the enemy from the left bank of the Cinca, and took possession of the fort of Monzon. At the end of April, the 6th corps received orders to resume the road to Castille, and proceeded through Burgos towards Valladolid. General Suchet was in full march with his division, when he received a courier which brought him orders to assume the chief command of the 3rd corps in the room of general Junot, duke d'Abrantes.

Suchet's division, the formation of which dated from the time of the camp at Boulogne, and which consisted of the 17th regiment of light infantry, and of the 34th 40th 64th and 88th regiments of infantry of the line, resembled in all respects a Roman legion; animated by one spirit, united under a chief to whom it was strongly attached, it had grown to be a well disciplined, a skilful, and an indefatigable body of men. It had taken a glorious share in the battles of Ulm, of Austerlitz, and of Iena, and being the advanced guard of the 5th corps, it had bore the brunt of the attacks at Saalfeld and at Pultusk. General Suchet felt the deepest regret at separating from it. With the view of protecting his return to Saragossa, he took with him the rear guard of his division, consisting of a company of skirmishers of the 40th regiment and of a battalion of the 64th, who proved of the greatest utility to him, not

only by their services, but also by the example of discipline and good order they exhibited to the 3rd corps, which was at that time wholly a stranger to that military spirit, of which it presented so perfect a model at a later period.

That corps d'armée, which had at first entered Spain under the denomination of the 2nd corps of the army of observation of the Gironde, had been trained under marshal Moncey in the best school for valour and good discipline, and had honourably distinguished itself at Madrid, before Valencia, as well as in Navarre. But the young soldiers of whom it was principally composed stood in need of fresh lessons of discipline and experience. The corps was originally formed of two veteran regiments, the 14th and 44th of the line, of a battalion of the 5th regiment of light infantry, of sixty companies of infantry of the depots of the army, organised into five legions, which were soon formed into the 114th, 115th, 116th, 117th and 121st regiments, and of fourteen squadrons of cavalry, in like manner converted into the 13th regiment of cuirassiers. It had afterwards been reinforced by a Polish legion, organised into three regiments, of two battalions each, called the 1st, 2nd and 3rd regiments of the Vistula, and by a squadron of Polish lancers. To these must be added the 4th re-

giment of hussars and the companies of engineers and artillery which had been collected in considerable numbers for the siege of Saragossa; they consisted of three companies of miners, six of sappers, eight of artillerymen, one of these being a company of horse artillery, and of eight companies of the train. The field artillery did not exceed twenty pieces of cannon.

The government seemed impressed with the idea that the whole strength of the 3rd corps did not fall far short of twenty thousand men. Nevertheless, the losses experienced during the siege, the great number of sick and wounded, the dispersion of the 121st regiment of the line and of the 3rd regiment of the Vistula over the surface of Navarre; and, above all, the removal of the 116th and 117th regiments which had been sent to Valladolid from Bayonne, where they had escorted a number of prisoners; these causes had actually reduced the number of fighting men then under arms, and available for service, to about 10,000 men, exclusively of the companies of artillery and engineers, as may be seen by the sketch of our situation towards the month of May, 1809.*

The 3rd corps had suffered considerably at the siege of Saragossa. The infantry was much

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 2

weakened; the newly formed regiments in particular were in a deplorable condition, owing to the defects necessarily attendant upon a recent and hasty organisation, and the inexperience of the soldiers who were young in the profession. Nearly all the men belonging to the artillery had left for Germany, and were replaced by others drawn from the infantry, and, generally speaking, very ill clad. The recruiting of the corps was incomplete; the pay was in arrears, the military chests were without funds, and the receiver of the province had fled; the means of subsistence were barely adequate to its wants; nor did there exist either magazines or establishments of any kind in the midst of a country wholly exhausted by the ravages of war.

In so discouraging a state of things, that army was far from compensating by its moral strength for the dangers to which it was exposed by its numerical weakness. White and blue uniforms of different shapes, which presented to the eye the offensive remains of a variety of alterations recently attempted to be introduced in the dress of the troops, actually occasioned in the ranks a confusion of colours which banished all sense of military consideration from the minds of an already desponding and weak soldiery. The appearance of misery degraded them in their own estimation, at the same time that it encouraged the pride

and boldness of a hostile population. They deeply lamented the state of destitution into which they had been thrown, and complained of an act of injustice from which their gallantry should have protected them. After having taken a principal share in the labours and dangers of the siege of Saragossa, they had seen the customary rewards bestowed upon soldiers of the 5th corps, whilst they alone had failed to receive such rewards; owing to an untoward misunderstanding between the chiefs. The unity of command was broken by the departure of marshal Lannes for Paris. A great number of general officers and others, who were anxious to be engaged in the campaign about to be opened in Austria, solicited and obtained the favour of proceeding to that country. The duke d'Abrantes himself had solicited leave of absence on the score of ill health.

General Suchet was aware of these circumstances, and the increase of difficulties which necessarily await a new chief, when he is unacquainted with the men he is appointed to command, was calculated to discourage the most undaunted spirit. This consideration would no doubt have justified, on the score of reason and of prudence, a refusal to take the command. Guided, however, by his zeal, and by a love of glory, satisfied moreover, that a failure of success is

not unattended with honour, when all the means which courage and perseverance are wont to supply have fallen short of their object, he did not shrink from the responsibility which was imposed upon him. Nevertheless, in taking charge of fresh troops, he felt anxious, before leading them into action, to pass them in review, to address and become acquainted with them, form them to his views, train them to military manœuvres, raise their moral courage, revive their confidence, and restore order and discipline amongst them. He had every reason to expect that the opportunity for so doing would not be wanting to him in the new position he was about to enter upon. Arragon, in fact, appeared to be subdued by the fall of its capital, under the ruins of which lie buried its choicest troops and inhabitants; every thing, therefore, presented an appearance, at least, of tranquillity in that quarter. Levies of troops had taken place at Valencia and in Catalonia, as well as in the other provinces; but hitherto their exertions had been confined to the defense of their respective territories. In Catalonia, the forces which the Spaniards had succeeded in organising were kept in check by the 7th corps of the French army. There did not exist, therefore, the slightest indication of the proximate entrance of a Spanish army into Arragon; and

general Suchet entertained the more hopes of being enabled to organise at leisure the 3rd corps, as the events subsequent to Napoleon's departure, the re-embarkation of the English at Corunna, and the battles of Medellin and of Valls had given to our affairs in general a favourable aspect throughout the Peninsula.

Notwithstanding, however, that the capture of Saragossa had, in the first instance, compelled Arragon to submit to us, our position in that province, so far from improving, was beginning to assume a dangerous turn; for the 3rd corps, which was already weak and insignificant in point of numbers, had again experienced a great reduction by the removal of the 5th regiment. The inhabitants, even when they did not resist us, were perseveringly bent upon counting our numbers.* They had quickly discovered the secret of our weakness, and the insurrectionary government was already preparing to take advantage

* In the month of January, 1809, a period when the national animosity against the French was at its height, a battalion of the 34th regiment of the line, belonging to Suchet's division, was sent from Calatayud to a neighbouring town for the mere purpose of reconnoitering, and with strict injunctions not to commit any act of hostility. It met, on its arrival, the inhabitants who, according to their custom, were basking in the sun outside the walls of the town, and, wrapped up in their cloaks, silently bent their looks upon the troop as it filed along. The chief of battalion on perceiving a numerous population col-

of it. General Blake received the command of the troops and provinces of the eastern part of the kingdom. Having collected, within a short space of time, a corps d'armée on the frontiers of Valencia, he flattered himself with the hope of defeating the 3rd French corps, of driving it back to Navarre and the Pyrenees, and advancing upon the grand line of communication from Bayonne to Madrid, in order to separate from their basis of operations the French armies which had penetrated into the heart of the Peninsula. The same void which was occasioned in Arragon by the departure of the 5th corps, had been felt all over Spain when the emperor returned to France with his guard, on his way to Germany. Engaged in a remote war against Austria, he was struggling with fortune at Essling, during the month of May, the very period when Sir Arthur

lected together, very prudently kept his troop under arms, sent for the alcalde, and after some preliminary arrangements, entered the town. On arriving at the alcalde's house, the commandant demanded provisions for his battalion. It was the general practice of officers to exaggerate a little their numerical strength, either with the view of over-awing, or of securing a more abundant supply for the detachment. He called for a thousand rations of provisions and a hundred rations of forage. *I am aware*, said the alcalde to him, *that I must supply rations to your troop; I shall order you to receive* 780 *rations of provisions and* 60 *rations of forage.* This was in fact the precise number of men and horses.

Wellesley was bringing the English army back to Portugal, and commencing operations with the view of driving us out of that country, and of afterwards attacking us in the heart of Spain. Blake was therefore seconded by circumstances, the effects of which were only developed at a later period. He did not venture upon an immediate attack of the French corps which defended Arragon; he prepared the way by again stirring up and arming the population. His efforts were crowned with a prompt and a widely extended success. Numerous partisans were organised on both banks of the Ebro, and commenced a petty warfare which unceasingly annoyed the 3rd corps in all its operations, and especially whilst it was engaged in any siege. General Suchet, therefore, though he afterwards succeeded in conquering far more formidable obstacles, had always to make head against those partial but annoying attacks, the origin of which dates from this period, and has its rise in the impulse then given to the nation at large.

When he arrived at Saragossa on the 19th of May, for the purpose of taking upon himself the chief command of the 3rd corps, the 1st division, which was established in a line running at right angles to the Ebro from Barbastro to Alcañiz, occupied along the Cinca and the Guadalupe, a line upwards of twenty leagues in extent. This line

divided in two by the stream which could be crossed by means of a bridge at Saragossa, that is to say, at a distance of twenty leagues in the rear, was still more dangerous by the vicinity of Mequinenza, a town defended by a Spanish garrison. The 2nd division occupied Saragossa and the adjoining country. The 3rd division which was partly employed in Navarre, had five of its battalions detached from the main body, and could afford no assistance in case of need.

The dispersion of the troops, over so weak a position, greatly favoured the views of general Blake, who bore down, towards the middle of May, upon the 1st division commanded by general Laval, drove back his advanced posts from Beceyte and Val de Alforja, forced him to quit Alcañiz on the 18th, and compelled him to retreat towards Sanper and Ixar. General Habert, who was stationed at Barbastro, having at the same time received orders from the duke d'Abrantes to recover possession of Monzon, which had been imprudently abandoned after the departure of the 5th corps, sent, on the 16th of May, eight companies of choice troops, and thirty cuirassiers to the left bank of the Cinca. One of those sudden risings so frequently occasioned by the melting of the snow, or by violent falls of rain, which have at all times made this a dangerous river, suddenly compromised the safety of the detachment, by separating it from Habert's

brigade; the cuirassiers alone succeeded in swimming back with their horses. The eight companies were surrounded by an armed population, and by regular troops from Lerida; and after gallantly fighting for three days, they found themselves without provisions or cartridges, or any means of retreating; and being considerably reduced in numbers, they laid down their arms and were taken prisoners.

This unpleasant intelligence reached the duke d'Abrantes at Saragossa, on the 20th of May, at the moment when he was surrendering the command of the 3rd corps to general Suchet. This new chief therefore found, on his first arrival, his army engaged in difficulties; his career opened with the very danger he had most apprehended; and he saw, as it were, every thing escaping from his grasp before he could lay hold of it. It became necessary to march, in the first instance, to the relief of general Laval. Being invested with the chief command, general Suchet quitted Saragossa on the 21st of May, only leaving a few troops in the town for the purpose of maintaining order, of guarding the parks of artillery, and of securing the communications. He sent orders to general Habert to abandon the left bank of the Ebro, and to proceed to cross that river at Fuentes, so as to be made available as corps of reserve. He advanced in person, with the disposable part of the 2nd division, to-

wards the banks of the Guadalupe, and overtook Laval's division on the heights in the rear of Ixar. He soon perceived that those troops, being dejected by recent events, did not deem themselves safe in that position. Nevertheless, he passed all the corps in review, reminded them of the glory they had acquired in the trenches of Saragossa, and the hope which their native country placed in their valour: he announced to them his firm resolution, now that he had quitted one of the finest and most gallant divisions in the whole army, thenceforward to unite himself irretrievably to them by a common fate, to extricate them from the deplorable condition in which they appeared, and to leave no exertion untried that might be calculated to secure to them a glorious career for the future.

In his anxiety to lose no time in reconnoitring the enemy and trying the mettle of his own troops, he ordered the 1st and 2nd divisions to march in the night of the 22nd of May, and on the morning of the 23rd he appeared before Alcañiz, where Blake occupied a position at the head of his forces. In our approach we took an advanced guard of thirty men prisoners.

On a close examination of the position, it was hoped that by seizing upon the hill of Las Horcas, which from its situation before the defile of the bridge and the outlets of the town, covered the enemy's line, it would require no effort to silence

the wings, by which means we should take a great number of prisoners. Two movements were accordingly directed towards the extreme lines, in order to keep in check the forces of which they consisted and to engage their attention, whilst general Fabre at the head of the 114th of the line and the 1st regiment of the Vistula, advanced in a column of attack towards the hill which was defended by some pieces of artillery and a line of infantry. The troops, animated by the example of their chiefs, showed at first great steadiness, and, notwithstanding a brisk and murderous fire, they reached the foot of the hill. A broad ravine, which had lately been dug in this place, suddenly arrested the progress of the column, which soon began to waver and to fall back in a state of disorder. All efforts made to recall it to the charge proved ineffectual. The general suspended the action, and in sight of the enemy he rallied his troops within a short distance from the spot, on the line of ground where they had been drawn up previously to the attack. They maintained a calm attitude until evening, when they carried off the wounded, and at nightfall they retired, a battalion of the 64th regiment forming the rear-guard.

The non-success of this attack was tantamount to an absolute defeat in the eyes of troops, which were already a prey to fear and dejection. Nevertheless, it was not without its advantage for the

general who obtained, by means of a few prisoners taken in the morning, some information respecting the numbers and character of the troops against which he had to contend, his efforts having hitherto failed in acquiring any positive knowledge on this subject. In all other respects the attempt upon Alcañiz proved abortive, and we were compelled to resign to the enemy, independently of the moral effect attending a victory, an advantageous position which the slowness of our retrograde movement fortunately induced him not to relinquish for the prospect of harassing us in our retreat.

We had already distanced the Spaniards by nearly five leagues, when the 1st division, which formed the advance, was seized with a sudden panic. The terrified soldiers fancied that the enemy was close at their heels. The alarm rapidly spread under favour of the darkness; they fired upon each other and took to flight in the utmost confusion. Men, horses, caissons, and field-equipages were hurried along pell-mell towards the point of retreat, and reached the village of Sanper, to which the general-in-chief, who had been slightly wounded in the foot, was proceeding with the intention of establishing a camp. The light of day, however, had the effect of dispelling the phantoms which the night had created; the soldiers, ashamed of their cowardice, rallied again and resumed their ranks. The events of that

night and of the preceding day confirmed the general in the painful conviction that the moral character of the 3rd corps had received a severe shock. In his anxiety to repair it, he seized the opportunity of exercising one of those acts of severe and prompt justice which are from time to time called for in a camp life. A drummer had spread the cry of alarm, by declaring that he had seen the Spanish cavalry charging the 2nd regiment of the Vistula, and the latter surrendering to them. The arrival of that regiment proved the falsehood of his report. The drummer was brought before a military commission which was formed on the instant, and he was condemned to be shot in front of the army. This example proved quite sufficient, and order and tranquillity were immediately restored. After waiting two days for the enemy in front of La Puebla de Ixar, the army continued its movement of retreat to the very walls of Saragossa, where it took up a position on the 30th of May, six days after the unsuccessful attack upon Alcañiz.

Notwithstanding the perfect order and the slowness of our march, our retreat was, nevertheless, considered by the whole country as the prelude to our complete evacuation of Arragon. We were, in fact, involved in difficulties, which might be attended with consequences of the most decisive nature. The general in chief was a prey to a very painful state of uncer-

tainty as to the course which it was most advisable to adopt. Entertaining, as yet, very little confidence in his troops, he feared that if the enemy should make a rapid advance upon him, he might not have it in his power to resist any determined attack from forces so far superior in numbers. Nevertheless, if at the moment of his assuming the command, he evacuated Saragossa, the siege of which had been spoken of all over Europe, and exposed himself to compromise by his retreat the position of all the French armies in the centre of Spain, such a course of proceeding was equivalent to a complete defeat. He accordingly adopted the resolution which would most redound to his honour, and was most consistent with his character. Stopping before Saragossa, he concentrated his small army on that solitary point, the preservation of which was well worth the risk of a battle. He determined that if Blake allowed him some respite, he should there wait the arrival of the 116th and 117th regiments, which he was led to expect would shortly return to join him. The 1st division was placed in advance of the Carthusian convent of the Conception, the 2nd division on the heights of Monte-Torrero. The soldiers no longer quitted the camp; they were made to take up arms every morning at three o'clock, and they remained in a fighting position until the return of the reconnoitring parties which were

sent to look out for the enemy. The general in chief, who was engaged in the two-fold object of re-organizing his army and regulating its plan of defence, passed the regiments in review, and attended to the most trifling details of their accoutrements and their wants. He thus acquired a knowledge of the causes to which the bad spirit prevailing in some corps was to be ascribed, distributed praises and punishments, and dismissed a few officers for neglectful or culpable conduct. In the meanwhile, we were constructing intrenchments and redoubts on the Monte-Torrero, and along the canal; the castle was put in a state of defence, with a view to our retaining possession of it, even in the event of our evacuating the town. The suburb was barricadoed, the artillery and baggage which could be dispensed with were sent off to Tudela and Pampelona, as well as the sick and wounded, in order that the army should remain perfectly unfettered in its movements, whether it confined itself to manœuvring, or ran the hazard of a battle.

The inhabitants who kept a close watch upon us for the purpose of discovering our projects, drew no other inference from our movements, than that we were anxious to conceal our immediate retreat. The general, however, was fully rewarded for his exertions and penetrating foresight by the improvement which took place

in the moral character of the soldiery. Surprised at finding themselves the object of such assiduous attentions, at the frequency of the reviews, at the exercises at firing and the manœuvres on an extensive scale, which now engaged the greater portion of their time, as if they were in a profound peace, they felt at once the improvement of their condition, and the revival of their expiring sense of valour and self-importance. Their being recalled to discipline and good order, had the effect of restoring their confidence in each other and in their chiefs. Fifteen days thus employed, whilst the troops were on the alert, and expecting every moment to be called into action, proved sufficient to accomplish this metamorphosis, and placed the 3rd corps in a condition to march up to the enemy and attack him in the open plain, instead of watching his approach under protection of their lines of defence.

If general Blake had moved rapidly forward after the action of Alcañiz, without allowing time for the 3rd corps to recover from its defeat, he would, perhaps, have compelled it to evacuate Arragon. It is probable, however, that this general was unwilling, by too much precipitancy, to compromise a success which he considered as almost infallible. He was expecting some reinforcements from Valencia, and with a view to promote his intended operation, he accelerated on

various points the breaking out of local insurrections. In consequence of the impulse thus given by him, colonel Ramon-Gayan approached Almunia and the valley of the Xalon with two thousand men. Brigadier-general Perena who had been defeated four months before, had reappeared with his troops, and pushed detachments forward as far as the bridge of the Gallego. On the left bank of the Ebro, we only occupied the fort of Jaca and the suburb of Saragossa. General Blake did not determine upon the movements he should adopt until the beginning of June, when he put his army in motion. Instead of advancing along the Ebro by the road of Fuentes, he proceeded towards Belchite at the head of twenty-five thousand men. He felt convinced that the troops which had been defeated at Alcañiz would decline fighting before Saragossa, and that by approaching the valley of the Huerba, and threatening the road of Alagon, he would compel us to retreat. Such, however, was not the intention of general Suchet, who waited for his antagonist; leaving his cavalry for the present at El Burgo, he divided his infantry between Monte-Torrero, and the convent of Santa-Fé on the road from Saragossa to Madrid; and detached a body of twelve hundred men to Villa-de-Muel, under the orders of general Fabre, for the purpose of scouring the country to the right of the army, and obtaining timely information of

the grand movement which the enemy indicated an intention of carrying into effect.

The main body of the Spanish army, under the orders of lieutenant general Arizaga, took up a position at Botorita on the 13th of June, whilst general Blake, the commander in chief, moved with the remainder of his forces from Cariñena to Longarès and Villa-de-Muel, which were occupied by general Fabre. On crossing the Huerba, general Arizaga captured a convoy of provisions and cut off general Fabre from Saragossa; the latter being attacked in two different quarters at the same time, opposed as much resistance as his position allowed him, and effected his retreat upon Placencia without experiencing any loss. General Suchet ordered the 2nd division, commanded by general Musnier, to advance to the support of general Fabre, but the approach of night prevented him from extricating that officer and restoring the communication. On the 14th, Musnier's division again attacked the enemy's advanced guard, compelled it to re-cross the Huerba, and was preparing to pursue it in order to seize upon the position of Botorita, when it was compelled to retire, owing to the arrival of the forces from Villa-de-Muel under Blake's immediate orders. The main body of the Spanish army having crossed to the left bank of the Huerba, and threatened our line of retreat, it now became necessary to arrest its progress;

general Suchet accordingly determined to oppose him, and adopted for the action of the 15th a new order of battle. The 44th regiment and the 3rd of the Vistula, remained in the camp of Monte-Torrero. Habert's division and the 2nd division were drawn up in a line, and encamped partly at the convent of Santa-Fé, partly on the heights to the right. The battalion of the 64th regiment was stationed in the rear upon the main road; this reserve of veteran soldiers, of the old division of general Suchet, though weak in point of numbers, maintained by its steady attitude and discipline, an imposing appearance in the midst of the 3rd corps. The brigade of cavalry commanded by general Wattier was placed contiguous to it. An officer was sent off to Alagon the same night, for the purpose of accelerating the return on the next morning of general Fabre, who on leaving Placentia, had descended the banks of the Xalon, and of hastening the march of the 116th and 117th regiments, which were on their way from Tudela to join the army.

The battle was about to commence almost under the walls of Saragossa. It was of the utmost consequence that the command of that important city should be confided to an officer of acknowledged merit, whose vigour and firmness of character might make up for the inadequacy of the troops left under his orders, with a view to prevent all popular movements, and arrest the pro-

gress of the Spanish corps on the left bank. The general-in-chief selected colonel Haxo of the engineers who had displayed great military talents during the siege of that city. He placed at his disposal the several corps of engineers, and a thousand infantry.

On the 15th of June, general Blake deployed his army in front of the small rivulet, over which runs the main road, by means of a bridge near the village of Maria; his right extended to the Huerba, of which he occupied the banks, and prolonged his centre and left as far as the heights, which he lined with infantry and artillery. These arrangements were slowly carried into effect; and although the two armies were at a very short distance from each other, the morning was consumed in a mere firing of advanced posts which was kept up by the 2nd regiment of the Vistula, and afterwards by the 115th regiment, until noon-day. General Suchet, who only sought to gain time until the arrival of his two detachments, shewed no impatience to commence the action. General Laval's two regiments on the Monte-Torrero, which was separated by the Huerba from the field of battle, were considered as a detached corps, and so kept for the purpose of watching the road to Fuentes. Our safety depended in some measure on their retaining possession of the commanding point which they occupied; for if the enemy had seized upon it,

Haxo commanded the engineers at the Seige of Antwerp Dec^r 1832

the presence of the latter would have sufficed to drive the population of Saragossa to arms, and place us in a most dangerous position. Thus it happened, that from the nature of the ground, and in spite of the measures which he had long been planning with the view of collecting his scattered forces, the general-in-chief found himself compelled to run the risk of a pitched battle, with thirteen battalions of infantry, seven squadrons of cavalry, and twelve pieces of cannon, forming together a force of less than nine thousand men. He was at last apprised towards noon, that colonel Robert had reached the neighbourhood of Saragossa, with the 116th and 117th regiments; and he sent him instructions to proceed without halting towards the convent of Santa-Fé. He immediately ordered the first reserve to advance and form into line, and general Wattier was brought nearer to the left, commanded by general Habert. Musnier's division was spread upon the heights, forming the centre and right, the extremity of which was flanked by the squadron of lancers under the orders of the Polish colonel Kliski. The general-in-chief, finding that the enemy remained motionless in his position, had hitherto allowed a part of his troops to take rest, and the horses to be kept unbridled, in order to increase the confidence of his small army, which was beginning to long for the battle, and demanded to be led to the charge.

The order for attacking was given at two o'clock. The movement commenced along the whole line, at the very instant when the Spanish army put itself in motion, and extended its left as if with the intention to outflank us. General Suchet proceeded at once to the extreme right, for the purpose of preventing this manœuvre; he detached the lancers and two hundred skirmishers to the flank, whilst a battalion of the 114th marched direct upon the enemy in a column of attack. Their charge threw into disorder the Spanish battalions, which were just putting themselves in motion; they fell back upon their line of battle, and had only time to assume an attitude of defense. The general-in-chief did not hesitate a moment in causing an immediate attack upon the whole left and centre of general Blake. The contending armies were separated by a ravine, which Musnier's division had orders to cross without firing, and with their arms shouldered. Colonel Chlopiski, at the head of the 1st regiment of the Vistula, formed in columns, forthwith marched up to the steep position of the Spaniards; the 114th and 115th regiments, which had deployed, made a similar movement under a murderous fire of artillery, which colonel Valée vigorously returned.* General Blake not

* General Valée commanded at that time the artillery of the 3rd corps, with the rank of colonel.

only sustained the attack, but drew reinforcements from his right, and moved his line forward against the 115th regiment, which the obstacles of the ground towards the centre, and the violence of the enemy's line had compelled to stop. The efforts of general Boussard and colonel Dupeyroux succeeded in rekindling its ardour. The general-in-chief sent forward the 2nd regiment of the Vistula, and the battalion of the 64th regiment, without, however, bringing them into close action. He detached general Harispe, his chief of the staff, with a hundred grenadiers; that officer rushed into the ravine, and though wounded in the first onset, he brought his soldiers back to the charge, and restored the chances of the battle. A violent storm, which had burst over the two armies, almost concealed them from each other, though they were a very short distance apart.

The movement attempted by general Blake on his extreme left, and the charge just made on the centre of the Spaniards, though apparently fortuitous and the effect of mere chance, were highly favourable to the views of the general in chief. On considering the plan of the battle, it will appear that the Spanish general, by establishing himself on the heights sloping down to the left bank of the Huerba, with ravines in his front and rear, had no means of retreat, if his positions should be forced, except by the road and the little

bridge of Maria behind the extreme right of his line, thus evidently compromising the safety of his left and centre, and in particular of the artillery with which they were lined. This defective arrangement on the part of the enemy naturally pointed out the course we had to adopt. General Suchet feigned at first to neglect his left, and even avoided a display of the cavalry he was collecting on that point, whilst his centre and right were engaged. He no sooner found the contest in this quarter at its height, than he rapidly flew to the left. The Spanish cavalry, supported by a battery and by a small body of infantry, was stationed beyond the bridge. He ordered general Habert to send forward the 14th regiment of the line, preceded by the battalion of the 5th light regiment as riflemen. He then suddenly directed general Wattier, who commanded the 4th hussars and the 13th regiment of cuirassiers to gain the start of the infantry, make a rapid charge, drive in the enemy's right, and take possession of the bridge. This manœuvre could not fail to be decisive of the contest, and it was executed with the quickness of lightning. The Spaniards being thrown into disorder by the suddenness of the shock, took to flight, and their cavalry was completely routed. We remained masters of the ground, the bridge and the battery. Although deprived of the assistance of his right, general Blake did not abandon his position Col-

lecting his masses of infantry and redoubling the fire of his artillery, he boldly stood his ground and waited the attack which he saw was preparing against him. General Suchet profited by the advantage he had just obtained on the flank of the enemy's last position. He sent general Habert against him in an oblique direction with the battalion of the 5th light regiment and the 14th of the line, whilst Musnier's division advanced in front to the charge. The contest was severe and obstinately maintained; but when French soldiers are once borne on the wing of victory, it is difficult to resist them. The enemy's infantry was driven back; it rushed into the ravines, and eluded our pursuit under favour of the darkness and of the raging storm. Twenty-five pieces of cannon and three standards fell into our possession. General Blake succeeded, notwithstanding the natural obstacles of the ground, in reaching the banks of the Huerba, and rallying the fugitives at Botorita, leaving a greater number of killed than of prisoners behind him. Amongst the latter was general O'Donohu, who commanded the cavalry, and colonel Menchaca, inspector of the infantry. Our loss consisted of about six or seven hundred killed and wounded. General Harispe's wound deprived the army for some time of the services of that gallant officer, who already held the rank of chief of the staff of the army.

The enemy having completely retreated during

the night, the general in chief felt desirous of immediately availing himself of those troops whose only duty during the battle had been to occupy the Monte-Torrero, and to display from a distance to the hostile general that he could dispose of another corps of reserve against him. He sent orders to general Laval to move forward to Torrecilla by the plateau of Fuentes, for the purpose of threatening the enemy's rear guard. The general in chief came the same night to Saragossa in order to direct some important arrangements in that city, from which it was his intention to absent himself for a short time. At night, the city was surrounded at a distance by Perena's bivouacs on the left bank of the Ebro, this officer having imagined that he could by mere demonstration promote the success of his cause and of the engagement; but the inhabitants who during the action had exhibited no other feeling than one of mere curiosity, altogether free from agitation or hostile indications, remained in a state of tranquillity and obedience, a prudent deportment on their part, from which they never swerved on any future occasion.

On the morning of the 16th, general Suchet beheld with surprise the army of general Blake still occupying its position at Botorita. Being still sanguine in his expectations of the effect which general Laval's march was calculated to produce, he reiterated his instructions to that

officer; and in order to second him, he confined himself to the object of diverting the enemy's attention by movements on the left of the Huerba, approaching his position without attacking him, and pushing forward detachments on the road of Villa-de-Muel and Cariñena. He thus acquired a certainty that no Spanish corps had retreated in that direction. This was an additional motive for expecting the result which he had anticipated from his manœuvre. General Laval, however, having been led astray by improper guides, found it impossible to reach the appointed spot on the 16th. Blake broke up his camp the following night, and his rear guard alone could be come up with at Tordecilla on the 17th; general Laval took a battalion of marines and a few camp-equipages. The general-in-chief commenced in person the pursuit of Blake on the morning of the 17th, and pushed on as far as Puebla d'Alborton. On the 18th in the morning, the two armies were again in presence of each other at Belchite. They immediately prepared for action; but their respective situations were greatly altered both in regard to their *materiel* and to the moral character of the soldiers. General Blake found himself compelled, after the loss of his artillery, to abandon all idea of conquering Saragossa, and was now on the point of fighting to secure his retreat. General Suchet having been enabled to assemble the greater part of his forces, presented himself

to the contest with twenty-two battalions and eight squadrons animated by their recent victory; he aimed at destroying, or dispersing at least, the enemy's army, with a view to complete his victory and to remain in undisturbed possession of Arragon.

Blake having been reinforced in the night by four thousand men of the army at Valencia, had taken up a position on the heights of Belchite. His right was stationed towards the height of the Calvario, with some cavalry in front in the direction of the road to Saragossa; his centre leaned upon the town and the convent of Santa-Barbara; his left extended across the heights towards the hermitage of El Poyo in several lines, with reserves in the rear and some pieces of artillery regularly drawn up. Those lines were connected by barns, loop holed houses and intrenchments. The whole ground in advance of our front, and especially of our centre, was lined with olive trees intersected by ditches and canals for irrigation which rendered it of difficult access. General Suchet deemed it sufficient to cause the centre to be watched by light troops supported by a few reserve battalions; he directed Habert's brigade and the 13th regiment of cuirassiers to turn, from a distance, the enemy's right between Codo and Belchite, and personally superintended the main attack against the left. General Musnier received orders to

march in columns by battalion, and to charge as soon as the artillery should have made an impression upon the line. This movement was executed by the 114th regiment, the 1st of the Vistula and the 4th hussars, whilst the 115th was advancing still further to the left. The Spaniards abandoned the hermitage of El Poyo; their wing retired in a body and took up a concentrated position round Belchite and Santa Barbara. They now opened a brisk fire of artillery; formed themselves into imposing columns of attack and with the support of their cavalry they advanced to meet us. General Wattier, however, succeeded in checking their movement, and general Musnier resolutely persisted in bearing down upon the infantry. The action was gradually becoming obstinate on both sides, when two pieces of our light artillery, which lieutenant Auvray had brought forward, directed their fire against the artillery of the enemy's army, with so much boldness and precision, that a howitzer shell falling upon a caisson set fire to it. Several caissons blew up, and spread terror in the Spanish ranks; the flight of one battalion caused the retreat of the remainder. Both wings followed the example of the centre, rushed through Belchite, and precipitately fled in the utmost confusion through the plains beyond the town. The defile leading to it, and the distance of the cuirassiers, who had not yet had time to come up

by the left, prevented our taking advantage of this dispersion of the enemy, or taking a considerable number of prisoners. The 1st regiment of Valencia was the only corps which succeeded in rallying at the distance of two leagues from the field of battle; it was instantly charged and taken prisoner. Nine pieces of cannon, which were the only artillery remaining to the Spanish army, a standard, twenty three caissons, and a quantity of small arms and baggage fell into our power. General Blake's army was completely dispersed.

On the following day, the 19th, we occupied Calanda, Alcañiz and Caspe, where we found stores and provisions in abundance. The general in chief sent four columns in pursuit of the enemy in all directions; one of these approached Tortosa, another entered Morella, a town situated in the kingdom of Valencia. General Musnier was left in command of the troops on the Guadalupe, with orders to place the castle of Alcañiz in a state of defense.

The general-in-chief crossed the Ebro at Caspe on the 23rd of June, caused a reconnoitring to be made in the environs of Mequinenza, advanced upon Fraga, crossed the Cinca, and took possession of the fort of Monzon. Another reconnoitring was also affected in the direction of Merida; which so alarmed its governor that he shut himself up in the place, at the very moment

when, according to common report, he was preparing to proceed to the relief of Gerona; the danger, with which he was now threatened, compelled him to renounce all idea of a distant operation, and to confine himself to the defense of his post. General Habert remained on the Cinca with the 3rd division.

The general-in-chief having completed these military arrangements, which were intended to protect the 3rd corps from danger, and to promote the success of his future operations, he crowned them by a first attempt at introducing a system of justice and moderation, which he calculated would enable him, whilst he held possession of Arragon, to subdue the animosity of its population. He exerted himself at Alcañiz and Caspe, two influential towns on the right bank, to calm the apprehensions of the inhabitants, and to hold out to them a prospect of future prosperity after the unavoidable disorders of a state of warfare, from which they were about to emerge. The same language and conduct were productive of a salutary effect at Barbastro and Huesca, chief towns of the principal corregimientos on the left bank, through which he passed on his way back to Saragossa. In this capital, in particular, he endeavoured to pave the way for the success of his plans by the most cautious conduct. The clergy, the public authorities, and a crowd of inhabitants, came to meet him at the bridge of

the Gallego, and received him with every demonstration of joy and confidence. Rejoicings spontaneously took place in this city during several successive days; an unlooked for spectacle, well worthy of attracting attention, occurring as it did in the midst of the ruins of a siege, still exhibiting its appalling effects in every direction. In the principal street, along the Cosso, were heaped and guarded the guns lately belonging to Blake's army, and now become the trophies of the battles fought at Maria and Belchite. This sight, which was calculated to impose upon ardent imaginations, was tempered by the no less imposing spectacle of the religious ceremonies which were celebrated in all their splendour in the venerated church del Pilar; and the general-in-chief made it his duty to contribute to it by the pomp of military display. This harmony had the effect of impressing the inhabitants with the idea that all further resistance on their part would be unavailing, and that it behoved them to submit to a regular order of things, which held out a prospect of peace and security. Upon these sentiments of the inhabitants of Saragossa general Suchet built his hopes of improving the condition of the 3rd corps d'armée and of Arragon itself.

CHAPTER II

View of the condition of Spain.—Organization of the Guerillas.—Various engagements.—Actions fought at San Juan de la Peña and at Nuestra Señora del Tremedal.—Capture of Venasque.—Successive occupation of Arragon.

General Suchet having returned to Saragossa on the 1st of July, he bent his endeavours, within the limits of his command, to the object of availing himself of the local and still recent influence created by the events which have just been related. But his efforts were counteracted by the general reaction of the public mind throughout the Peninsula. The Spaniards are, of all men, the most susceptible of excited feelings, consequently the most credulous, and at the same time the most prone to doubt or disbelieve; they readily placed dependence upon reports, and as readily rejected them according as they favoured or ran counter to their hopes and wishes. The candid account given by general Blake of his defeat at Belchite, compelled them to admit that the French had just obtained a

signal success in Arragon. The central junta of Seville attempted to revive the spirits of the nation by accounts of a more cheering nature. The victory of Eckmülh, the capture of Ratisbon and of Vienna had failed to make due impression; but the battle of Essling, the breaking down of the bridges on the Danube, and the necessity in which the French army was placed of halting on the bank of that river, afforded, as they alleged, a sure presage of its proximate and unavoidable destruction. At the same period of time, and on a less distant scene of action, the successive evacuation of Portugal, Gallicia and Asturias, the hope of recovering possession of Madrid, and the combined march of the English and Spanish armies for the purpose of effecting a junction on the banks of the Tagus, excited the Spaniards to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and accelerated the organization of the numerous levies which were arming against us in every part of the Spanish Peninsula.

The victories of Maria and Belchite had not wholly eradicated from Arragon the effect produced in that province by the circumstances just adverted to. Blake's army had disappeared; his *materiel* and magazines had fallen into our hands; he had no longer any grand dépôt or point of junction. It must, however, be admitted that, notwithstanding its numerical strength, and the great pains bestowed to the object of

giving it a formidable appearance, that army was a mere auxiliary in the cause it came to defend; and the insurrection, profiting by the losses of the regular army, soon became far more dangerous to the enemy. The remains of Blake's army having returned home or dispersed itself through the country, served to keep up and reinforce the Guerilla bands already formed, which were thus recruited by the accession of experienced officers and of well-trained soldiers. They re-appeared more formidable and numerous than before: armed bands, the existence of which was hitherto unknown, sprung up amongst the mountains of Calatayud, and in the defiles adjoining Huesca and Barbastro. There it was that this new system of resistance was brought into action in the north of Spain, which was afterwards so skilfully wielded by some of its chiefs, and which defended the country in a far more effectual manner than the regular war carried on by disciplined armies, because it was more consistent with the nature of the country and the character of its inhabitants. This is a truth which the geographical form of Spain places beyond a doubt, and which is borne out by her history from the time of Sertorius to the present day.

Considered in a geographical and physical point of view, Spain is in many respects as much connected with Africa as with Europe;

there can exist no doubt of the fact, when glancing at a map of the Mediterranean we behold near the peninsulas of Greece and of Italy the Spanish Peninsula stretching out her hand as it were, to join the extreme point of Africa, which seems to be a mere continuation of the territory of Spain, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of names and the strait which separates them. On consulting all historical accounts, it will be seen that the fate of both countries presents a resemblance no less striking than their territory. The Romans went so far as to confound them under a common denomination. That portion of Africa which borrowed from *Tingis* (*Tangier*) the name of *Tingitana*, has sometimes received the appellation of *Hispania transfretana* (Spain beyond the strait). The Phœnicians and Carthagenians were attracted from Africa by the wealth of Bœtica; the Vandals, who are said to have left their name to the province of Andalusia, and afterwards the Goths crossed the strait for the purpose of establishing themselves on the opposite coast of Africa; and, at a later period, the Moors or Saracens again brought rulers from Africa to exercise their sway over Spain, from whence they were banished by the last revolution which that country underwent less than three centuries ago.

If we next direct our attention to those countries, not as they formerly were, but as they are

at the present day, we cannot avoid discovering many traits of resemblance between them. Through the difference which the religion, the government, and the laws have created in the manners, the costume, and the language of their respective inhabitants, we find that the physical and terrestial affinities, the soil, the water, the system of agriculture are still the same in two neighbouring countries which a long series of events have estranged from each other. Thus it is, that the same burning sun parches the coast of Barbary, as well as Andalusia, and the Algarves. The mountains, barren of trees, no longer attract the clouds or storms. The plains, and frequently the vallies, are visited with droughts. It is no doubt true, that wherever the ressources of art have been combined with fertilising streams, the result has been highly successful in bringing forth abundant harvests. Adjoining these fertile tracts, however, we find immense deserts, or else *desplobados*,* the extent of which the eye vainly attempts to measure ; and the mind gives way to despondency at the aspect of a space equally barren and dreary in every direction. If we proceed to the summit of some of those mountains which traverse Spain from one

* Depopulated spots of ground are so common in Spain, that the inhabitants have a substantive, which specially defines them; they call them *despoblados*.

extremity to the other, we find under a constantly burning sun, high lands devoid of culture, and barren slopes, of which no animated object ever breaks the uniformity. Nothing arrests the eye except a river or a brook, which is seen in the distance winding its course at the bottom of a valley, and is lined with a verdant border, along which the beholder traces the crops, the plantations and the dwellings of man. A coloured map representing the form of every valley, the blue waters, the borders of rivers lined with a green tint of varied breadth, would exhibit a faithful picture, and point out the real condition of that territory, which, although nearly equal in extent to France, scarcely contains and supports a third part of our population. One might thus embrace at a glance, and, as if by anatomical process, the veins and arteries of that immense body, which, though lacking plumpness, still retains all its nerves and muscles, if such a comparison may be allowed, and presents in its structure a work evidently formed for grace and vigour.

The Spanish peninsula, in fact, leaning as it does upon solid foundations, is covered with lofty chains of mountains extending in all directions, and appears like a vast promontory between the two seas that wash its shores. Gently declining towards the east and west, it naturally divides itself into two unequal slopes, the one to-

wards the Ebro, and a few small rivers flowing in the direction of the Mediterranean, the other carrying to the ocean, the waters of the Guadalquivir, the Guadiana, the Tagus and the Douro. Proceeding inland from the sea-shore, some low plains of admirable fertility and cultivation, form the basis of this amphitheatre. One ascends through vallies cultivated as *huertas* below the waters, and as *secanos* above them,* thus reaching the first chain of mountains. Beyond these mountains, however, there is no descending as usual into a valley; one enters into immense plains supported by the internal plateau of country. Whole provinces, the two Castilles, La Mancha, and all the centre of Spain, are placed in that elevated region. The centre is further crowned by other chains, bearing to the very clouds their snow-capt tops, which a summer of six months' duration will not always melt away.

The result of this conformation is, that the waters must sink deep into the ground, before they can

* Water is valuable in Spain, owing to its great scarcity. Almost every brook has been turned from its course, for purposes of irrigation. The lower parts of the land take the name of *huertas*, (gardens;) they are principally used for the cultivation of rice, Indian corn, olive-trees, &c. But owing to the fertility of the soil, and the genial warmth of the climate, advantage is taken of many parts of the country not susceptible of being watered, which are called *secanos* (dry fields;) these are reserved for corn, vines, &c.

force their way to the sea. Whilst the rivers in the north of Europe reach their mouths after a long course through the country, and across lakes and swamps, the rivers in Spain, together with the streams flowing into them, rush down by rapid descents from deep and rugged gullies, presenting picturesque and wild scenery, and narrow and difficult passes at every step of their progress. It is impossible to travel the distance of a few leagues in that country, without meeting one or many of those defiles, like the Thermopilæ, or the Caudine forks, in which two or three hundred men would be sufficient to arrest the march of whole armies. The ravines are generally dry, and yet impassable. The large rivers present no means of communication; navigation is frequently interrupted by various obstructions. A few canals, dug in the midst of popular opposition,* are seldom used except for purposes of

* In Arragon, the canon Pignatelli, a man of comprehensive views and of elevated mind, formed the plan, during the last century, of completing the canal called the imperial canal, which was first commenced by Charles V, and which he afterwards abandoned. This canal was intended to be supplied by the waters of the Ebro, taken on the right bank below Tudela in Navarre, and was to convey them along the barren hillocks which border the valley of the river, as far as Caspe, where the mountains approach each other, and prevent the continuation of a lateral canal. The result would have been an increase in the means of irrigation, and moreover, an easy mode of conveyance for exporting the produce of Arragon,

irrigation. Two royal main roads, connected by a small number of inferior causeways, run from the capital to Bayonne, Valencia, and Barcelona. They cross over streams and brooks by means of handsome bridges, and are neither injured by the rains nor by the rolling of vehicles, in a country

or importing that of Catalonia, Castille and Navarre, an incalculable advantage in a country where the most useful commodities often lose their value for want of means of sale. The utility of such a plan stands not in need of demonstration to the man who has the simplest notions of agriculture, of commerce, or of political economy. Nevertheless, its execution was opposed in every way by numberless obstacles, by clamour, prejudices, and calumny. Pignatelli, the friend of a minister, (count d'Aranda,) who, like himself, was a native of Arragon, and yielded not to him in his anxiety and zeal for the public welfare, stood in need of protection, and of the utmost perseverance to avoid being discouraged, and to bring his vast undertaking to a successful close. He had the satisfaction of finishing the canal, the bridges, the sluices, the drains, as far as Saragossa, in other words, of realising one half of his plan. The Spanish Riquet embarked at the *Bocal*, a spacious basin where the river is turned from its course. During the whole of his voyage, he beheld waters issuing from the canal, and spreading life and abundance in the country about the Ebro; and with his boat, a perfect triumphal car, he reached the *Casa Blanca*, a handsome large mill, standing at the same elevation with the Monte-Torrero, above Saragossa. On arriving at that spot, he erected a fountain on the main road, with the following inscription, which I still read at the commencement of the siege of Saragossa, but which I afterwards sought for in vain:—*Viatorum commodo, et incredulorum convictioni.*

where every thing is transported on the backs of mules, and where the service of post horses is scarcely known. In every other direction, the communications are extremely difficult, the provinces are isolated from each other, the towns and villages separated by immense distances, and built upon heights, or inclosed within walls, surrounded by splendid forests of olive-trees, but rarely by cottages or country houses. Whole tracts of land are covered with broom and heath. Those uncultivated spots serve, no doubt, to feed immense flocks of sheep, whose fine wool is a source of wealth to the Spaniards, though they can only render it available by the aid of foreign industry; but the really useful cultivation, that which contributes to support and increase the population, is confined within very narrow limits. The hand of man disdains to plant; combustible materials are wanting in the midst of numberless and still unexplored coal-mines; and in a fertile country which is favourable to every species of production, and where the numerous poor are without means of subsistance, the potatoe is neglected; nor is any attempt ever made to introduce, or propagate it.

It will readily be admitted that a country so peculiarly adapted to a defensive warfare, inhabited as it is, by men no less remarkable for their active and sober habits than for their courage and intelligence, can with difficulty be conquered.

Various nations have successively invaded it. History exhibits them seizing upon Spain after long and sanguinary wars, establishing their dominion on various points, without being able wholly to subdue the Spaniards, and defeated at last, or driven out as much by the constancy of the inhabitants as by the usual inconstancy of fortune.

The spirit of the ancient Celtiberians still animated their descendants, when the emperor Napoleon, after having wounded their pride, attempted to conquer their obedience. It is well known that a people determined to defend themselves on their own soil present a mass of strength and a power of opinion, the absence of which would prevent hastily formed armies from offering any effectual resistance to an invading power. The armed and disciplined youth sustained with steady constancy a national struggle against the French armies on fields of battle and especially in besieged towns. But the greater part of the population, sometimes without any distinction of age or of sex, embarked in that active and obstinate species of contest which brought enemies upon us in all directions and exhausted us far more than regular engagements. Each district formed as it were its own Guerilla for the purpose of protecting its territory and co-operating in the common defence. Peasants, land owners, fathers of families, priests and monks, unhesitatingly abandoned their dwell-

ings in which the greater part scarcely enjoyed more of the comforts of life than in the open country, in order to swell the Guerilla bands that were forming against us. Prepared to undergo every sacrifice, free from the wants of a luxurious life as well as from the attachment so generally felt for uniforms, for the mode of service or the peculiar nature of the weapons, they met in irregular bodies, selected their own chiefs, carried on operations according as their caprice dictated, never failed to attack when numbers and a favorable opportunity promised them success, fled without disgrace when they were the weakest, and occasionally, by a general dispersion planned before hand disappeared, so that it became difficult to discover any trace of them. These Guerilla parties naturally fell under the controul of a few enterprising chiefs, the remains of the numerous smugglers who covered the frontiers of each province of Spain. This is one of the traits of the national character which their celebrated Cervantes had no hesitation in pointing out as peculiar to them. The habit of bearing arms and of using them on the high roads too often made robbery an auxiliary to patriotism, and led us, with some colouring of justice, to confound them under the same denomination and in the same predicament when they violated the laws of humanity and of nations. We must acknowledge,

however, that the chiefs of the Spanish army made it a point to repress the excesses of these bands and punish them with as much rigour as it was in their power to exercise towards them.

Their isolated efforts were sufficient, seriously, to molest the 3rd corps in its occupation of Arragon. They assumed a greater degree of activity and became more formidable to us by the common impulse which was given to them. The insurrectionary juntas of the provinces and the central government assumed a controul over them, and ably combined their movements so as to render their services still more available to the common cause. General Suchet having established his forces on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, as well as in Saragossa, felt it necessary to take a wider range in order to occupy and organize the country. But his authority being confined within a small circle around those points, met with obstacles in every direction.

The corps of colonel Ramon-Gayan, as well as the one which had been raised in the principality of Molina had united, and occupied the valley of the Xiloca, Daroca, the mountains of Montalvan, and the environs of Cariñena. The advanced guard had stationed itself at the convent of Nuestra Señora del Aguila, near Paniza, at the distance of seven or eight leagues from Saragossa. A camp for three thousand men surrounded that spacious edifice placed as an eagle's

nest at the summit of a high mountain; it was intrenched, loopholed and barricadoed, and was provided with considerable supplies of ammunition and provisions. Aranda and Calcena at the foot of the Moncayo also became points of junction for those bands which infested Tarragona, the valley of the Ebro, and our line of communication with Navarre. A French regiment which had been for a long time in possession of Soria, had at first kept the country in check to a certain distance; but it was recalled to Madrid, and the regiments of Soria and of the Princeza, having been detached from the corps of La Romana, came to establish and organise themselves in the vicinity of Calatayud. Their force did not amount to less than three thousand men who became the nucleus of the corps of Villacampa, an active Guerilla leader who maintained himself in Arragon during nearly the whole war.

The bands which had formed on the left bank of the Ebro were perhaps more dangerous still. The insurrection of the upper vallies of Arragon which prided themselves in never having been conquered, was planned with a view to facilitate general Blake's operations. They had received money, arms and proclamations. The forced recruitings, the junction of several scattered bands, and the arrival of many officers sent from Lerida to command them, gave a character of steadiness to those armaments. One of these officers was

Renovalès, who after signalising himself in the defense of Buenos Ayres against the English, had recently been taken prisoner in the assault of St. Joseph during the siege of Saragossa. Whilst they were conducting him into France, he deserted from Pampelona where at his own request he had been allowed to stop, and was left free on his parole. He repaired to Lerida and obtained the command of all the vallies to the westward of Jaca. In organising that insurrection, he displayed all the activity and zeal which an officer could bestow on a cause in behalf of which he had not hesitated to break his word of honor. The convent of San Juan de la Peña, situated in a formidable position, became a principal dépôt which the enemy endeavoured to protect with intrenchments, and which served as a rallying point for all the bands of the neighbourhood of Jaca. To the eastward of this place, towards the frontiers of Catalonia, colonels Perena, Pedroza, Baget, Sarraza, and father Theobaldo were posted with their troops upon the mountains above Huesca and Barbastro and in the vicinity of the Cinca, thus surrounding, although at a distance, our camps or cantonments; and communicating with the marquis de Lavalle the governor of Lerida.

These numerous bands, spread over so vast a circumference, began to operate in a simultaneous and uniform manner. They destroyed our strag-

glers, and frequently even our detachments when they were in small numbers and off their guard; they spread terror throughout the country, harrassed our partisans, compelled all young men to re-enlist in the Spanish armies, intercepted the couriers, arrested the convoys, and obstructed the return of the contributions or provisions we had raised. On the approach of our troops, those bands withdrew without fighting, so that they made their appearance at every spot we did not occupy, and offered no opportunity for making a serious attack upon them in any position; there existed no means of coming up with or even seeing them, unless we could succeed in taking them by surprise.

The numerical weakness of the 3rd corps, which had no means of repairing its daily losses, gave additional activity to the daily increasing influence of the insurgents. A reinforcement of fresh troops would from that moment have been requisite to repress that dangerous spirit, but the government of Madrid was equally in need of troops, and looked for them in vain; it was not in a condition to relieve the threatened provinces. Though alarmed at Blake's movement upon Arragon in the months of May and June, it had not done any thing to enable the 3rd corps to conquer in the struggle. Navarre was nearly barren of troops; the public service in that quarter was carried on by means of that corps d'armée which

was compelled to keep up detachments in every direction for the purpose of collecting provisions and securing its communications. General Caro had assumed the command of the kingdom of Valencia, and was engaged in reorganising its army, the strength of which began to exhibit an imposing appearance. With respect to General Blake himself, as soon as he had collected at Tortosa the remains of his defeated army, he abandoned his views upon Arragon, rallied the garrison of Tarragona, and manœuvred for the purpose of relieving Gerona, the siege of which would have been greatly protracted by a timely succour.

General Suchet, after having, on his return from Saragossa, thrown a glance at his position, perceived that the most urgent operation was that of relieving Jaca, which was blockaded as it were by the insurgent bands. This fortress secured our shortest communication with France. The operation was effected with great rapidity, and in order that he might be free from any further uneasiness respecting the safety of so important a post, he supplied it with provisions for ten months. He resolved at the same time to make an immediate effort against the hostile corps which were forming in all directions, in order that he might establish his authority over all the points of Arragon which he might have it in his power to overrun with his troops. He was aware that in endeavouring to act with vigour in one direction,

he would be compelled to diminish his forces in another; it would be necessary to attack the insurgent bands one after another, notwithstanding the disadvantage of such a kind of warfare. Being unable, however, to augment the number of his soldiers, he resolved multiply them by the rapidity of their movements; and their activity and courage thus supplied the place of the reinforcements of which he stood in need.

He began by occupying Almunia and Cariñena. The works which were intended to give additional strength to the castle of Alcañiz were actively urged forward. The corps of Perena and Pedroza, which had come to threaten Barbastro and Huesca, were driven back; general Habert suddenly fell, on the 19th of July, upon the camp of the former chief, took possession of his headquarters, was on the point of carrying him off, and compelled him to fly for shelter to Viescas, situated in the midst of inaccessible mountains covered with perpetual snow. The general-in-chief advanced in person, during the night from the 19th to the 20th, to Cariñena, where he had suddenly assembled four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers. Before day-break, he caused Paniza and the position of Nuestra Señora del Aguila to be surrounded. Gayan's corps, which was stationed there, offered a very slight resistance, and evacuated the position without allowing us time to enclose him. He abandoned his camp and

provisions, which were destroyed as well as the entrenchments erected in the convent. The general-in-chief returned the same night to Saragossa with the news of his successful expedition. The inhabitants, who scarcely had time to notice his absence, learned with surprise that it had only cost him a few hours to seize upon a position which they had considered impregnable.

Several corps had been sent from Paniza in pursuit of the corps of colonel Gayan, there being always some advantage in driving to a greater distance an enemy whom it was found impossible to destroy. Colonel Kliski occupied Daroca, brought the inhabitants under subjection, and took possession of a dépôt of arms. The enemy rallied on the mountain of Uzed with some insurgents of Calatayud and Molina; he marched forward, defeated and drove them to the frontiers of Castille.

General Laval was dispatched to Calatayud and dispersed the bands assembled in that quarter; he also cleared the environs of Moncayo. A small corps of troops was likewise detached to the Cincovillas, a district, the possession of which is important from its adjoining Saragossa on the one side, and the frontiers of Navarre on the other.* Wherever our troops established them-

* The inhabitants of Sos, Castillo, Sadava, Exea, and Tauste, on the frontier of Navarre, along the left bank of the Ebro, displayed great attachment to Philip V in the war of the

selves, the general-in-chief began to put in practice the system of administration which he was laying down for Saragossa.

At this period of time, intelligence was brought to Spain of the crossing of the Danube, of the battle of Wagram and of the armistice of Znaïm. These events were communicated very opportunely to counteract the first impression created by the battle fought at Talavera on the 28th of July; the Spaniards claimed it as a victory over us; but the advance of marshal Soult having compelled the English to retreat towards the Tagus, and general Venegas having been defeated at Almonacid, Madrid was thereby relieved from the danger that threatened it. It became evident that the French army in the Peninsula would be no match for the English united to the Spaniards, unless they received those reinforcements which the war with Austria had hitherto rendered impossible: the change of circumstances henceforward justified the expectation of their being shortly sent to our relief, and the French government lost no time in announcing their proximate arrival.

If the Spaniards were not at first much dis-

succession. He granted them, as a reward, the title of Villa (which is of greater consequence than *pueblo*, a village, and of less consequence than *ciudad*, a city); and he erected these villages, under the name of Cinco-Villas, into a distinct corregimiento, of which Sos is the chief town.

couraged by appearances so unfavourable to their cause, the French, on the contrary, entertained the sanguine hope that fresh combinations of a more effectual character than the former ones, would soon bring the war to a close. General Suchet determined to complete the pursuit and destruction of the Guerilla bands of Arragon, in order that he might afterwards dispose of his corps d'armée for any other operations he might be called upon to undertake.

He had succeeded in throwing provisions into the fortress of Jaca, but not in relieving it altogether; for the armed bands which had collected in the neighbourhood, had resumed the blockade, and the garrison was in some measure pent up within its walls. The consequence was, that the communication with France was intercepted, and there was ground for apprehending that some treachery or surprise might deprive us of that highly important point. The insurgents occupied in front of Jaca, and at a short distance from it the convent of San Juan de la Peña, a commanding position of very difficult access, which contained a garrison, ammunition, and provisions, and was placed in a good state of defense. Popular superstition and enthusiasm combined to attach great importance to that convent. In former wars, the rock of San-Juan de la Peña had always remained in the power of the christians, who carried on an interminable

struggle against the Moors in the mountains of Arragon. Its church contained the tombs of twenty-two kings of Arragon. The central junta, in its instructions to the inhabitants of the left bank of the Ebro, exhibited San-Juan de la Peña as the palladium of their independence. It was accordingly the rallying point for all the armed bands of the vicinity, who found there a safe asylum after their frequent excursions into the valley of the Gallego. Two detachments of twenty men each, who escorted thirty men belonging to the band of the 115th regiments, having stopped at the village of Bernuès during the night of the 23rd of August, and failed to keep a proper watch, were surprised by Sarraza's band, and nearly all put to death. It was essential to prevent similar disasters for the future, and to destroy the den which allowed of their being committed with impunity. General Musnier was entrusted with this expedition; he assembled under his command a battalion of the 5th light infantry, another of the 64th, a third of the 115th of the line, and part of the garrison of Jaca. With these forces he attacked the position of San-Juan de la Peña on three sides at once, on the 26th of August. It was carried after a sharp resistance; the garrison was killed or taken prisoners, and every part of the convent which presented any means of defense, was either set on fire or destroyed. After this opera-

tion, general Musnier proceeded with one column to the vallies of Echo and Anso, whilst colonel Plicque penetrated with the remainder of his troops into the valley of Roncal. Renovalès kept all those mountains in a state of insurrection, and fomented the movements which perpetually alarmed that portion of the frontiers. The vallies were subdued, disarmed, and punished; that of Roncal capitulated after a rather obstinate defense. The general-in-chief left two battalions there for some time, as a detached corps, in order to secure the return of the corn and cattle which were required of the inhabitants for the support of the army. He gave directions at the same time, not only that the church of San-Juan de la Peña should be preserved, but that a fund should be specially set apart for the preservation and service of the tombs of the kings of Arragon. He thought it right to evince that mark of respect for an object held in veneration by the people of Arragon; and the esteem they bore him in return, shewed their gratitude for his endeavours to prevent, after a victory, those dilapidations which the chances of war render almost unavoidable.

Those successes, which had cleared the frontier of Arragon adjoining Navarre, led us to proceed on a similar plan of operations towards the frontier of Catalonia. The 117th regiment returned to the Cinca, whilst a part of the gar-

rison of Jaca drove back in the same direction the bands of Broto and of Fiscal. Perena, Pedrosa, and Baget rallied their troops between the Cinca and the Noguera. Renovalès overtook them and assumed the chief command. It was of importance that we should oppose the formation of such an assemblage of troops near our own lines. General Habert was ordered to attack it, and advanced towards Fonz on the 23rd of September. Colonel Robert, whilst marching to the enemy, felt it necessary to resort to a stratagem, in order to induce him to quit his unassailable position. After a few weak attempts, he feigned a retreat, and drew the insurgents after him, when rapidly turning round, he overtook them and put the greater part to the rout: general Habert was advancing at the same time upon the village of Fonz, and taking possession of it at the point of the bayonet. The bands were almost completely dispersed; and the chiefs returned to Lerida and Mequinenza. The whole left bank of the Ebro was restored to order and submission, and the French army was enabled to extend its cantonments and its influence.

The general in chief availed himself of the circumstance to form a secure establishment on the Cinca. He caused Fraga and Monzon to be occupied by general Habert. The

first of these towns had a wooden bridge over the Cinca, which facilitated a passage at all seasons. This was rendered an important position, owing to the vicinity of Lerida and Mequinenza; it was accordingly fortified with some field works on the height of the left bank which commands the bridge and the town. At the distance of a few leagues above Fraga, and on the same side of the river, stands the town of Monzon, commanded by a castle, which the French had occupied the preceding year, and had afterwards abandoned, it being of no advantage for their operations; but its situation now gave it far more importance. It was in a good condition, had several buildings bomb-proof, and solid ramparts. A small garrison was placed in it with the necessary ammunition and provisions; and as the river was at some distance, a tête-de-pont was constructed on the left bank, by the establishment of a flying bridge. This operation, and the result of the engagement at Fonz, enabled us to make preparations with a view to our taking possession of Venasque and of the corregimiento of Benavarre, the last in the province of Arragon, in a north eastern direction. The Catalonians having joined a great number of *dispersos* from Arragon, made an attempt to defend the town; they moved towards Graüs which was occupied by colonel

Lapeyrolerie, with nine hundred mountain chasseurs. That officer advanced in person to attack them without a moment's delay.

He commenced his march through Roda, on the 17th of October, reascending the Isavena, drove them on that and on the following day, from one position to another, and came up to their main body on the 19th. But the fires of the bivouacs were no sooner lighted, than he discovered that the insurgents were collecting very considerable forces, and that he was hemmed in on all sides, as if in a trap, in the midst of the numerous defiles which he had before and behind him. He immediately determined upon the course he was to adopt. Persuaded that irregular troops never display much intrepidity or watchfulness during the night, he resolved to open himself a passage by forcing at the point of the bayonet the enemy's line which prevented his retreat, and to avoid firing a single shot. He took up arms at the hour of two in the morning, and in the utmost silence, formed his troops into columns, and sent forward as an advanced guard colonel Roquemaurel, with four companies of chasseurs of the Pyrenees. This daring officer forced his way through the Spaniards, who were taken by surprize and driven in; terror spread amongst them to a certain distance. In the first moment of alarm, they fled instead of rallying;

and the column passed through, and rapidly moved off without losing a single man. Colonel Lapeyrolerie brought the whole of his troop back to Graüs. He had the satisfaction to find that his sick and wounded had remained undisturbed; during his absence, the inhabitants of the town had saved them from the fury of an armed band of the vicinity, which had come up with the intention of putting them to death. This trait of humanity was often renewed in Arragon after that period.

Fraga and Candasnos, into which we had just thrown small garrisons, were attacked by Guerilla bands from Mequinenza; but their attempts proved abortive. At the same time, the Spanish general Lavalle collected fourteen hundred men at Batea, and on the 16th of October he marched upon Caspe, which colonel Dupeyroux occupied with a battalion of the 115th regiment. The Spanish advanced guard immediately seized upon the Capuchine convent, a commanding position at the entrance of the town. Whilst the battalion was taking up arms, colonel Dupeyroux resolutely advanced against the convent with no other troops than the company of grenadiers, and took possession of it before the Spaniards could find time to recover from their surprise, or to stand their ground; he then instantly repaired to the head of the enemy's column, threw it into disorder, and compelled it

to retreat. He was, however, severely wounded on the occasion.

A band of smugglers who were spreading terror through the country in the neighbourhood of Belchite, was surprised at Lecera during the night, and completely roused by captain Monnot of the artillery.

General Chlopiski had been sent towards Daroca with the 1st regiment of the Vistula, part of the 2nd regiment and the cuirassiers. He defeated on the 12th of October the troops of Molina, which had formed a junction with the regiments of Soria and of the Princeza. Colonel Kolinowski pursued and drove them beyond Ojos-Negros; general Chlopiski pushed forward as far as Molina.

General Buget marched upon Arnedo and Soria, for the purpose of dispersing the armed bands. Returning afterwards to Navarre, he went in pursuit of young Mina, who at the head of two hundred men stopped the convoys on the road to Pampelona, and afforded a prelude of the part in which he since acquired so much celebrity.

In Spain the churches and convents are, generally speaking, vast and solid edifices which, if standing in an advantageous position, offer great resources for a defensive warfare. After the fall of Paniza and of Nuestra-Señora del Aguila, the insurrectionary troops on the right bank of the Ebro formed a junction in the church of Nuestra Señora del Tremedal, situated on an almost inac-

cessible mountain, which Villacampa had occupied and intrenched, beyond the town of Molina, in the heart of the Sierra d'Albarracin, near the sources of the Tagus, the Xucar and the Guadalaviar. The troops thus collected experienced the same reverses as the armed band of San Juan de la Peña; colonel Henriod received orders to make himself master of the position. He left Daroca on the 23rd of November with his regiment, the 14th of the line, eight companies of the 2nd regiment of the Vistula, the 13th of cuirassiers, two pieces of cannon, a howitzer, and one hundred and fifty Arragonese conductors of carts and mules loaded with provisions. These forces did not exceed 1,700 men. He came to bivouac on the 24th at dusk, in the village of Ojos Negros, the defile of which he found occupied by some of Villacampa's troops. A few companies of skirmishers, which he detached upon his flank during the night with orders to gain the woody summit of the mountain of Villar de Saz, determined the enemy to abandon the defile on the 25th at day-break, to fall back upon Origuela, and from thence upon the position of the Tremedal. The Spanish forces amounted to nearly 5,000 regular soldiers, besides a number of armed peasants, who had been collected at the sound of the tocsin, and who lined all the adjoining woods, with a view to threaten our rear and surround us, if our attack should fail of success. They entertained no doubt of the victory, general

Villacampa having availed himself of the advantages of the position to excite confidence in his troops. The mountain of the Tremedal forms a kind of crescent three quarters of a league in length; it rises upwards of 600 feet above the Molina and the small town of Origuela, built upon its bank in a narrow gorge at the extremity of a barren plain two leagues in extent, which runs in the direction of Villar de Saz. The nearest branch of the crescent terminates in a circular platform, on which spot stands the monastery and its appendages. The summit is surrounded with needles and rocks, forming as it were a parapet with embrasures. Its flanks lined with fir-trees give a sombre and imposing appearance to that isolated mountain. The roads of Albarracin, Daroca and Molina meet at the town of Origuela, where a bridge has been constructed; the convent has no other communication than a by-way winding in the rear of the mountain and terminating at the road of Albarracin, and a steep path which descends in a direct line to the bridge and the town. Moats had been dug and abatis formed in every direction.

On reaching that position at eleven o'clock in the morning, colonel Henriod despaired of carrying it by main force in the open day, and determined to manœuvre for obtaining possession of it. He first attacked the extremity of the mountain, which he made a feint to turn by the road leading

to Albarracin, with the greatest part of his troops. This attack, which he did not seriously intend to follow up, was continued during the whole day; its only object being to induce the enemy to withdraw his forces from the convent and send reinforcements to the opposite side. Towards dusk, the colonel marched upon Origuela with six companies of choice troops moving in column, with a piece of artillery and a howitzer, rapidly passed through the town which had been deserted by its inhabitants, crossed the bridge, established himself on the plateau beyond it at the foot of the declivity, compelled all the troops that had descended from the convent into the by-road to return from whence they came, and opened a brisk fire from his two field-pieces, whilst by the aid of the lights which he had ordered to be kept up in the bivouacs in his rear, our baggage and line faced about and took the road to Daroca. This movement could not fail to deceive the enemy, and to persuade him that we were taking advantage of the night to effect our retreat.

At this moment the six companies, being formed into three columns, without cloaks or knapsacks, and with their muskets slung in their shoulder belts, as they had been strictly enjoined not to fire, clambered up in silence by that side of the mountain most difficult of access, against which no demonstration had been made, and which its ruggedness must have led the enemy to consider be-

yond the reach of attack. On arriving at the summit, they stopped to regain breath, and waited for the signal agreed on. The firing had completely ceased on both points of attack; the Spaniards imagined we were in full retreat, and were rejoicing at their fancied success. On a sudden the six companies, headed by captain Parlier, rushed through the embrasures or spaces between the rocks, charged the Spaniards at the point of the bayonet, and converted their acclamations of victory into cries of terror. Those who escaped death fled in every direction. Villacampa attempted in vain to rally a few soldiers; they were deaf to his entreaties; his sword was broken in the struggle, and he was hurried along by the fugitives. The provisions with which the buildings were abundantly supplied fell into our power. But we could neither remove them nor remain in the position we had just wrested from the enemy; and our safety required that we should destroy them. The church contained a considerable quantity of powder and fire works; the explosion was tremendous. The sparks were thrown to a great distance, set fire to some parts of the neighbouring woods, and even reached the town itself which might have been burned to ashes had not our soldiers, in the absence of the inhabitants, arrested the progress of the flames. This volcano, which threw its glare over the surrounding mountains to a considerable distance, was a signal for the

dispersion of all the armed bands which had collected amongst them. The enemy lost nearly 500 men; on our side we had only to deplore the loss of a few gallant soldiers, so completely were the Spaniards taken by surprise and panic-struck. The success was owing to the skill of colonel Henriod. The circumstance which most attracted the notice of the general-in-chief was that without being arrested in his progress by the strength of the position or the superiority of numbers, he nevertheless did not allow himself to be carried away by that inconsiderate ardour which overlooks all obstacles; he did not purchase by torrents of blood, as is too often the case in a state of warfare, the possession of a barren rock, which he would have to abandon as soon as it should fall into his hands. His measures were, on the contrary, marked by wisdom as well as valour, and he made up by skilful manœuvring for the smallness of his forces.

Other engagements of minor importance took place on various points of Arragon; and although we omit to notice them, they were attended with honour and utility to us, as they had the effect of establishing the superiority of the soldiers of the 3rd corps, and daily impressed the minds of the inhabitants with that fact, which they were now taught by their own experience, the only monitor to whose dictates they paid any deference. This tedious petty warfare was attended with the advantage

of forming good officers, and inuring them to the duty of acting on detached services; and had the effect of developing those talents which subsequently raised many of them to the ranks of distinguished generals.

In the month of November, general Suchet completed the submission of Upper Arragon, by the capture of the town of Venasque. Captain Roquemaurel was sent against it with the battalion of the 64th and the chasseurs of the Ariege; he forced the positions in the valley. penetrated into the town, surrounded the fort, the garrison of which, being intimidated by the inhabitants, compelled the governor to open his gates. This success afforded fresh means of communication with France, and enabled us to disarm the vallies of Venasque, Gistain, and Bielsa; a dépôt of ammunition was destroyed in an adjoining convent on the frontier of Catalonia.

With a view to secure a similar result on the right bank of the Ebro, the general-in-chief availed himself of the approach of an expeditionary corps sent under general Milhaud from Madrid to Cuenca, in the mountains of Castille. He repaired in person to Teruel with a division on the 25th of December, and sent some troops forward as far as Ruvielos, where the insurrectionary junta had taken shelter in its flight towards Valencia. Teruel and Albarracin were the only parts of Arragon to which the 3rd corps had

and influence. The evacuation of Walcheren by the English, on the 24th of the same month, relieved the emperor from all uneasiness respecting a diversion which would have absorbed the means he intended to direct against the Spanish Peninsula. The armistice of Znaïm had no sooner been concluded, than reinforcements were sent thither, which did not amount, at the close of the year, to less than thirty thousand men.

By the arrival of those first troops, the army of Madrid obtained fresh successes, for which we were still more indebted to the misunderstanding between the English and Spanish generals. Ever since they had separated on the Tagus, and the English had fallen back upon the Guadiana, the two Spanish armies of Estremadura, and La Mancha, amounting together to 50,000 men, under the command of general Arizaga,* having again moved towards the Tagus, in the direction of Madrid, came to offer battle in the plains of Ocaña, where they were completely routed on the 16th of November, whilst the English army was in its cantonments round Badajos, and remained indifferent to the movements and the defeat of its allies.

The armies of Galicia and of Asturias, under the command of the duke del Parque, were de-

* The same who commanded a division of Blake's army at Maria and Belchite.

feated on the 28th, by general Kellermann, in the position of Alba de Tormès, near Salamanca.

Gerona had capitulated on the 10th of December, and by the termination of that obstinate siege, the 7th corps, the command of which had just been transferred from general Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, to marshal Augereau, was left at liberty to undertake other operations in Catalonia.

These repeated successes induced the government of Madrid to send the French army into Andalusia, which the total absence of fortified places seemed to hold out to us as an easy conquest. At this period, the English themselves had abandoned the Guadiana and the environs of Badajos. On the 1st of January 1810, the whole of their army had re-entered Portugal, where it took up a position near Almeida in the province of Beira. The remains of the Spanish army defeated at Ocaña, defended the passes of the Sierra-Morena. They were attacked and routed on the 20th of January; the French entered Grenada on the 28th, and Seville on the 1st of February; on the 5th they reached Chiclana, opposite Cadiz, where they stopped. Andalusia was compelled to submit; but the island of Leon was in a state of defense. The Spanish army retreated to it, and was reinforced by an English division, under the orders of general Graham. In vain were summons to surrender sent into Cadix, which had become the asylum

of the central junta, and of the insurrectionary government. This resistance prevented the complete occupation of Spain.

The 3rd corps had also obtained a share, however small, of the reinforcements arrived from France. In the early part of January 1810, it amounted to nearly twenty thousand men, of which number, 4,000 soldiers of all arms had been detached to garrison the castles of Saragossa, Alcañiz and Monzon, and to occupy the districts of Jaca, Venasque, and Tudela. Several detachments coming from the dépôts in the interior of France, and whole battalions belonging to the 3rd corps, were marching to join it, and the minister announced their arrival in regular succession. As this augmentation of forces was no longer required against Guerillas which were daily defeated, notwithstanding their numbers, and their obstinate resistance, general Suchet had it in his power to undertake the sieges of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, the neighbourhood of which proved very harassing to the province of Arragon, by favouring along the frontiers a spirit of insurrection, and the incursion of armed bands.

In other respects, the presence of a disciplined army, and the organization of a regular system of internal administration had considerably improved the condition of the province. The inhabitants gradually resumed their peaceful occupations, and

appeared to yield ready compliance to our wishes. We had no other enemies to apprehend than the bands of Guerillas or organized corps formed beyond the frontiers of Arragon, which were sheltered by the three above mentioned towns, and found in them a secure asylum after their defeat, it being impossible to destroy them without first adopting serious operations against those fortresses. Three corps in particular, which acted with steadiness, and in common concert, presented to us on three points of the frontiers of Arragon, a system of resistance occasionally of an offensive, but mostly of a defensive character; the first corps, under brigadier-general Perena, on the left bank of the Ebro, occupied the line of the Noguera, and manœuvred round Lerida; the second on the right bank, under brigadier-general Garcia Navarro, manœuvred in advance of Tortosa, and preserved the line of the Algas; the third, or left corps, under general Villacampa, overran the mountains of Albarracin and Cuenca. Those chiefs bent their endeavours to the object of keeping up by forced recruitings the nucleus of regular corps, which they had been enabled to collect and organize. Out of 40,000 soldiers who had been raised and equipped in Arragon, at the commencement of the insurrection, there scarcely remained 7 or 8,000; of this residue, 2,000 had been carefully drafted by Villacampa into the regiments of Soria, and of the Princeza,

2,500 into the battalions of the line, or of volunteers at Tortosa, 800 into the regiment of America, which maintained possession of Mequinenza, and the remainder into Doyle's regiment at Lerida.

Nevertheless, the position of the 3rd corps in Arragon rendered all attempts against the interior of the province wholly unavailing. Teruel and Daroca were occupied by general Laval with the 1st division, Alcañiz and Caspe by general Musnier with the 2nd division, and Fraga, Monzon and Barbastro by general Habert, with the 5th light infantry, and the 116th and 117th regiments. The Spanish generals, though always in the presence of our troops, and ready to take advantage of the least neglect on our part, were in the two first months of 1810 losing a portion of their activity, or of their influence. A great number of young men quitted their standards, and came to re-people the villages where our protection was extended to them. Our partizans were proportionably on the increase. The corregidors and alcaldes, whom we made responsible for the maintainance of public tranquillity, ventured at last to give open support to an administrative system, which was gradually gaining ground, and a government far less ephemeral than it had been represented to them. A former chief of a band of smugglers, belonging to Barbastro, was the first to set this example

of confidence, by binding himself to afford a more effectual support to the French cause. He solicited permission to raise at his own expense a company of foot gendarmes, and offered, as a pledge for his good conduct, his family, and a fortune of 2,000,000 of reales. Notwithstanding the danger of placing arms in the hands of the people, general Suchet determined to accept this offer, persuaded that such a company, if well organized, led by a proper chief, thoroughly acquainted with the country, and having a natural intercourse with it, would render more effectual services than a whole battalion, and be the terror of all the armed bands of the interior of the province. In a short time, those small scattered corps, chiefly composed of malefactors, were unable to conceal any of their movements from our knowledge. Daily reports enabled us to follow them in their most secret places of resort. Several were surprised at Alvalate, and at other points round Barbastro and Monzon. This circumstance, and the severe measures resorted to against the recruiting parties who excited the young men to return to the Spanish armies, produced a salutary impression, the effect of which would, no doubt, have been more lasting and extensive, had it not been for the fresh cause of disturbance which manifested itself on the frontier of Navarre.

This province, through which the 3rd corps

had kept up its communications with Paris and Madrid had enjoyed such perfect tranquillity during the first year of the war, that its roads were completely unobstructed, and the artillery was transported from Pampelona, for the siege of Saragossa, without escort, or the smallest opposition from the inhabitants. But whether owing to a vicious administration, and the weakness or venality of its agents, to the misunderstanding which subsisted between the superior authorities of Pampelona, the insufficiency of the troops left at their disposal, or perhaps to all these causes combined, the spirit of insurrection had gradually gained ground in that province. Without fortresses, without dépôts, or any ostensible means of support, armed bands were formed in the interior, augmented their numbers with impunity, and spread themselves in every direction; at this period, they intercepted the roads and carried off our couriers; it may be said, in short, that the authority of the governor of Navarre did not extend beyond the glacis of his capital.

A young student of the name of Mina, who had left that city in 1809, was the first promoter of these scenes of disorder. He at first placed himself at the head of a few armed men, obtained some slight advantages, which stimulated him to fresh exertions, and he succeded in bringing many prisoners to Lerida. His activity and zeal attracted the attention of the governor of that town, who

supplied him with arms, ammunition, and reinforcements. Shortly afterwards, his commission of appointment to a command, and the pair of colours which he received from the junta of Seville, were the means of his raising a regular band of soldiers, with which he continued his warlike exertions and his system of annoyance. Avoiding every serious engagement, and never attacking unless his position and his numbers promised him the advantage, he was shortly enabled to measure his forces with large detachments, and to seize upon our convoys. His activity, his energy, the rigid severity he exercised towards every Spaniard convicted or accused of having rendered us the slightest service, however compulsory it might have been, enabled him to assume a formidable attitude, and ensured the secrecy of all his operations. Whether he placed himself in ambuscade at the Carrascal, a dangerous wood between Tafalla and Pampelona, where he often attacked us, or marched forward to surprise our advanced posts, or retreated to elude our pursuit; he was dreaded and treated with deference wherever he appeared, but never discovered or betrayed. He soon acquired so much power over the country, that in the month of January the government of Navarre deemed itself justified in entering into a negotiation with him, as with a regular general, for the exchange of prisoners,

and even admitted some officers into Pampelona, who were the bearers of his flags of truce.

This alarming success in a province adjoining France, soon attracted the attention of the French government, who were thereby thwarted in their projects of sending forward the 3rd corps. The destruction of so troublesome a Guerilla chieftain became a preliminary measure of the utmost consequence. General Suchet accordingly received, at the same time with a commission which invested him with full powers, an order to commence immediate operations in Navarre, with a view to quell the disturbances to which it was a prey.

He sent general Harispe in pursuit of Mina, with the 114th regiment of the line. This officer proceeded towards the Cinco-Villas in the beginning of January, and advanced upon Mina, who occupied Sanguessa, whilst 400 Polish soldiers quitted Tudela, moved in the same direction, and a column of 800 men left Pampelona for the purpose of co-operating in that movement. As Mina had already on some occasions approached the frontiers of Catalonia, two battalions were despatched to the upper vallies towards Ainsa and Medianoz, in order to deprive him of that retreat, with directions to attack or drive him back wherever he might present himself, and in any case to intercept him on his way to the Cinca. The general in-chief repaired

in person to Huesca, in order to secure the due execution of those measures; but they proved unnecessary, Mina declined to fight, and left Sanguessa a short time before the arrival of general Harispe and his junction with the Polish troops. He feigned to take up a position at Monreal; he was favoured by the delay in the arrival of the column expected from Pampelona, and when general Harispe moved forward to surround and attack him, Mina, whose rear was unobstructed, escaped by a rapid march, and boldly advanced to the attack of Tafalla with 1,000 infantry and 200 cavalry, at the moment when his appearance was least expected. He felt no difficulty in obtaining possession of the town: but the weak garrison established in a barrack resolutely defended it, and resisted his summons and his attacks; he withdrew the following morning in another direction, after having occupied during a whole day our line of communication.

This bold attempt induced us to redouble our exertions. General Harispe availing himself of the circumstance that a division had just arrived from France under the command of general Loison, who occupied Logroño and the upper Ebro, directed the column to join him which had quitted Pampelona, and occupied, by means of his detachments, the towns of Sanguessa, Sos, Lodosa, and Puente la Reyna, as well as the principal passes of the Arga, of Arragon, and of the Ebro.

He scoured the country with several moveable columns, provided with small pieces of mountain cannon, which were carried on the backs of mules, allowed Mina's troop no respite, followed it wherever it took up a position, pursued it in its retreat, and finally drove it into the mountains, where the difficulty of subsisting, and the severity of the season, compelled it at last to disperse. This chieftain concealed the arms of his men, sent the greater part back to their homes, effected his own escape by wandering from one sheepfold to another, was on the point of being taken with seven men who formed all his escort, and only escaped by assuming a disguise. Shortly afterwards, he exhibited a trait of his adventurous character, by posting himself, in the garb of a peasant, on the high road near Olite, and in the midst of a group, for the purpose of seeing general Suchet, who was on his way from Saragossa to Pampelona.

This general reached the capital of Navarre on the 20th of January. There had long existed a fatal misunderstanding between the military governor and the duke de Mahon, the viceroy sent from Madrid. The clashing of their respective authorities was the cause or the occasion of it; and the want of system, resulting from this misunderstanding, gave rise to great remissness and disorder in every branch of the service. The avarice of the agents of a vicious

administration took advantage of these circumstances. Any further endurance of the evil would compromise the very safety of the place, where treachery was imperceptibly finding its way. Musket shots were every day fired upon the glacis, and in the very residence of the vice-roy, whom it was attempted to intimidate. The general-in-chief began by removing the civil authorities, and enjoined such measures as he deemed best calculated to check the hostile feelings of the inhabitants. He issued severe regulations, the object of which was, to disarm the adjoining country, and to prevent fresh levies of young men. The dispersion of Mina's troop was favourable to the success of those measures; it was hoped they would restore to Navarre that state of tranquillity which it had for upwards of a year, uninterruptedly enjoyed.

Another and a no less important motive for the visit of the general-in-chief to Pampelona, which was even the secret object of it, was one of paramount consideration with him, connected as it was with the future operations of the 3rd corps. This was, the inspection of the parks of artillery, and of every thing requisite for carrying on a siege. He found the arsenal in good condition, a numerous artillery in readiness for use, and the gunpowder and other manufactories in full activity. We were indebted for those efforts to the exertions of colonel d'Auguereau of the artil-

lery, the success of which was mainly promoted by the vice-roy's zeal.

General Suchet, however, had scarcely organized the administration of Navarre, when general Regnier entered Spain with a corps of troops, and with directions to occupy that province, and to complete its pacification. The troops of the 3rd corps returned to Arragon, in order to make way for Lagrange's division. Colonel Plicque having been despatched to upper Arragon, a part of the country familiarly known to him, he overtook and dispersed Sarraza's band in the direction of Ainsa. About the same time, general Habert, who was stationed on the Cinca with the 3rd division, was engaged in superintending the works of the fort of Monzon, and the repairs of the bridge of Fraga. Colonel Rouelle of the 116th regiment, having been attacked at the latter point by the garrison of Mequinenza, gallantly defeated it. Shortly afterwards, general Vergès, who was stationed at the same spot with the 121st regiment, sustained a similar attack at the head of four companies of chosen troops, who drove the Spaniards back as far as Torriente, and compelled them, after a running fight, to re-enter the fortress. General Musnier, who was placed along the line of the Algas, brought up the 115th regiment against a few battalions of the garrison of Tortosa, which had advanced as far as Orta, and put them to the rout, after

giving them a lesson well calculated to render them more circumspect for the future.

Such was the situation of Arragon and of Navarre at the moment when general Suchet, having returned to Saragossa, was preparing to carry those orders into effect, which were about to give a new direction to his future operations. Happy had it been if uniformity and singleness of purpose had distinguished it! No sooner had the emperor returned to Paris, than the prince of Neufchâtel, whose attention had been absorbed by other objects during the campaign of Wagram, resumed the title and functions of head of the staff of the French armies in Spain. There still existed, however, a regulation which left the chief command in the Peninsula to king Joseph. Thus, on the one hand, general Suchet was still bound by the ties of obedience to the court of Madrid in whatever related to military matters; and, on the other, he had secret orders to render an account of the financial administration of Arragon to the prince and the French ministers only. He was not to make those instructions known at Madrid, unless he should be under the necessity of revealing them.

The first letters of the prince of Neufchâtel related to the operations of the 3rd corps beyond the frontiers of Arragon. The emperor had, no doubt, imagined that, after the capture of Gerona, the 7th corps was fully competent to reduce the

other fortresses of Catalonia; he therefore pointed out to general Suchet the conquest of Valencia as the next object of his operations. With a view to this distant expedition, the 3rd corps was to be raised to thirty thousand men. In consequence of those orders, a considerable supply of biscuit was got in readiness; we bestowed our attention to the forming of magazines, and raising the means of transport; reports were sent to Paris relating to the *personnel* and the *matériel* of the artillery and the engineer corps; an additional supply of several field-pieces, of reserves, and of artillery horses, was forwarded to Laval's division at Teruel. These arrangements were completed by the end of January, when general Suchet, on leaving Pampelona, received from the head of the staff an intimation that he was to prepare for a different course of operations. The prince appeared to have indefinitely postponed the expedition to Valencia, and left the general-in-chief at liberty to lay siege to Lerida or Tortosa, the choice of either being left to his own judgment; the 7th corps was to approach the lower Ebro, and the 3rd corps was to proceed to meet it, whilst the 8th corps would occupy Logroño and the upper Ebro. The latter corps, however, which was organizing under the orders of the duke d'Abrantès, shortly quitted Navarre, on its way to join the army of Portugal; and it will be seen, that the corps in Catalonia,

the movements of which were wholly unknown to us, effected its junction at a very late period, in a very imperfect manner, and only for the space of a few hours. This affords a fresh proof, if any such were necessary, of the difficulty and danger of distant co-operations during a war.

It was neither an easy nor a ready task for general Suchet to countermand and reframe all his preliminary arrangements. He sent advice to Madrid and Paris at the same time, what were his movements or his views, what means of action he had at command, or what obstacles to encounter. He was aware that the king was informed by the emperor of the various measures enjoined to the 3rd corps; and in this kind of uncertainty in which he was then thrown by existing circumstances, he fancied that the French government had not yet laid down a definitive plan. The instructions which he received, partook more of the character of projects for his consideration, than of orders for carrying them into execution. He was in immediate expectation of their being confirmed and followed up, when an unforeseen occurrence came to add to his state of perplexity, which a circumstance of great weight had the effect of removing. King Joseph being desirous of availing himself of the influence which the rapid successes obtained in Andalusia were calculated to exercise over the minds of the inhabitants, and of the secret intercourse which

he kept up in the city of Valencia, conceived the design of taking possession of that capital, and of the province. The head of the king's staff, the marshal duke of Dalmatia, by a despatch dated Cordova the 27th of January, which reached Saragossa on the 15th of February, ordered general Suchet to advance upon Valencia by rapid marches, in two columns, the one by Teruel and Segorbe, the other by Morella, San-Mateo, and the road along the sea-shore. The despatch added, that the army of the south would send a detachment towards Murcia, for the purpose of co-operating in the principal movement; and it expressed a sanguine expectation, that Valencia would open its gates.

On the receipt of such precise orders, general Suchet had scarcely any alternative left to him. He had not yet received any instructions from Paris which relieved him from the obligation of obeying the commander-in-chief of the army in Spain. True it is, that at the same time an imperial decree of the 8th of February had raised Arragon into a separate government, placed the province in a state of siege, and directed that all the military and civil powers should centre in the governor-general. This very decree, however, although it gave an almost absolute authority to general Suchet, did not in any manner infringe upon his intercourse with Madrid, the orders emanating from thence being imperative upon him

in respect to *purely military* operations, agreeably to an explanatory letter of the prince of Neufchatel, under date of the 9th of February. But the courier who was the bearer of the despatch, containing the decree and the letter, was taken prisoner on his way through Navarre, a very common occurrence, which was, however, on this occasion, attended with very unexpected consequences. The positive orders from the French government to the chief of the 3rd corps only arrived at a later period, and at a moment when insurmountable obstacles stood in the way of their being carried into effect. Not obtaining from Paris the replies to his despatches which he had so earnestly solicited, and having moreover been called in by repeated orders from Cordova, general Suchet deemed it incumbent upon him to undertake the expedition to Valencia, whatever doubts he might entertain of its successful issue, since he was about to proceed without any besieging train, and was leaving armed bands in his rear which were on the watch to intercept his communications.

Being anxious to clear as much as possible his line of march, he gave orders to general Laval, on the 16th of February, to attack Villacampa's corps, and drive it out of Arragon. That general came up with the enemy's advanced posts at Villastar, within a short distance of Teruel, and soon afterwards with all his forces at an in-

trenched position near Villel in front of the Guadalaviar. He immediately caused him to be attacked by general Chlopiski, whilst colonel Kliski was manœuvring with four companies along the heights of Villel. The intrenchments were carried; the Spaniards took to flight and escaped by re-crossing the river; a great number were drowned, others taken prisoners, and the remainder dispersed amongst the mountains of Castille.

Immediately after this engagement, which would keep off Villacampa for a time, the general-in-chief repaired to Teruel on the 26th of February. He collected at this place Laval's division with Pâris' brigade, amounting in all to twelve battalions, as well as the regiment of cuirassiers, two squadrons of hussars and one of lancers. General Habert brought at the same time six battalions and 150 hussars from Monzon to Alcañiz. He was ordered to repair to Morella on the 27th of February, and proceed by San Mateo and Cabanis to Villareal or Nulès, either of which two places he was to reach on the 2nd of March. General Musnier was left with eight battalions and 250 horse to occupy Saragossa and keep Arragon under subjection; general Vergès was on the line of the Cinca, and general Buget on the right bank of the Ebro.

The castles of Saragossa, Alcañiz, Monzon, Venasque, and Jaca were provided with garrisons,

arms, and every kind of ammunition; the towns of Saragossa and Tudela were protected by some field-works, and rendered proof against a coup-de-main. Our affairs were thus left in a promising condition during the absence of the army, our line of communication being alone liable to attack. At this period, however, ten battalions were on their march from France under the order of general Montmarie, who brought a reinforcement of conscripts for each of the regiments of the 3rd corps. Instructions were left behind, directing that column, consisting of about 4,000 men, to push on as far as Daroca, in order to maintain the communication of the army with Arragon during the march to Valencia. Fortified barracks were established at Teruel; and colonel Plicque, with a detachment of infantry, was directed to maintain that post and to protect the convoys and couriers from obstruction on their way through the country.

Our columns had left Teruel; general Habert, who had the longest march to perform, had already proceeded a considerable distance on his way, and was no longer in communication with the army, when on the 1st of March, at the moment of quitting Teruel, the general-in chief received the duplicate of the decree of the 8th of February, with a despatch bearing date the 18th of that month, enjoining him to lay siege to the towns of Lerida and Mequinenza.

This order came too late; the movement which the king had directed was already in a course of execution. It is an undeniable truth that in time of war, more than under any other circumstance, a knowledge of the existing state of things is so indispensably requisite, that without such knowledge, it is utterly impossible to fix the moment of acting, and equally so to form a just estimate of that state of things, at a distance of 200 or 300 leagues from the scene of action. The first law for an army being the law of self-preservation, it is absolutely necessary, on all occasions, to submit to whatever course that paramount condition may dictate. General Suchet could neither order general Habert to fall back, nor leave him unsupported in the heart of the kingdom of Valencia. He therefore determined to continue his movement, and resigned himself to the chances of an enterprise which it was no longer in his power to recall.

The first march of our troops brought them to Sarrion, and in front of Alventosa, where the Valencian army had taken up a position behind the deep ravine through which runs the small stream called the Minjarès. It had the appearance of an immense ditch intersecting the plain, and was only seen on coming close up to its sides, which rose perpendicularly, and within half a gun-shot of each other. The road cut along the declivity of the left bank, and connecting the

elevated lands of Sarrion with the bridge of Alventosa, was interrupted by a ditch thirty feet broad, and was protected by the musketry of the right bank. On the other side of the Minjarès, the village of Alventosa was grouped round an isolated rock, crowned by the ruins of an old castle, which, together with the village, were occupied by the enemy and formed their advanced guard. The Valencian army, covered by this natural intrenchment and advanced post, was drawn up on the plateau in the rear. It had on its right the bridge and village of Puenseca, and Manzanera on its left. That army might have amounted to 10 or 12,000 men; in spite, however, of its formidable attitude and well-chosen position, we were fully convinced that it would not risk a battle on the frontier, at a time when general Habert's column was marching along the sea-shore, on its way to attack Valencia. It was much more probable that it would confine itself to watch or obstruct our movements, and hold itself in readiness, under every circumstance, to cover the threatened capital. These considerations determined the general-in-chief to manœuvre in such a manner as would at least enable him to force the Valencian army from its position, if he should not succeed in bringing it to an engagement.

He had remarked, on his arrival, that the left of the Spaniards was inadequately supported, and that on approaching the source of the Min-

ment manifested itself in the interval, and the letters and summons addressed by the general-in-chief to the governor, were wholly unattended to. We soon learned, on the contrary, that the popular excitement was displaying itself in an opposite sense. The archbishop and a number of persons suspected of favouring us, were arrested. Three gallows were erected in the great square for the purpose of striking terror into the people, and a colonel baron de Pozzoblanco was hung under pretence of being a traitor. The news of the advance of a French corps upon Murcia, had indeed been announced from Seville; but that movement did not take place; the same spirit, moreover, which had broken out in Valencia, manifested itself in its vicinity. General Suchet accordingly adopted the determination not to prolong his absence from Arragon. Previously, however, to his return, he resolved to chastise the armed bands which were collecting around him; and although he had not one half of the 3rd corps before Valencia, to maintain a bold attitude in the midst of that hostile population.

Colonel Henriod marched upon Liria with the 14th regiment, and quelled every disturbance. General Boussard was sent on the 8th of March to Castellon de la Plana with 200 cuirassiers and 300 chosen foot soldiers. He met 2,000 armed peasants at the bridge of Villareal, behind the

Minjarès, and instantly ordered a charge; a great number were killed, and the remainder took to their heels.

The army broke up its encampment on the 10th of March, at the entrance of the night, and forming itself into a single column, resumed the road to Segorbe and Teruel, which was already threatened or intercepted by hostile detachments. So early as the 7th of March, general Villacampa deeming the moment to be favourable when the army was at a distance, had proceeded towards Teruel and penetrated into the town. The garrison of 400 men, under the orders of colonel Plicque, had been under the necessity of shutting itself up in the fortified barracks of the seminary.

Villacampa was informed that a detachment of 150 men, escorting four pieces of mountain artillery and some boxes of ammunition had left Daroca on its way to join the army. He immediately detached some of his forces to surround it. The convoy thus attacked in an extensive plain, a league from Teruel, and having a very inefficient commander, retreated in disorder to a venta, where the whole were taken, with the exception of a few horsemen, who escaped to Torremocha. Shortly afterwards, Villacampa caused an attack to be made upon a company of Polish soldiers who occupied the post of Alventosa; the commanding officer, who had

had nothing else to do but to shut himself up in the old castle, or retreat to the adjoining post of Las Barracas, adopted the very worst course, that of defending himself in the open country, on the plateau of the right bank of the Minjarès; his handful of soldiers were surrounded and taken prisoners.

In the meanwhile, the castle of Teruel was closely blockaded. In the absence of artillery, the enemy resorted to other means, such as sending summons, keeping up a regular fire of musketry, and demonstrations of an under-ground attack. The seminary and an adjoining convent, forming together the barracks were situated on the wall of enclosure. The position on the country side was highly advantageous, owing to the declivity of the ground on which these buildings were erected. On the side of the town they were completely isolated, excepting at one extremity, where the convent came in contact with a large square tower, the lower part of which served as a gate to the town, and the upper part as a steeple to the church of St. Martin. This tower had a full command of the barracks, and of all the adjoining streets; it ought therefore to have formed part of the system of defence. It communicated, through the first story, with the church by the organ gallery, which should have been occupied and barricadoed; but this precaution was neg-

lected. We had allowed the clergy the full use of the church, which was the chief parish church of the town, and divine service continued to be celebrated there as usual. Availing themselves of this circumstance, the enemy contrived to enter the church, and scaled the organ gallery. They were now about to seize upon the tower, and the internal defense of the barracks would accordingly have become useless, had it not been for captain Léviston of the engineers, who rushed upon the Spaniards at the head of a few sappers, drove back all those who were in the gallery, and in the church, and either killed or took prisoners those who had found their way to the steeple. The siege was now changed for a second time into a blockade, and on the 12th of March, the head of the column of general Pâris, forming the advanced guard of the army returning from Valencia, was descried beyond Sarrion. Villacampa now determined to retreat. The arrival of the general-in-chief on the following day, the 13th, completely restored our line of communication. He repaired on the 17th to Saragossa, to which place the artillery, Habert's division, and part of the cavalry, directed their march. Pâris' brigade proceeded to Montalvan; and Laval's divison was left to occupy Teruel, Daroca and Calatayud, as well as to oppose the forces of Villacampa and of the Valencians, during the operations which were about to engage the

attention of the 3rd corps on the left bank of the Ebro.

Availing himself of the moment when the line of the Cinca had been left unprotected, Perena had advanced along both banks to the attack of Monzon, and of the tête-de-pont; general Vergès, however, having arrived from Fraga, defeated and compelled him to retreat. This was a fortunate, though a casual occurrence; the movement of general Vergès was the effect of a concentration of forces, which had been ordered by the general-in-chief in conformity with the plan of operations he had laid down for the siege of Lerida. The enemy then occupied Fraga, destroyed a few intrenchments we had raised there, and set fire to the bridge.

In the meantime, the successive departure of the French troops from Navarre had enabled Mina to rally his followers, renew his incursions, and again advance towards the Cinco Villas in Arragon. The general-in-chief sent general Harispe against him with fresh troops drawn from Saragossa, whilst the chief-of-battalion Deshorties quitted Jaca with the battalion of chasseurs of the Ariège, and advanced by way of Verdun, to bar the entrance of the upper vallies. Thus driven back to the right bank compelled to quit Arragon, and fly for shelter to Navarre, where general Dufour, the successor of general Regnier, had taken possession of all the

passes, and being hemmed in on all sides, Mina, early in April, fell in the midst of the French advanced posts, was taken prisoner and sent to France.*

This event relieved the French army from the annoyance of a very enterprising Guerilla leader, and calmed for some time the disturbances in Navarre. We shall soon find his uncle Espoz y Mina succeeding him, and gradually taking a still higher flight than the young student his nephew had ever done.

* Some years afterwards he went to America, where he perished in a premature attempt to accomplish the independence of Mexico.

CHAPTER IV.

Preparations for the siege of Lerida.—Investment of the place.—Details concerning it.—State of the fortifications.—Temporary junction with the army of Catalonia.—Approach of the Spanish army, commanded by Henry O'Donnell.—Battle of Margalef.—Fruitless attack upon the redoubts of Garden.—Opening of the trench.—The batteries are established.—First opening of the fire.—Renewal of the fire from the batteries, and opening of the breaches.—Capture of the redoubts of Garden.—Assault and taking of the town.—Capitulation of the castle and of the fort of Garden.

THE excursion of the 3rd corps to Valencia, which excited the displeasure of the French government, without accomplishing the views of the government of Madrid, had been for general Suchet the almost necessary consequence of his position. Having returned to Arragon after that movement beyond the limits of his own province, and being on the point of resuming, by the siege of Lerida, the course of operations which were within his immediate sphere of action, his whole attention was now directed to the object of rapidly pushing the siege forward, and repairing

lost time. With the reinforcements it had just received, the 3rd corps then consisted of thirty-three battalions, and nine squadrons, amounting, in all, to about twenty-two thousand effective soldiers.* Nearly one third of these forces would necessarily have to remain in Arragon for the purpose of keeping up our establishments in that province, and of defending it either against the detachments from Navarre, and upper Catalonia, or against Villacampa, who remained towards the frontiers of Valencia and Castille, with a corps of three or four thousand men. The rest of the army was very inadequate, in point of numbers, to undertake such an operation as the siege of Lerida, in presence of the Spanish army of Catalonia, commanded by Henry O'Donnell, afterwards count del Abisbal. But the government had ordered marshal Augereau to assist in the siege of Lerida, and to move the 7th corps towards the Ebro, for the purpose of affording aid to the 3rd corps. This was a prudent combination, the execution of which did not present any serious difficulty. Nevertheless, it proved unavailing, though not from any delay on the part of the 3rd corps. Our army of Catalonia had certainly acquired a greater freedom of action since the capitulation of Gerona; it was, however, under the necessity of never absenting itself

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 8.

for any length of time from Barcelona and its vicinity, and was kept in check by tbe movements of Henry O'Donnell; we shall, accordingly, find that it had scarcely come within sight of the lower Ebro, when it was compelled to resume its position near Hostalrich.

On arriving at Saragossa, general Suchet immediately directed his attention to the completion of his warlike preparations at Monzon and of sending thither his besieging train. His troops, in the meanwhile, were resuming their march towards the centre, or towards some point of the circumference of Arragon. The 3rd division, under the orders of general Habert, moved from Saragossa to the Cinca which it had quitted a month before. General Laval, who was formerly stationed at Teruel with the 1st division, left general Chlopiski on the Xiloca and proceeded in person towards Saragossa with Montmarie's brigade. General Musnier, who commanded in Arragon during the march of the army to Valencia, had already a brigade of the 2nd division at Fraga under general Vergès. He overtook his other brigade at Caspe and Alcañiz, where it was returning with general Pâris from Teruel through the mountains of Montalvan. He crossed the line of the Guadalupe at the latter end of March, threatened Tortosa and compelled all the troops to fall back which were covering the defense of that place. He was ordered after this feint

movement, to re-ascend the lower Ebro as far as Mora and Flix, by taking possession of the boats and thereby securing the passage of the river, and to open, if possible, a communication with marshal Augereau's army.

The destruction of the bridge of Fraga had contributed to secure the town of Lerida from any immediate danger. Whilst that bridge was in existence, it had the advantage for us of being situated on the high road from Saragossa to Lerida, and of affording at all times a passage over the Cinca; it was therefore the most direct line of operations. With reference however to the siege of Lerida, it had the serious disadvantage of being too near Mequinenza where the Spaniards had a garrison of 1,500 men, which might easily be reinforced by troops from Valencia. In other respects moreover, the road through Alcubiere did not appear so liable to objection; it was less exhausted of forage, and it led in a direct line to Monzon, where we established an hospital, ovens, magazines, and the besieging train which was to consist of forty pieces of cannon, each of them with a supply of seven hundred balls. A battalion of the Vistula took up a position at Candasnos, with a view to protect this communication; and four squadrons of horse and foot gendarmes who were on their way from France, were immediately distributed, with some detachments of troops of the line, amongst our

positions at Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujaralos, and along the left bank of the Ebro. Whilst these preparations were in progress, general Habert engaged the attention of the enemy in front, by various movements between the Cinca and the Segre.

The commander-in-chief was aware that the Spanish brigadier-general Perena had stationed himself with four battalions at Balaguer, a position on the Segre, surrounded with old fortifications, and deriving great importance from its stone bridge; he resolved to take possession of it. General Habert approached the place on the 4th of April with a portion of his troops. Perena shewed at first an intention of opposing him, until he was informed that colonel Robert had crossed the Segre at Camarasa with the 117th regiment, when becoming apprehensive of an attack from both banks, he precipitately withdrew to Alcoletge, where he crossed the river by the bridge of Lerida and returned to take up a position at Corbins on the bank of the Noguera.

General Suchet finding that he could command a passage over the Segre, immediately accelerated his arrangements; and leaving general Laval in Arragon, transferred his head quarters to Monzon on the 10th of April, taking with him Vergès' brigade and the 13th regiment of cuirassiers, six companies of artillery, one of pontoonmen, another of miners, and two companies of

sappers. From Monzon he advanced on the 13th towards Lerida by the road of Almacellas, and established himself within view of the place. General Habert descended from Balaguer by the right bank of the Segre. The hussars led by lieutenant Monvel forded the Noguera under the enemy's fire. After a smart engagement, Perena retreated into the town, and general Habert took up a position on the heights of San-Rufo. On the same day, general Pâris, who led the advanced guard of general Musnier, after having crossed the Ebro at Flix, made his appearance on the left bank of the Segre which he had re-ascended, and drove back all the enemy's troops that he found beyond the tête-de-pont. With the view of supporting his operations on that bank, General Harispe proceeded thither on the 14th, with three battalions and a portion of the 4th hussars. This regiment was greatly reduced in numbers, having left several detachments in Arragon; but the 13th cuirassiers formed an excellent reserve of cavalry. Although it had been newly raised, it had made such rapid strides under the skilful management of colonel d'Aigremont as to vie in experience with the oldest regiments; its appearance always inspired the French soldiers with confidence, and the Spaniards with a degree of terror which a most brilliant feat of arms soon proved to be well warranted.

The name of Lerida recalls to the mind a variety of recollections which the history of ancient and of modern wars has stamped with celebrity. Passing over the part which *Ilerda* acted during the campaigns of the Scipios, in the second Punic war, it is equally well known that, at the commencement of the civil war, Cæsar besieged or rather kept in check within the walls of this town, Afranius and Petreius, the two lieutenants of Pompey, who, notwithstanding they had five legions under their command, a number equal to his own forces, and had the advantage over him of being in possession of the town and of its bridge on the Segre, suffered themselves at last to be hemmed in while attempting to manœuvre, and basely laid down their arms. In modern times, Lerida has held a place in the narrative of every campaign in Catalonia. In 1644, Don Felipe de Silva attacked the town, which was defended by 3,600 Frenchmen and 2,000 Catalonian peasants, and after a blockade of upwards of two months, drove it, rather by cutting off its supplies than by force of arms, to the necessity of capitulating. In 1646, the French, under the command of count d'Harcourt, attempted to starve Lerida into submission; but their lines were forced, and the town relieved after a protracted blockade. In 1647, the great Condé opened a trench against the north side of the castle; this isolated attack was delayed by the difficulties of the ground, and by the

numerous sorties made by the garrison; and after a lapse of twenty days, the siege was raised, in consequence of the approach of the Spanish army with a determination to relieve the place.

During the war of the succession in 1707, the duke of Orleans finding himself master of Valencia and of Arragon, in consequence of the battle of Almanza, came to besiege Lerida, in spite of Lord Galloway's army, which was neither in sufficient strength nor adventurous enough to compel him to raise the siege.* The investment took

* Marshal Berwick, at the head of a corps of observation, kept lord Galloway in check. The duke of Orleans had no part of his army diverted from the siege. According to M. de Quincy's report, his forces were distributed in the following manner:

At Monzon.....	5	battalions.		
Benavarre		,,	13	squadrons.
Alfaraz.....	11	,,	20	,,
Castellon de Farfana.	12	,,		,,
Balaguer, the head-quarters of the duke of Orleans	5	,,	21	,,
Total.....	33	battalions	54	squadrons.

The greater part of the cavalry was detached with eight battalions to the left bank of the Segre, in order to complete in that direction the investment of the place; a duty which devolved upon lieutenant-general d'Avaray.

After the taking of the town, and whilst the siege of the

place on the 13th of September; the trenches were opened on the night of the 2nd of October, in front of the upper Segre, and an attack directed against the bastion of the Carmen, where the present enclosure came in contact with an old projecting wall, lined with towers, but without ditches, which wall is no longer in existence. The works were retarded by the rains and the frequent sorties; on the 12th, however, at nightfall, every thing was in readiness to storm the breach and to form a lodgment in it. On the 14th, the French obtained possession of the town, the plunder of which was directed by general orders and carried into effect, agreeably to certain regulations, during the space of eight hours, by two soldiers appointed from each company in the army. On the 16th, the castle was attacked from the country side. This second siege was longer and more difficult than the first, owing to the hardness and declivity of the ground. The artillery could scarcely open a breach; after twenty-five days' exertions, the wall being undermined in two places, and every thing in readiness, the assault was ordered for the night of the 10th of November, when the prince of Darm-

castle was proceeding, lord Galloway advanced as far as Borjas-Blancas. But he confined himself to mere demonstrations, and withdrew, notwithstanding the signals of distress from the castle.

stadt, governor of the castle, finding it impossible to protract the defence any longer, beat a parley. The duke of Orleans caused fort Garden to be surrendered to him as well as the castle, and allowed the garrison to remove to Barcelona with all the honours of war. They had been reduced to 2,000 men. Thirty-three pieces of cannon, several mortars, 30,000 cannon balls, 10,000 pounds of gun-powder, and other ammunition, were found in the place.

Lerida is situated on the borders of the Segre, and on the main line of communication between Arragon and Catalonia, twenty-five leagues from Barcelona and as many from Saragossa; it has a stone bridge, and stands at a short distance from the Ebro and the Cinca; it exercises a powerful influence by its population, consisting of from 15 to 18,000 inhabitants, and by its position which commands a great extent of country. The town, properly so called, is built along the right bank of the Segre. The greater part is defended by the river itself; and a tête-de-pont had just been constructed on the left bank, consisting merely of a lunette surrounded with a ditch, and intrenched by a square building. The enclosure of the town on the land-side was formed by a wall without any ditch or covered-way, partly terraced and fortified with bastions, and partly flanked with towers. Its real strength, however, consists in the castle, which protects nearly the whole town, and com-

mands it from the summit of a hill rising about seventy metres above the river. On the ridge of the hill stands a turret of great height, round which are grouped several large and well-constructed buildings. The fortification which surrounds the castle is an irregular square, measuring 250 metres in its external dimensions, flanked with strong bastions of twelve or fourteen metres in steepness. The western front alone is defended by a ditch; every other part of the walls is unprotected; but their base is so elevated above the surrounding country that the besieger finds no favourable spot for placing his cannon and battering in breach. The south and east fronts, looking towards the Segre and the road to Balaguer, are built upon almost inaccessible declivities. The north front, which might be termed the relieving front, as it is the only one immediately connected with the country, is also very difficult of access, owing to its great elevation and the nature of its approaches, the ground being chiefly rocky. The west front alone presents a rather gentle slope, which might be approached by a regular attack; but the besiegers must first be in possession of the town, and of fort Garden, the rear of which would have a full view of the trenches. Garden is built on the top of a plateau, commanding the western extremity of the town, and standing at an elevation of 600 metres; Petreius and Afranius were

encamped on this spot when Cæsar laid siege to the place. The Spanish engineers having considered that this fort was too weak and too inconsiderable for securing to the garrison of Lerida the enjoyment of the gardens and pasture-grounds which line the river in that direction, as well as the possession of the plateau itself, had attempted to drive the besiegers to a greater distance. With this view, they had protected it by an extensive horn-work, which lined the declivity on its right, and was connected, on the left, with an old redoubt. Its ditches were dug in a very hard stony ground, and presented a perpendicular scarp and counterscarp, five or six metres high, which might be deemed proof against any open attack. They had also raised at the other extremity of the plateau two large redoubts, the one named del Pilar, the other San-Fernando, at a distance of upwards of 1,500 metres from the town, and 700 only from the new horn-work.

These fortifications were all in good condition, and contained a garrison and an artillery fully adequate to prolong the defence, which was confided to the major-general Garcia Conde, a young and active officer, who indulged the hope of making the siege of Lerida last as long as that of Gerona, where he distinguished himself by introducing a convoy of provisions into the place. Independently of the regular troops,

the town contained a population excited to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and a great number of the neighbouring peasantry, who, animated with the same sentiments, had hastened to bring arms and provisions into the place. It occurred to general Suchet, that during a popular war, such means of defence might turn to the advantage of the besiegers, if he could succeed in creating in the minds of the besieged an impression calculated to accelerate the surrender of the town.

Previously to quitting Mora, general Musnier could only come in contact for a few moments with the corps of marshal Augereau, which held temporary possession of Valls and Reuss towards the close of the month of March. The enemy having broken up their encampment under Tarragona, and carried off a French battalion at Villafranca, on the 3rd of April, marshal Augereau felt apprehensive lest they should relieve Hostalrich which was on the point of surrendering for want of provisions; he attempted to approach Barcelona, and gave up all idea of forming a junction with the army of Arragon.* Spanish armed bands immediately afterwards made their appearance along the lower Ebro, a circumstance which confirmed us in the opinion that the 7th corps had retired, at the very moment when the 3rd corps was effecting the

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 4.

investment of Lerida. Thus it was, that general Suchet, instead of receiving any support in his expedition, was compelled to rely exclusively upon his own forces. This unforeseen position made him determine not to accelerate the opening of the trench, nor the arrival of the besieging train stationed at Monzon, but to keep his troops in reserve for a short time longer. He more particularly bestowed his attention to the object of forming a passage across the Segre, above Lerida, and within a league of that town. He directed, at the same time, some engineer officers to reconnoitre the approaches, and ordered all the preliminary works in the camp, such as gabions, fascines, &c. to be immediately begun. Of the twenty-two battalions of the 3rd corps which were collected on the frontiers of Catalonia, two were left at Monzon, and another was doing duty at Balaguer. The remaining nineteen were stationed as follows: on the right, general Vergès, with three battalions of the 121st regiment covered the roads leading to Mariola and Varcalas; and as the extensive plateau of Garden had a distant command of the road to Fraga, a battalion of the 114th regiment was placed on the Sierra de Canelin, and erected at this place an intrenchment, with two pieces of cannon. General Buget with two more battalions of the 114th of the line, and one battalion of the 3rd regiment of the Vistula, was stationed on the road to Monzon.

Towards the left and somewhat in the rear, was the engineer corps, at the windmill of Gualda, facing the village of Villanueva del Picat, the general-in-chief's head quarters. Still further to the left, towards the heights of San-Rufo, the two battalions of the 5th light regiment, and two more belonging to the 116th of the line, under the orders of general Habert, intercepted the road leading to Balaguer and Corbins. On the left bank, three battalions of the 117th regiment, belonging to Habert's division, but on a detached service with general Harispe, surrounded the tête-de-pont. The general of division, Musnier, was at Alcoletge, in the rear of general Harispe, as well as generals Pâris and Boussard, with the 115th of the line, the 1st regiment of the Vistula, and the cavalry; these troops formed the corps of observation.

It thus appears that the investment of the town was not complete above the bridge. The commanding position of Garden, over both banks, compelled the besiegers to keep at a distance from the river; it would have been impossible to cover the whole interval without giving a considerable extension to our line of troops. General Suchet confined himself to the object of causing the low grounds which adjoin that part of the Segre, to be constantly watched, night and day. The space occupied by the reserve was determined by the nature of the country at Alcoletge to-

wards those points, which are either open grounds, or cover the roads leading to Barcelona and Tarragona. Independently of this circumstance, generals Harispe and Musnier, from the position which they occupied, not only protected our passage across the Segre between the fields along the banks, but also had every facility for retreating towards the bridge of Balaguer, which presented a safe passage in the event of the overflowing of the river, an accident which the season of the year and past experience naturally led us to apprehend.

The investment was scarcely completed, when a Spanish superior officer was taken prisoner by the advanced posts of the left bank. His object appeared to be to obtain admission into the place, and he represented himself as the bearer of a proposal for an exchange of prisoners, which enabled him to come over to us in the character of a flag of truce. Some suspicion seemed to attach to his errand; the commander-in-chief was not therefore in a hurry to send him back, being impressed with the idea, that he might have it in view to make some communication to the garrison. A rumour was gaining ground that general Henry O'Donnell was assembling forces at Monblanch; Campoverde had approached Cervera with a division of troops; and armed peasants had made their appearance on the upper Segre. General Musnier was ordered to proceed with

the reserve to Balaguer on the 19th of April. The garrison, fancying that the moment was favourable, made a sortie in considerable numbers, and attacked general Harispe, who vigorously drove them back into the place.

The commander-in-chief had also proceeded on the same day towards Balaguer, which he was desirous of reconnoitring, as he deemed its position to be of the highest importance to him. On his arrival, he directed a few works to be constructed for the protection of the bridge, and ordered the castle to be placed in a state of defence; he also ordered some artillery to be planted on the ramparts, and the bridge of Camarasa, at the distance of a league from the town, to be destroyed. From thence he advanced on the 21st as far as Tarrega, for the purpose of reconnoitring and procuring intelligence respecting the army of marshal Augereau, and O'Donnell's manœuvres. We had great difficulty in employing spies in a country so new to us, in which every inhabitant was our enemy. We were every where hated and every where deceived, unless when pride or the confidence of success in the enemy led them involuntarily to betray their intentions. In general, however, all promises or threats were equally unsuccessful in eliciting any secret that one might turn to advantage. The French general was indebted to mere chance for the knowledge which he acquired of O'Donnell's march.

He was secretly informed of that officer's having quitted Tarragona, at the head of two divisions, and proceeded in the direction of Monblanch. If general O'Donnell should be joined by Campoverde's division, this manœuvre on his part would place him in a condition to obstruct, and even to prevent the siege. General Suchet doubted the truth of the report, as he could not persuade himself that the 7th corps had completely retired; nevertheless, it behoved him not to overlook such important intelligence. He hastened to bring his column back to the camp by forced marches; and on the evening of the 22nd, he placed general Musnier at Alcoletge, together with the cavalry of general Boussard, as a corps of reserve.

The Spanish general had actually encamped at Vinaxa on the 22nd, with the divisions of generals Yvarola and Pirez, amounting in all to about 8,000 infantry, and 600 cavalry, being the choicest troops of his whole army. He received there a note from the governor of Lerida, announcing that part of the French infantry, and nearly the whole of their cavalry, had made a movement, and quitted their encampment before the place. Deceived by this information, which was no longer correct at the moment of his receiving it, O'Donnell accelerated his march at an early hour on the 23rd. He halted at Juneda at ten o'clock, started again

at noon at the head of his 1st division, and of his cavalry, and proceeded in the direction of Lerida, through the plain of Margalef, in the utmost security, not suspecting that his flanks were threatened in an open country where he could not discover the slightest trace of an enemy. Nevertheless, he formed his troops into three columns; the first consisting of light infantry, advanced by the high road; the other two on the right and left, but somewhat in the rear of the first, and preceded by sharp-shooters. The light infantry, on approaching the place, met our advanced posts, which fell back. On the first report of musketry, general Harispe mounted his horse, placed himself at the head of the 4th hussars, and followed by some companies of skirmishers belonging to the 115th and 117th regiments, proceeded to meet the enemy, when he discovered that their advanced guard alone had come up. It sometimes happens in war, that decisive moments are not slow in presenting themselves; a bold charge of hussars on that head of column, did not allow it time to form or to recover from its surprise. Being suddenly compelled to stop, and to fall back, it lost one half of its men, who were cut down or taken prisoners; and the relieving army no sooner arrived in sight of the place, than it found itself separated from it. The garrison was, at the same instant, endeavouring to debouch from

the tête-de-pont, under cover of a general discharge of artillery from the castle, as well as from the town, and encouraged by the acclamations and other joyful demonstrations of the inhabitants, who were eye witnesses of an engagement in the result of which they were so deeply interested. Colonel Robert who was prepared to oppose the sortie, kept the enemy in check with the 117th regiment, and when he perceived that the garrison was dispirited by general Harispe's success, he instantly charged, and compelled it to re-enter the place.

In the meanwhile, general Musnier had marched from his position at Alcoletge, and having discovered the object of the enemy's movement, instantly adopted the wisest course he could resort to in the existing emergency. Instead of proceeding to join general Harispe, he took the direct road through which O'Donnell was approaching. His infantry accelerated its march in order to keep up with the cuirassiers, who were advancing in all haste under the orders of general Boussard, and without meeting with any obstacle to impede their progress. O'Donnell was at a short distance in one of the houses of Margalef, an old village, or rather the ruins of one, which had been destroyed in former wars. He ordered the 2nd division to halt, which was but just leaving Juneda, and the first to fall back. The light infantry, of which general Navarro's

brigade consisted, had already lost its battalion of advanced guard, in consequence of general Harispe's charge; it had barely sufficient time, on its return, to form in column near Dupuig's brigade, which was ranged in order of battle on the high road, having the artillery on its right, and the cavalry on its left. The 13th regiment of cuirassiers deployed in presence of that line, and under its fire; our artillery hastened to draw up, and briskly returned the enemy's fire. The Spanish cavalry made a demonstration of moving forward; but the cuirassiers did not allow them time to try that movement; they rapidly closed with and defeated them. The Spanish cavalry fell back in disorder on the light infantry, and on the line of battle, which was beginning to waver. The cuirassiers did not slacken their charge; the Walloon guards in vain attempted to form into a square: the whole Spanish infantry being taken in flank, in consequence of our following up the charge, were surrounded, and, after a fruitless resistance, laid down their arms. Our cuirassiers met, at the further extremity of the field of battle, a Swiss battalion just arrived, and forming the advanced guard of the division of general Pirez, and made it share the fate of the eight battalions of the 1st division. General O'Donnell was hurried along by the fugitives, who only rallied on coming up to the 2nd division; he there restored order amongst his troops, and has-

tened his retreat. Notwithstanding the sharp pursuit directed by the commander-in-chief, and carried by the chef-d'escadron, Saint-George, as far as Borjas-Blancas, general O'Donnell retreated in good order, and reached before night-fall some positions on the road to Monblanch, where he found shelter from the enemy.*

The action fought at Margalef was, like all cavalry engagements, as sudden as it was quickly decided; the credit of it was chiefly due to the 13th regiment of cuirassiers, which happening to occupy a favourable position, resolutely took advantage of it. Our wounded exceeded the number of our slain, and we had only to deplore the loss of one officer, young d'Houdetot, a lieutenant of cuirassiers. He had received two bayonet wounds, which were not at first considered desperate; but as we were re-crossing the Segre on the following day, the commander-in-chief, who was in conversation with him in the boat, and entertained sanguine hopes of his recovery, from the calmness and confidence which he displayed in the midst of his sufferings, had the mortification of witnessing the dying moments of this interesting and highly promising young officer, who, at the age of eighteen, had already won the cross of the legion of honour on the field of battle. The Spaniards lost three pieces of

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 5.

cannon, a pair of colours, three standards, a great number of muskets, and, independently of their slain, 5,617 prisoners, including general Dupuig, eight colonels, and 271 officers. They were sent over to the right bank of the Segre, on the 24th of April, in the open day, and brought within sight of the place, on their way to the head-quarters of Villanueva del Picat. They were then passed in review in the presence of the Spanish officer who had been detained as the bearer of a suspicious flag of truce, although he was treated with becoming consideration; he was immediately afterwards restored to liberty, and dismissed by the road to Cervera.

On the night after the action, general Suchet, who still adhered to his first idea of making an impression upon the minds of the garrison, and was fully persuaded that the armed population, being more ardently excited than the regular troops, would also be sooner discouraged, ventured upon a double attack which was not attended with the success he anticipated.

He first sent orders for general Vergès to advance against the redoubts of San-Fernando and del Pilar, which greatly obstructed our investing the place, to make a sudden attack, and take possession of them. At midnight, a battalion of the 114th regiment boldly came up to the redoubt del Pilar, and established itself in it, the enemy, who was taken by surprise,

having abandoned their post, after a very trifling resistance. A battalion of the 121st regiment found greater difficulty in penetrating into the redoubt of San-Fernando; it was larger, and in a better condition than the other, and was defended by fifty resolute men, who had just been put upon their guard by the attack of the 114th regiment. On finding the gate shut, our soldiers instantly rushed into the ditch; but they were unprovided with hatchets and ladders, and must have suffered a severe loss in that position, if the ditches had been better flanked, or if the Spaniards had not been in want of grenades. Owing to the impossibility of coming to close quarters, or of injuring each other, a kind of armistice ensued, during which a parley took place. The Spaniards, apprehensive that a last effort of our gallant troop might be fatal to them, offered, on their word of honour, not to fire, if it would consent to withdraw. This proposal was accepted, and our men returned before day-light to the camp. The redoubt del Pilar, which could not have withstood the commanding fire of the redoubt of San-Fernando, was also evacuated; a twelve-pounder, which was found there, and which it was impossible to remove, was hurled down the declivity. The Spaniards resumed possession of the redoubt on the following day.

About the same time, the commander-in-chief ad-

dressed a letter to the governor of Lerida, and in order to add some positive fact to the common-place language of every summons, which is a mere expression of a desire to avoid any useless effusion of blood, he proposed that the governor should send one or more commissioners to the field of battle of Margalef, and to the head-quarters, in order that he might satisfy himself as to the number of killed, wounded, and prisoners. The reply was truly laconic, and faithfully pourtrays the character of a nation which cannot be denied the possession of dignified and elevated sentiments. It was, word for word, as follows:

Lerida, 24th April, 1810. *General, this town has never reckoned upon the assistance of any army. I beg to assure you of my distinguished consideration. Signed* JAYME GARCIA CONDE.

If the result had corresponded with this language, and if the characters who appear on the public scene could be judged at the tribunal of history by the words they have spoken, the above might be worthy of being quoted at the same time with the remarkable expressions which Rome and Sparta have handed down to our admiration. General Suchet perceived that other means should be resorted to for accomplishing his object, and thenceforward endeavoured to make a prompt and vigorous display of them. The prisoners were sent to Monzon under a

strong escort, and from thence, by way of Saragossa and Jaca, to the frontiers of France. Their march through Arragon had a salutary influence over the inhabitants, who became more quiet and submissive when they had ocular demonstration of O'Donnell's defeat. The battering train was immediately procured from Monzon, moveable hospitals were formed, every means got in readiness to afford assistance to the wounded, and we were enabled to open the trenches at the end of the month of April.

The regular siege of a town was at that period a novel operation for most military men. Nevertheless, the 3rd corps had served its apprenticeship at Saragossa, and the general-in-chief expected much from the courage and attachment of his troops. He more particularly relied upon the talents of the two officers who commanded the artillery and the engineers; a right understanding between the heads of those two important branches of the service is an indispensable condition for carrying on a siege with any prospect of success. General Valée united to the practice of his art a scientific knowledge of the duties of an artillery officer and a military man; for the formation of a battering train, and the keeping it in good order, we were wholly indebted to him. On the other hand, colonel Haxo, of the engineers, had caused tools to be made in Arragon, with the assistance of some

funds for which he had applied to the commander-in-chief. This measure of precaution, so useful in a country where all resources of the kind were to be created, mainly contributed to the success of the siege. During the events which had occurred from the investment of the place, he bestowed his attention on every preparatory measure. He caused the canals to be closed which communicated with the town, and inundated a part of the ground where the attack was to be carried on; and he requested that orders might be given for driving back into the town the last advanced posts which the garrison still held outside the gates. Accordingly, during the night from the 26th to the 27th of April, some companies of skirmishers boldly approached the front of the Magdalen, without firing a shot; several of the men even came close up to the wall. The enemy's advanced posts took to flight, and a sharp fire of musketry was kept up by the contending parties. The same operation having been repeated during the two following nights, and round the whole enclosure of the town, the besieged relinquished all further attempts to retain possession of their out-posts, a circumstance which enabled the engineer-officers to approach the place, and minutely reconnoitre the front of attack, as well as the access to it. The attack was proposed to be made on that front which had been assaulted by the duke of

Orleans, when he carried the town 103 years before; a course which was adopted on the present occasion. The trench was to begin on the right, near the road of the Cross, and in front of a rivulet or azequia; to run across the road to Balaguer, and to extend nearly as far as the Segre to the left, so as to embrace and surround the whole of that front, from the bastion of the Magdalen to the bastion of the Carmen. The breach was to be made in the latter, on two sides at once.

In the evening of the 29th of April, sixteen hundred armed soldiers without knapsacks, each man provided with a pick-axe and shovel, were assembled behind the extremity of the back part of the trench, terminating at the post called the Cross, and standing within about four hundred toises of the place. At nightfall, they were successively led from thence by the engineer officers to the site where the work was to be carried on, which they immediately commenced. Although so closely exposed to the enemy's fire, without any other protection than the darkness of the night, and the silence which they maintained, they exerted themselves with the greatest alacrity to get the work in a sufficient state of forwardness to afford them complete shelter by day-break. Two select companies, divided into four sections, were placed beyond the pioneers, flat on their faces with centinels kneeling

before them with crossed bayonets. Another select company occupied a flank position on the left bank; and a reserve battalion in the rear was to march rapidly forward, and afford assistance to any point where our soldiers might be attacked or give way. Every chief, every officer of a company, was acquainted with the general instructions as far as they concerned him; and the soldier himself, in his perilous situation, was apprised of the duty he had to perform, and of the assistance there was at hand, on the first signal that might be given. During this first siege, general Suchet endeavoured to put in practice all those arrangements for carrying on the service of trenches, which the wisdom of old regulations had established, and of which reflection, as well as experience, had confirmed the utility. All the nineteen battalions encamped before Lerida, supplied in turn every day, either as pioneers or as guards of the trenches, a certain number of men, in one or more companies, each consisting of eighty men, commanded by their respective officers. These minute precautions were productive of a salutary effect. The commander-in-chief feeling satisfied that a company may be animated, as well as a regiment or a battalion, by the esprit-de-corps, that lever which operates so powerfully amongst soldiers, gave by that arrangement, to those who were employed at the trenches, a greater degree of solidity and steadiness than is usually found in an or-

dinary service performed by detachments. He also deemed it preferable to select for pioneers the soldiers of the centre companies, in order to reserve for the grenadiers and skirmishers the special duty of keeping watch over the works, an honourable commission which belonged to their primitive institution. The general order regulated every morning the service of the following day, in such a manner, however, as that the time for working and for taking rest should, as nearly as possible, be equally apportioned to all. It is well known that the infantry is the main source from whence all other branches of the service are supplied. The respective corps which composed it had already furnished pioneers, to be incorporated with the sappers; the artillery had applied for several companies of infantry, to do duty as auxiliary artillery-men; other services, which did not admit of being suspended, frequently required detachments and excursions. All those measures stood in need of being closely inquired into and placed in harmony with each other. If order and regularity are always useful in war, they are at no time more so than during a siege.*

The opening of the trenches, which was superintended by colonel Haxo and the officers and soldiers of the engineer corps, was effected

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 6.

under the orders of general Buget, assisted by colonel Rouelle, captain Meyer, first aid-de-camp of the commander-in-chief, the major of the trench Douarche, &c. The night operation was successfully carried on; the enemy discharged a few fire balls and grape shot, but at random and with very little effect. They had an opportunity of perceiving at day break from their ramparts the development of the works, which already placed the besiegers beyond their reach. The parallel was at 140 toises from the place; it was completed during the night of the 30th of April, and could be made instantly available to the construction of batteries. Of these three were originally erected. The first, consisting of four eight-inch mortars on the extreme right of the parallel, was intended for the purpose of annoying the batteries of the castle. The second, of four pieces of cannon, twelve long pounders, was to destroy, or at least to batter down the right flank of the bastion of the Magdalen, so as to render the contiguous flank unavailing for the defence of the bastion of the Carmen. The third, which was of six pieces of cannon, sixteen pounders, was to effect a breach on the left face of the bastion of the Carmen, through which it was intended to penetrate into the town. The trenches were inundated with rain; it required great exertion to drain off the water, by leading them to a canal, the course of which was turned

off. Two cheminements were commenced on the bastions of the Magdalen and of the Carmen; the parallel was extended on the right towards the foot of the castle, and on the left by a new cheminement towards the bastioned intrenchment, forming the projection of the Carmen. The second trench of the left cheminement served to erect a fourth battery, of two pieces of cannon, sixteen pounders, and two six-inch howitzers, the object of which was to batter in front the upper and lower right face of the bastion of the Carmen, and on the back part of the trench, the left face of the same bastion, as well as the adjoining curtain. Some Spanish sharp-shooters, who were gliding along the left bank of the Segre, annoyed by their fire the left of the parallel, by attacking it in the rear. The 117th took up more advanced positions, drew together its posts, and put an end to the enemy's petty excursions. The garrison had not yet made any attempt upon our works. At five o'clock in the evening of the 4th of May, after an uninterrupted fire from all the batteries of the castle and of the town, 5 or 600 men sallied forth from the battery of the Carmen; they rapidly moved towards the left of the parallel and the battery No. 4, which had not a moment's time to place itself in a state of defence. The pioneers and two companies of the trench guard retreated to the point where the first night's work had terminated. Captain Bugeon

of the 121st regiment, rallied at this place his company of grenadiers, attacked the enemy who were in possession of the left of the works, and compelled them to fall back. An obstinate engagement took place, in which captain Bugeon ran his sword through the body of a Spaniard, who was engaged in a personal contest with the lieutenant of sappers, Leclerc; our pioneers of the centre and our reserve having instantly advanced, the Spaniards took to flight, and re-entered the town in the utmost confusion by the gate of the Carmen, after having had to sustain the fire of all our infantry. A few Spaniards had shewn themselves at the same time outside the gate of the Magdalen; but we were on our guard, and the firm attitude shewn by our troops at this point of the trench, prevented the enemy from attacking them.

On the 5th and 6th of May, a trench was opened on the left between the battery No. 4 and the river, as a substitute for a place d'armes in case of any sortie. As some straggling sharpshooters still succeeded in annoying our pioneers from the bank of the Segre, with a view to get rid of them, we determined to open a cheminement on the left of the Segre, so as to obtain possession of the bank; three winding trenches were pushed forward; advantage was taken of a canal for irrigation which crossed the road to Barcelona, and after having dried it up and cleared it, we

converted it into a parallel against the tête-de-pont. The company of horse-artillery encamped with the 117th regiment commenced on that side a battery for an eight-pounder and a howitzer; the Spaniards had some field-pieces on the bridge which this battery was destined to attack. The right of the parallel was extended to the foot of the castle, as far as a small hill, under cover of which we placed a platoon of soldiers to defend that much exposed point. It was found necessary to employ a quantity of gabions in this work, and to bring earth in baskets for the purpose of filling them. We were thus enabled to foresee what difficulties we should have to contend with in any future attack, if we had to besiege the castle when the town should have fallen into our hands.

At 5 o'clock in the morning of the 7th of May, the artillery opened its fire; the batteries No. 2, 3, and 4 soon dismounted four of the pieces of cannon which defended the bastions of the Carmen and of the Magdalen. The battery No. 1 threw shells into the castle; two field howitzers, placed on the extreme right in front of the camp of the 121st regiment, and facing the gate of St. Martin, opened upon the town, whilst our light artillery on the left bank returned the fire of the artillery which the enemy kept up from the bridge over the Segre. But the fire from the castle was now directed against our batteries Nos. 2 and 3, dismounted

three pieces of cannon, and left twenty artillery-men hors de combat; this circumstance compelled us to slacken our fire. The enemy's fire became more active in consequence; the four pieces dismounted in the bastions of the town were replaced, the howitzers belonging to the 121st regiment were silenced; captain Brador, commanding the battery No 1, was killed by a cannon ball, and soon afterwards that battery was thrown into confusion by the bursting of a shell in the midst of it. The besieged were encouraged by this success, which suspended for a time the progress of our attack; 300 men sallied out of the town through the new gate that very night, glided along the wall as far as the right of the parallel, surprised and drove back the platoon of soldiers on duty. They afterwards penetrated into the trenches as far as the road leading to the gate of the Magdalen. But the pioneers having quickly taken up their arms, rallied behind a curtain which bordered the road, and some chasseurs of the 5th light infantry advanced against the enemy's left flank. The Polish chef de bataillon Schutz, and lieutenant Regnault of the 114th regiment, came up in haste with a reserve consisting of a handful of gallant soldiers; the enemy fled and was pursued beyond the trenches, which he precipitately evacuated. In this imprudent pursuit, the company of the 114th lost an officer and several grenadiers, owing to the enemy's

fire of grape-shot; and lieutenant Bordieres, an aid-de-camp of the commander-in-chief, and an officer of uncommon bravery, received a severe wound, of which he died a few days afterwards. The Spaniards lost nine men taken prisoners, and eight killed, amongst whom was an artillery-man, who had provided himself with four fire-lances, which were intended to set fire to our mortar battery.

On the following day captain Monnot, who commanded the artillery of the left bank, was struck dead by a cannon ball. The continuance of the rains, and the effects produced by the fire from the castle, which was levelled at our works, did not however arrest their progress. General Valée repaired the injury we had sustained, restored the batteries, and re-armed them, in order that we might batter in breach with more success than we had hitherto done. Two new batteries were erected, the one denominated No. 5, on the left of the road to Balaguer, consisting of four mortars recently sent to us; the other, No. 6, consisting of two howitzers, and placed between battery No. 4 and the Segre. A second parallel was opened between the cheminement of the two recently-attacked bastions, with the double object of getting nearer to the points where a breach was to be effected, and of pushing forward the batteries Nos. 2 and 3, in order to screen them from the fire of the castle, which became

less dangerous in proportion as it took a more downward direction. But as the latter operation would necessarily take up some time and protract the siege, it was determined not to undertake it, unless it were absolutely called for. The number and calibre of our battering train were augmented. A last battery of four howitzers, denominated No. 7, was added to the rest, in a position where the ground offered a natural shelter. The object of it was to multiply the cross-fires directed against the castle, and thereby to afford to the batteries in breach, the means of producing the effect which was expected of them. These works of the artillery and engineer corps were carried on from the 8th to the 12th of May. The commander-in-chief encouraged them by his presence, and by the distribution of rewards amongst the pioneers. He caused the breast-works to be lined with bags of earth, especially those in the second parallel, and ordered that sharp-shooters should be stationed behind the battlements, in order to keep up a constant fire against the artillery-men of the enemy's batteries.

At nine o'clock in the morning of the 12th our batteries, eight in number, consisting of fifteen pieces of cannon, and nineteen mortars or howitzers, re-commenced firing. The front of the castle and the bastion of the Ascension, supported by field-pieces established on the bridge, warmly

returned to the fire of our battery No. 4, though for a very short time and without success. Our artillery, which was served with great steadiness and precision, obtained the advantage, dismounted the cannon of the bastions of the Magdalen and of the Carmen, and quickly opened breaches; each gun fired upwards of a hundred shot in the course of the day. A case of howitzers and grenades in the bastion named Louvigny, burst with a loud explosion; the confusion which this accident occasioned in the castle, afforded us a decided advantage. Towards evening, the two breaches of the Carmen appeared to be wide and accessible; some Swiss deserters penetrated through them during the night, and repaired to our trenches: we learned from them that trenches were cut, and batteries erected in the streets of the town, in anticipation of our making an assault.

This circumstance attracted the particular attention of the commander-in-chief. Contrary to the expectation he had entertained at the commencement of the siege, he saw that the governor, instead of isolating himself and preparing for the defence of the castle, persevered in defending the town, although the moment had arrived when it behoved the latter to come to terms of capitulation. This was, no doubt, the effect of the influence exercised over his councils by the armed population, who, acting under an excitement

of feelings very inconsistent with prudence, served as auxiliaries to the garrison. The French general accordingly determined to carry, without any further delay, the two redoubts, and the horn-work erected on the plateau of Garden, to which we have already had occasion to allude. The extensive space of ground which they covered, might, at the moment of the assault of the town, have become an asylum for the inhabitants, whereas, his intention was to compel them to seek refuge in the castle, for the express purpose of shortening the siege and of lessening its calamities. In the night of the 12th general Vergès, with a battalion of the 114th, four select companies of the 121st, and 100 pioneers armed with tools, was directed to carry the redoubts of San-Fernando and del Pilar; general Buget, with six select companies, and a few sappers, led by captain Foucaud, was ordered to attack the horn-work, by penetrating through a breach which had been discovered on the right branch, and which it was possible to approach under cover of a ravine; the chef-de-bataillon Plagniol, of the engineer corps, was to advance at the same time towards the front of that work, with two select companies, and 400 pioneers. At midnight, the three columns began to move, notwithstanding the brightness of the moon rather obstructed their operations; some engineer officers sappers were proceeding with them, and ladders

had been provided for the occasion. The redoubt del Pilar was instantly carried, as it had been on the former occasion; the enemy hastily withdrew, and flying towards the horn-work, fell upon the column of the chef-de-bataillon Plagniol who charged them, followed in pursuit, and came up to the ditch of the work, which only contained a very small guard of soldiers. Our men planted their ladders for the purpose of descending, and immediately prepared to scale the redoubt. The sappers proceeded to force the entrance gate; sergeant Maury mounted on the back of a grenadier, got over the gate, and broke it open with his axe and both columns penetrated into the work; for the corps of general Buget having lost its way in the ravine, had returned to the point occupied by the chef-de-bataillon Plagniol. The Spaniards endeavoured in their retreat to rally behind a corps-de-garde; but they were forced to retreat to the covered way of fort Garden. In the meanwhile, the redoubt of San-Fernando had made a more protracted resistance. Two companies of the 121st succeeded at first in establishing themselves on the counterscarp, and kept up a continued fire to prevent the enemy from showing themselves above the parapets; two other companies rushed into the ditch and fixed the ladder to the scarp. After an obstinate struggle, in which captain Montauban of the engineers received a mortal wound,

our soldiers penetrated into the redoubt, but they could only obtain possession of it after having put the garrison to the sword, they having persisted in making a desperate resistance after they were driven back and deprived of all hopes of escape; at last however, a lieutenant and twenty men laid down their arms. Our loss consisted of about 100 men killed or wounded. Of the 300 Spaniards, not more than sixty escaped destruction; we took five pieces of cannon. The engineer officer hastened to secure the position of our soldiers in the works they had just succeeded in carrying by this nocturnal attack. The commander-in-chief, who watched its progress and directed every movement, instantly gave the requisite orders on the spot, for our ulterior operations; and on the approach of day he returned to the trenches, for the purpose of striking the decisive blow.

The artillery had continued firing upon the castle during the night; on the 13th it resumed its attack against the Carmen, and endeavoured to widen the breaches. With a view to facilitate the assault, the corps of engineers contrived to cut steps in the second parallel, in order that the troops might the more easily rush forward, and collected on the back of the trench the necessary materials for the lodgments to be formed on the breaches, as soon as they should have been carried. The enemy, on the other hand, made

preparations for a general sortie, for the purpose of retaking the horn-work of Garden that very night; but they were not allowed time to carry their intention into effect.

In the afternoon, the order was given for the assault, and general Habert, who jointly with colonel Rouelle commanded the trench, received the plan of the intended attack. The select companies of the 5th regiment of light infantry, of the 116th sappers, and the pioneers of the 115th regiment, and of the 1st regiment of the Vistula, were assembled in the second parallel; the commander-in-chief placed himself, with the reserves, at the central point of the trenches. At the hour of seven, which was shortly before nightfall, he ordered the signal to be given by four bombs fired at the same time. Our firing instantly ceased, and the troops rushed forward. Some of the companies were to penetrate through the principal street which runs parallel with the quay and the river, others on the right, towards the gate of the Magdalen, whilst some miners should proceed in the same direction, along the outward wall, for the purpose of blowing up the gate, and thereby giving admittance to as many troops as it might be found necessary to introduce.

The impetuosity of the assailants at first bore down all resistance on the breaches. Presently, a dreadful fire of musketry played upon the heads of our columns, in conjunction with the

guns from the castle and the bridge; they were at first thrown into confusion, but general Habert hurried them along by beating the charge. Colonel Rouelle received a bayonet wound in the attack on the main street. The lieutenant of miners, Romphleur, had great difficulties to encounter before he could succeed in forcing open the gates of the Magdalen. On the left, captain Vallentin of the engineer corps, moved rapidly forward along the projection of the Carmen, towards a gate which separated him from the quay, and which it was necessary to pass under the fire of grape shot from a piece of artillery on his flank, and the musquetry from the houses. The sergeant of sappers, Baptiste, regardless of almost certain death, climbed the gate, and threw it open to the troops, who rushed upon the quay. The Spaniards who were defending the trenches cut in the main street, found themselves completely turned. At the same moment, general Harispe, who had orders to act as soon as we should be masters of the breach, and the engagement should have been transferred to the interior of the town, attacked the tête-de-pont on the left bank. The commander-in-chief sent forward the reserves, and personally crossed the breach in order to direct the movement. This display of force did not allow the Spaniards to persist any longer in their defence, and put an end to a sanguinary

strife, which would thenceforth have been carried on in the dark. The bridge, the quay, and the streets were left covered with dead bodies, and the garrison began to retreat towards the castle.

The commander-in-chief aimed at a much more important result than his efforts and the gallantry of his troops had just achieved. It would have been an infinitely more useful object to avoid, if possible, the necessity of besieging the castle. He made colonel Robert enter the town through the bridge with the 117th regiment, and sent him in the direction of the gate of Saint-Anthony. From that moment, all the troops, by a simultaneous movement towards the centre, and a well-sustained fire of musketry, endeavoured to drive the garrison and the inhabitants from street to street and house to house, towards the elevated part of the town and towards the castle, in which latter it was our object to compel them to seek shelter. The firing from the castle upon the town, by increasing the danger and the terror of the inhabitants, contributed to hurry them along pell-mell with the troops, towards the ditches and bridges. Pursued by our soldiers, they hastened to reach the enclosure and to shut themselves up in it, the governor not having had time to order their being driven back, or courage to enforce such an order. Our mortars and howitzers never ceased firing the whole of

the night nor during the morning of the following day. Each bomb being aimed at the narrow space in which this crowd had taken refuge, fell upon groups of soldiers and unarmed men all huddled together, and spread destruction and disorder among them. It was natural that the efforts of the governor and of the most determined men should be checked by the presence of the women, the children, the aged men, and the unarmed peasantry, who suddenly fell from the height of popular phrensy into discouragement and a dread of death. These measures were attended with as prompt and decisive an effect as general Suchet had anticipated. A white flag was hoisted on the turret at noon of the 14th; and shortly afterwards, the bearer of a flag of truce came to propose the surrender of the castle and to sue for terms of capitulation. The commander-in-chief sent general Valée and colonel St. Cyr Nugues of the staff, to the castle, and colonel Haxo of the engineers, to fort Garden, for the purpose of concluding and signing that capitulation, by which both garrisons were to be allowed the honours of war. They filed off through the breach, laid down their arms, and remained prisoners.

By the conquest of Lerida we obtained possession of 133 pieces of cannon, 1,000,000 of cartridges, 100,000 pounds of gunpowder, 10,000 muskets, ten standards, and a great number of magazines. But the trophy which of all

others, was of the highest value to the conqueror, was the setting at liberty thirty-three French officers of the army of Catalonia, who were found in the castle, and who embraced their deliverers in a transport of joy which will easily be accounted for. The besieging army lost about 200 killed and 500 wounded, either in the works and the assault, or in the engagements which took place from the 12th of April, the day on which the town was invested, until the 14th of May, when we took possession of it.

The loss of the garrison during the siege, was estimated at about 1,200 men. The prisoners amounted to 7,748 soldiers and officers, according to the statement which was drawn up, and which accompanied the despatch conveying the official report and the capitulation.*

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 7.

CHAPTER V.

Regulations adopted subsequent to the taking of Lerida.—Skirmishes during the siege of that place.—Investment of Mequinenza.—Opening of the trenches.—Taking of the town.—Establishment of the batteries.—Opening of the fire upon the fort.—Capitulation.—Capture of the fort of Morella in the kingdom of Valencia.

The establishment of order in Lerida, and the occupation of that portion of Catalonia which is under its influence, were the first objects that occupied the attention of general Suchet. He halted for several days in the town, during which he gave the requisite directions for filling up the trenches, repairing the breaches, and putting every part of it, once more in a complete state of defence. Several houses that were built close to the walls had suffered greatly from fire, and from the shells thrown into the town, and of this circumstance the general took advantage to forbid their being re-built. He made it his special study to restore confidence to the inhabitants, to

whom he promised every protection, both in respect to their persons, and their property, and he not only protected the clergy from injury, but restored them to the exercise of their sacred functions. There had been a central junta established in the town, which had served to foment the excitation among the people of the province, and to such a height had that excitation been carried, during the siege, that when we entered the town, we found nailed to one of the gates, the heads of two artillery officers who had been massacred on suspicion of keeping up a correspondence with the French The commander-in-chief assembled the members of the central junta, and assured them, that these two officers had been innocently put to death, since not one of the whole besieging army knew any thing about them; he stated to them at the same time, that a great many of the inhabitants had demanded, that they should be put on their trial, as guilty of numerous acts of cruelty and of barbarity, but he added, that faithful to his engagements, which he had agreed to in signing the capitulation, he would not allow any act of revenge to be attempted against them. He required from them, however, in the course of fifteen days, a general statement of their receipts and expenditure during the siege, that it might be printed and published, to satisfy the numerous complaints of the inhabitants. By this measure,

and by their temporary detention in their respective houses, the commander-in-chief preserved the lives of these, over whom the capitulation had extended its inviolable shield. At the same time, he selected a corregidor, and a new junta from among the most respectable people in the place, and lastly, he nominated baron Henriod, colonel of the 14th regiment of infantry of the line, a man of firm and prudent character, governor of the town, the forts, and the province at large. The preservation of our first conquest in Catalonia deserved to be the more carefully attended to, that at the very time of the assault of the 13th May, several masses of troops and of *Somatens** were advancing on Segre Alto, and Noguera, for the purpose of disturbing our operations, or in the hope that by pressing upon us during a somewhat lengthened siege, we might be straitened in provisions.

The upland vallies of Catalonia are quite a nursery of bold and active soldiers, and it was necessary to disperse as speedily as possible a considerable body of troops, to which the vicinity of general Campoverde with a corps of regulars, gave courage and support. Even previous to

* *Somaten* properly signifies troops raised for the defence of a province or city—local militia.—*Miquelète* is a name given to the mountain troops of Catalonia; neither of these descriptions of troops are enrolled in regiments, or brigaded.

the 18th of May, 800 miquelète had marched against Vénasque, when they were repulsed, and driven back into the valley of Aran. The chef-de-bataillon, Renouvier, who commanded at Jaca, directed at the same time an expedition upon Arens, where he took 150 prisoners; and general Habert marched to Talarn and Tremps, where the main body of the *Somatens* was stationed, and against Campoverde, who occupied the mountains of Lliniana. Colonel Robert, who had orders to attack the *Somatens* with the 117th regiment, turned the Col. d'Ares, though very strongly defended, advanced rapidly on the bridge at Tremps, which he turned, routing the enemy that defended it, and taking a great many arms, and a large quantity of ammunition. Thus, instead of being in a condition to support the insurgents, Campoverde found his retreat menaced by the march of general Habert, who had directed his troops on Pons and Lentorn, and interposed between him and Cervera; he retreated rapidly in the direction of Cardona. Colonel Robert, who, to his merits as a soldier, united talents of another order, was charged with the pacification of the country, and he speedily contrived to render this fertile province one of the most valuable resources of the 3rd *corps-d'armée.*

During the siege of Lerida, Arragon also was the object of fresh attempts on the part of the

enemy. The marquis of Lazan, brother to general Palafox, took possession of Alcañiz early in May, and pressed hard on the citadel there. Captain Wikoski, with his small garrison of 300 men, made an honourable defence. The enemy had driven a mining gallery close to the walls, when a soldier of the 114th, named Roland, got himself lowered by a rope from one of the embrasures, with a view to roll a howitzer shell into the gallery; he was fortunate enough to get into the fort again, without being hurt, though exposed to a very sharp fire of musketry. The explosion destroyed the Spanish works, and thirteen of their men perished under the ruins. The brave Roland received the cross of the legion of honour for this action. General Laval immediately sent general Montmarie to the succour of the castle of Alcañiz. The latter, with 1,500 men of the 14th and 3rd of the Vistula, 500 cavalry, and three field-pieces, did not hesitate to attack 5,000 men, though intrenched behind the bridge, and in the houses of the town, the walls of which were regularly loopholed. He passed the stream* with the water to the cartouch belts, charged the Spaniards, and drove them from street to street, whilst the cavalry wheeled round to attack them in the rear. They would have been surrounded, had

* The Guadalope, a tributary of the Ebro.

they not saved themselves by a prompt retreat.

On the side of Calatayud, on the 13th May, the chef de bataillon, Petit, at the head of 315 men of the 14th, and thirty-two gendarmes while guiding a convoy of provisions to Saragossa, was attacked by Villacampa who had received information of his movements, and who by an exceedingly rapid march, succeeded in shutting him up in the defile of el Frasno. Petit saw the impossibility of forcing a passage in the face of forces ten times more numerous than his own; he therefore drew up his men in close column, and making a bold push towards the left, he arrived at the village of Paracuellos, in good order. The convoy of 300 mules was necessarily abandoned. The Spaniards pressed on him from all sides, but he contrived notwithstanding that he was himself wounded, a circumstance which damped neither his firmness nor intrepidity, to struggle through a fight not more unequal than obstinate, until he gained Savinan. The Spaniards kept firing furiously at the two flanks of the column, and charging it now in the front, now in the rear, and every moment his little handful of men was becoming less, by the dropping of some of its number; at length these brave fellows having exhausted all their powder, dashed through the Xalen, charged the village of Arandija, which

they took at the point of the bayonet, and there maintained their position, notwithstanding a final and furious attack, until they saw their enemies retire in despair of carrying it. The loss they had sustained was extremely great; their brave commander, Petit, had been thrown from his horse, and falling beyond the line of the column was taken, and along with him 141 of these gallant men, among whom were twelve of the gendarmes, who perished, or were taken. The commander-in-chief bestowed a just and merited eulogium on the conduct of the 194 soldiers who returned, the greater part severely wounded, and took immediate measures for getting Petit, their leader, exchanged; but what was his extreme affliction, when he learned that that gallant officer had been assassinated! On the evening of the combat, he was sitting by a fire in the camp of the enemy, and getting his wounds dressed, while a crowd of Spanish officers who surrounded him, were looking on him with admiration, when a ruffian taking advantage of the darkness, approached him from behind, and stabbed him through the body with a bayonet. The officers who witnessed this act of cowardice inflicted the most summary punishment on the perpetrator, the just reward of a deed that nothing could excuse, but which they could neither foresee nor guard against. Navar alcalde, of el Frasno, a respectable old man, who had followed

the French column, and who also fell into the hands of the Spaniards, was burned alive;—this may serve as a specimen of the fury that animated our enemies.

General Chlopiski, from Daroca, had pursued Villacampa as soon as he ascertained that he was in motion, and having sent back his artillery to Cariñeno, that he might be less encumbered, arrived at el Frasno on the 14th, the morning after the battle. Villacampa had then moved, but he resolved to follow him without delay; he directed colonel Lafosse, with the 44th regiment, upon Catalayud and Setina, while he himself marched on Xarava, with forty hussars and fifty cuirassiers; (his infantry could not keep up with him) and got up with Villacampa's rear-guard there, and took 174 prisoners. On the 17th he marched on Campillo, and thence on Molina; he then took the direction of Cuenca, but it was found impossible to trace the fugitives any further. A manufactory for arms was destroyed at Molina, and a great number of gun-barrels, some blacksmiths' vices, and some bar-iron, were carried to Saragossa. Every report went to prove that the army of Villacampa was in a state of complete dispersion, and 600 of his soldiers, who had fled from the ranks, and abandoned their arms, presented themselves before Calatayud. This was the sixth time that the young fellows had been seen coming back to

their homes, and yet even then it was impossible to reckon on their resolution to remain there. It must be confessed that the means adopted by the chiefs of the bands to make them join the army again, surpassed in vexatiousness and cruelty any thing that can be imagined.

About the same time at Ayerba, forty foot gendarmes of the 9th battalion, who, like all the stations for communication on either bank of the Ebro, occupied an intrenched post, which they had orders to defend to the last extremity, were unexpectedly attacked by 300 men coming from Navarre. After sustaining with great coolness the attack of their assailants, they shut themselves up, and thus repulsed all their assaults. The Spaniards succeeded in setting fire to their barracks, but the gendarmes retired into a small building that was fortunately isolated, and there, as in a redoubt, maintained themselves with invincible steadiness, until the enemy, vanquished by the resolution of these forty gallant fellows, thought fit to retire. The commander-in-chief took pleasure in the orders of the day, to advert to the numerous proofs of courage that were displayed by the soldiers of the 3rd corps; nor did he fail in all such cases, to make known the names of every commander, officer, and soldier that merited that distinction. Such a publicity produced the happiest effect on the minds of the soldiers, and on those of the natives also.

The morning after his entry into Lerida, general Suchet had directed the 121st regiment to march by the left bank of the Segre towards Mequinenza. The siege of this fort and that of Lerida were so intimately connected, that two months before the French government had directed them both to be undertaken at the same time. The means of accomplishing this were, however, wanting; and motives that were easy to be appreciated had determined the commander-in-chief to begin with the siege of Lerida. As soon as the troops began to approach Mequinenza, as a preliminary he despatched his aid-de-camp, captain Ricard, who was instructed to offer very advantageous terms of capitulation, but they were rejected, although the fall of Lerida must have naturally discouraged the little garrison, by taking away all hopes of being relieved.

In the interval between the 16th and 20th of May, the 114th regiment and the 1st of the Vistula, set out from Fraga and Torriente for the purpose of investing Mequinenza: general Musnier was appointed to command the forces and to direct the siege.

The elevated plateau that supports the Monnegro, and which is traversed by the route that leads from Saragossa to Fraga, by Bujaralos, Penalva, and Candasnos, terminates at the Cinca and the Ebro; it sinks very rapidly as it approaches the banks of those rivers, but an

elevated counter-ridge extends not only to the point where they form a junction, but for 600 feet farther down the bank of the combined streams. The little town of Mequinenza, which is shut in between the rocky foot of this ridge and the bank of the river, forms a kind of port on the Ebro, which is no longer navigable at Saragossa or above that town, and only begins to be so when joined by the Segre and the Cinca. Thus Mequinenza, without being in any of the lines of land communication, forms the key of the Ebro as far as Tortosa and the sea. This important position, which is mentioned by Cæsar under the name of Octogesa, and which has figured in almost all the Spanish wars was, when besieged, in a respectable state of defence. At the extremity of the counter-ridge already alluded to, stands an old castle surrounded by a terraced inclosure, which follows all the bends and turns of the rock on which it is situated. The rock, which is very precipitous on three sides, extends towards the west to the breadth of about 150 toises. This is the only point that admits of a regular attack; it is defended in front by bastions faced with stone, and has a ditch cut in the solid rock, and a very good covered way, palisadoed. Some old walls built in the times of the Moors, which extend from the fort to the bank of the river, except in those parts where the rock is perpendicular, connect the defences on

the heights with those below, and thus cover the town, the two ferries, and the roads that lead to them. Intrenchments and out-works had been formed and batteries added, chiefly on the Fraga road, which is the only one by which guns can be transported. The part to be attacked was soon determined on, for it was impossible to force the approaches unless on the side of the plateau. The principal difficulty was to bring up the artillery. It was necessary to construct a road from Fraga to within gun-shot of the works, and our four reconnoissances had not enabled us to discover the means of effecting it. In the month of November preceding, colonel Haxo, taking advantage of the movement of a detachment of our troops between Fraga and Candasnos, had advanced very near to Mequinenza, and had examined the ground in its neighbourhood. He accompanied general Musnier, when the latter went over it at the head of the troops, and by his directions the road was traced out, which after all, it was necessary to open from Torriente. For about two leagues the troops had merely to follow the plateau, which served, with a very few repairs, for their purpose. When they had advanced about 1,200 toises the difficulties began to increase. The peasantry were employed as labourers, and it was found necessary to cut out a path in the steep declivity, and to blast the rock in a number of places, in order to reach the

lower plateau: this work continued until about the 1st of June.

So early as the 20th May, whilst these preliminaries were in progress, general Musnier had driven in a number of the enemy's advanced posts, and established his camps. A part of the 121st appearing sufficient for the left bank of the Segre, the remainder crossed to the right bank, and thus formed the left of our line; they took up their position behind a small hillock within gun-shot of the Fraga road. The 114th and the 2nd of the Vistula, with the artillery and sappers, occupied the plateau by which the attack was to be made, while several companies of voltigeurs were as far in advance as the banks of the Ebro, to which the want of water compelled our soldiers to have constant recourse, although the road was long and difficult, and very much exposed, at least in the beginning of the siege, at which period general Montmarie, who had orders to march from Alcañiz, in order to complete the investment of the place, had not yet arrived. On the 28th May he took up a position on the heights on the right bank, and the Spaniards, who had dragged a cannon thither, threw it into the river and retired. The 2nd of the Vistula, which was destined for the attack on the town, was stationed on the brink of the stream at the foot of the slope of the left bank and an embranchment was added to the road, in order to facilitate the communica-

tions between the river and the camps. The park of artillery remained on the height where the new road had been cut; it consisted of eighteen pieces of cannon, six of which, twenty-four pounders, were provided with every thing necessary for 800 discharges each. On the day of the 30th May the general of engineers arrived from France. He brought with him a brigade of officers of the same corps two companies of sappers and one of engineers. Of nine companies of miners or sappers that had been collected in Arragon the previous year, only three now remained with the 3rd corps. The reinforcement brought by general Rogniat was extremely useful in the sieges to which this division of the army was successively directed. General Rogniat's fame, which had been acquired at Dantzig and at Saragossa, had preceded his arrival, he crowned it afterwards by the sieges he directed while with the army of Arragon in the east of the Peninsula.

This same 30th May our main guard, by favour of a cover, pushed forward to within 300 toises of the outer wall. The enemy commenced a brisk cannonade next day, and even attempted a sortie with great appearance of resolution; 300 voltigeurs, however, who firmly awaited the attack of the 800 Spaniards that composed it, soon checked their advance by a close and well directed discharge of musketry; our advanced post in con-

sequence maintained the position it had taken up. The enemy had still an outer post on a hillock about 100 toises in advance of the castle; on the night of the 2nd June they were driven from it by the voltigeurs of the 114th. Advantage was immediately taken of this to open a parallel, and 500 men were employed under general Haxo in effecting that purpose. The ground was difficult, and the sound of the pickaxes on the rock having directed the attention of the enemy to the spot, they kept a smart and uninterrupted fire of grape shot on the labours during the whole of the night. As they were very close to the place and crowded together, they suffered a good deal before they succeeded in covering themselves. Fifty men were killed and wounded on the occasion, and the chef-de-bataillon, Sève, was also hurt; the parallel was finished notwithstanding, as well as a communication to the rear on the right side.

During the night of the 2nd an attempt was made against the town, as it was considered most important to close up and isolate the garrison as much as possible, in order to cut off the chances of escape by water. To effect this object, a battalion of the Vistula attacked and carried a Spanish fortified post, about eighty toises from the wall of the town, and a trench was immediately cut at that distance in the narrow slip of land that stretches from the hill to the river. At the same time general Montmarie es-

tablished on the right bank some strong posts of infantry. They occupied a position close to the river in trenches, so constructed as to protect them from the fire of the castle; but before these dispositions could be completed or could produce any effect, eleven vessels suddenly left the town for the purpose of sailing down the Ebro. In spite of every effort of our soldiers, who were very disadvantageously situated for pursuing them, only two of them were captured. They were found to be laden with inhabitants of the town, who were endeavouring to escape from the inconveniences of the siege, and who were carrying away all their effects along with them. This trifling event served to convince us still more of the necessity of getting speedy possession of the town.

During the night of the 3rd the attack on the fort was continued; the parallel was completed and was prolonged for a score of toises towards the left. The artillery began immediately to construct their batteries upon the very stubborn piece of ground where the breaches had first been opened. We succeeded in forming some battlements, by means of bags filled with earth, for the purpose of cannonading the embrasures of the enemy, and we forced him in consequence to keep them closed the whole of the day with bags of wool; our pioneers were no longer disturbed in their operations. On the

town side we advanced forty toises, but it was found difficult to cover ourselves from the fire of the castle, and still more from that of a small intrenched post, which was within fifty toises of the fort and took in flank the whole of our works all the way along the stream. It was found impossible to get a position for erecting a battery against the town, on one hand, because of the narrowness of the slip of ground between the hill and the river, and on the other, because of the fire of a piece placed on a square tower, which terminated the outer wall of the town on the side next the water: the musketry of general Montmarie was directed against this fort.

On the evening of the 4th the engineers pushed forward on the right of the parallel by a zigzag of thirty toises long, and the branches and communications were completed. The miners, meanwhile, continued to blast the rocks, which they could not contrive to get round; Mary, lieutenant of the engineers, was wounded. General Rogniat, perceiving that the fire of our light troops from the right bank of the Ebro had compelled a portion of the defenders of the square tower to abandon it, and to retreat to the castle, and imagining that he perceived some hesitation in those who remained, immediately ordered forward a company of the sappers, under the command of captain Foucauld, and a company

of the grenadiers of the Vistula, led on by the chef de bataillon, Chlusowitz, supported at some distance by the whole battalion. Our men rushed forward to the tower, scaled the walls, and the adjacent intrenchments which were only eight feet in height, and by nine o'clock in the evening succeeded in establishing themselves in the tower, and in the houses adjoining to it. The enemy instantly retired to the fort, abandoning the town to us at discretion, with eight pieces of cannon, four hundred muskets, and some ammunition. The sappers as soon as the town had surrendered, busied themselves in securing by epaulements, our communication between the streets and squares that were commanded by the castle, while the battalion of the Vistula took up its station in the town, in order to ensure possession of it, and began to loop-hole the walls of the houses that looked towards the ramps of the fort, in order to prevent the enemy from debouching by those points. It was, however, difficult to imagine that they would attempt a *coup-de-main* by a way which was both steep and narrow, and up which, if driven back, their retreat must be so full of danger. In fact, they contented themselves with throwing shells, and rolling down stones, from the effects of which the townspeople suffered more than we did.

Our artillery constructed three batteries, the

first of which consisted of four mortars, and which was placed in the rear of the parallel, about two hundred toises from the place it was intended to bombard—the turret of the castle. The second was erected on the right of the parallel, within one hundred and twenty toises of the covered way; it consisted of two twenty-four pounders, and two six inch howitzers and was intended to batter the right face of the bastion on the left of the horn-work, and also to throw howitzer shells into the continuation of the faces of that work. The battery No. 3 contained four twenty-four pounders, and two sixteens; it was placed in the parallel towards the left and was within one hundred and ten toises of the covered way; it was destined to batter the curtain and the left face of the bastion on the right. These different works which were began on the 4th, were finished during the night of the 5th of June. In the mean time the engineers pushed forward the zigzag on the right, which they had begun the evening before, and under favour of a hollow way, advanced to within thirty toises of the wall, and began to form there a place of arms. In the night of the 6th forty grenadiers of the 114th, were commanded to carry the small intrenchment, called the horse shoe, which the Spaniards still kept as an outwork, and whence they very much incommoded our attack from below. They carried it like thorough-bred soldiers, with

vigour and rapidity, and maintained themselves there, notwithstanding a keen fire from the fort.

The commander-in-chief, who had been called to Saragossa by the affairs of Arragon, arrived in the camp on the 7th in the morning, and immediately proceeded to visit the trenches, the whole of which, as well as the town, he narrowly examined. Sixteen guns were at that time in battery, and of these he confided the command to the artillery chef-d'escadron, Raffron, an officer of the highest courage; the fire was opened, by his direction, on the 8th of June, at four in the morning. Our superiority was for some time disputed, and three pieces of the battery No. 3, were dismounted by the enemy, but such were the skill and intrepidity of our gunners, that this accident but redoubled their efforts, and the advantage was speedily seen to be on our side. About nine o'clock two large masses of the parapet had tumbled in, four embrasures were rendered useless, and the fire of the fort was nearly silenced. The enemy endeavoured, by keeping up a very sharp fire of musketry, to conceal the check sustained by his artillery, and at the same time he endeavoured to re-mount his guns; but our shells, which occasioned yet more terrible effects on the turret than our bullets did on the ramparts, speedily threw the whole garrison into disorder and alarm.

At ten o'clock the governor ordered a parley to be beaten and terms of capitulation were immediately entered on; the commander-in-chief authorized general Musnier to sign the articles, by which the garrison became prisoners of war. It was, when the fort surrendered, 1400 strong, besides seventy-eight officers. We found within the castle forty-five pieces of ordnance, 400,000 cartridges, 30,000 weight of powder, an immense quantity of cast-iron, and provisions for three months.

The fall of Mequinenza completed our possession of all the fortified places in Arragon. By its conquest we took away from the enemy the last dépôt for stores, the last retreat for his troops, when defeated, on the left bank of the Ebro; and lower Catalonia lost in it an advanced post, of which it could at any time make use to disturb the peace of Arragon, by pouring into it its bands and armed corps, whenever a favourable opportunity presented itself. The capture would have been attended with still more valuable consequences to our arms, had the forts of Cardona, Berga, and Seu d'Urgel been in their turn occupied by our army in Catalonia; for in that case we might have completed the entire submission of the mountain-valleys between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. It was not so ordered, however, and the result was that, during the whole of the war, the mountains, either of Arragon or of Catalonia,

were continually receiving instructions, arms, and ammunition, for the purpose of harassing or attacking our troops.

At all events, it was most important to take advantage of the moment when the enemy was discouraged, and therefore the commander-in-chief, only two hours after the surrender of Mequinenza, gave orders to general Montmarie to assemble his brigade, to penetrate into the kingdom of Valencia, and take possession of Morella. This movement was executed with great celerity, for on the 13th of June our troops entered the castle of Morella, in which they found but eight pieces of cannon, and these in an indifferent condition, and without ammunition; the enemy had neglected that post, though an advantageous one, and capable of being well defended. The commander-in-chief resolved to put it in a respectable state, on account of its possessing the two-fold advantage, that with it he could cover Arragon and threaten Valencia; the Spaniards felt, when it was too late, the importance of occupying this fort. General O'Donohu,* at the head of a body of troops belonging to Valencia, advanced upon the fort at the end of June, and began to take up a position as if he meant to surround the French

* The same who had been wounded and taken at Maria, and who, like Renovalès, had made his escape from Pampelona.

troops, and to cut off their supplies. General Montmarie, with his brave 14th regiment and 3rd of the Vistula, did not, however, allow him to complete that manœuvre; on the contrary, he marched boldly out against him, routed him, and put him to flight. Our possession of Morella was not disputed after this; the army of Arragon established a garrison there in the first instance, which a good while afterwards received some reinforcements; and, with this assistance, our soldiers maintained their position there until the complete evacuation of the kingdom of Valencia. Following the example of the Moors, who long waged war in the same quarter, we took possession of all the rising grounds in the neighbourhood, and fortified them, in order to place our stores, both of provisions, and ammunition, in security, but more especially for the purpose of enabling us to exercise an influence over the population, which, even in those places where it had been subdued, frequently exhibited symptoms of hostility or of discontent. They were, indeed, ever disposed to deny altogether, or at least to undervalue any advantages we might obtain in fighting on plain ground, but the capture of a station, or of a fort, was a positive and indisputable result, the traces of which were not to be erased, and which consequently beat down opinionativeness however obstinate, and silenced incredulity however sceptical.

CHAPTER VI.

Our march on the lower Ebro.—General view of Catalonia.—The 3rd corps receives orders to besiege Tortosa.—Opening of a road from Mequinenza to that city.—Supplies drawn from Arragon.—Military organization of the province during the siege.—Head quarters established at Mora.—Investment of the tête-de-pont at Tortosa.—Sorties of the garrison.—Movements of the Spaniards against the forces of the besiegers.—The French army of Catalonia approaches the 3rd corps.—Junction of the duke of Tarentum with general Suchet at Lerida.—First convoy by the Ebro.—Death of general Laval.—Partial actions.—The army of Catalonia returns to Barcelona.

About this period of the war in Spain, namely, in the summer of 1810, the grand French army took possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, and penetrating into Portugal under the orders of marshal Massena, advanced against the lines of Torres Vedras. The provinces of the north and of the centre were occupied; the army of the interior held Andalusia from Grenada to the walls of Cadiz. The Spanish regency, which was shut up in this last asylum, not only defended them-

selves there with the greatest obstinacy, but cherished most carefully, through the medium of Carthagena and Alicante, the spirited resistance the provinces in the east.

No province in the Peninsula, in a military point of view, is so well organized as Catalonia. The number of strong places it contains is very great,—Roses, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, Seu d' Urgel, Cardona, Lerida, Tortosa, Tarragona, and in the centre, Barcelona, the capital, whose dimensions and strength not undeservedly allow it to rank among the first fortified towns in Europe. This vast province presents such numerous obstacles both natural and artificial, that a French army entering by Perpignan, unless it were numerous and abundantly provided, can never make any efficient progress in it, either in the interior, or even on the coast by the grand route, unless it be supported by a fleet, or by another French corps d'armée operating on the lower Ebro. The 7th corps which was commanded in the first instance by general Gouvion St. Cyr, and afterwards by marshal Augereau, and which, at the period of which we are treating, had been confided to marshal Macdonald, had little or no communication with our other forces in the Peninsula. Its position in a mountainous tract and in the midst of fortresses which it was impossible to take, or to keep when taken, but by the assistance of magazines, compelled

them to remain perpetually in sight of France, for the purpose of drawing supplies from it. The sea meanwhile was shut against them, and land convoys, which are ever so slow, so difficult, and so insufficient, were necessarily to be resorted to for the provisioning of Barcelona alone. Until that task was completed, the military operations of the 7th corps were limited to a very narrow circle, which was every day more and more contracted by the attacks of the enemy. Whilst the junta of the Manresa continued propagating insurrections throughout the whole of the province, the Spanish army, commanded by Henry O'Donnell, manœuvred with the utmost facility at every point where it could hamper or interrupt our movements. O'Donnell was advantageously posted at Tarragona, an ancient city where new defences had been raised and old ones strengthened at a very great expence, and whose maritime position gave it additional importance in a war which the English, by their cooperation, cherished and maintained. Round Tarragona and at a short distance from it, are several wealthy and industrious towns, such as Valls and Reuss; the country, generally, is extremely fertile, well cultivated, and thickly inhabited, and the whole of its produce was deposited in safety, and as a resource in case of necessity in that city. Having his troops concentrated in this spot, as in

an intrenched camp, with a formidable redoubt to protect it, O'Donnell could push forward his squadrons in any direction, as circumstances required, towards Tortosa by the Col de Balaguer; towards Lerida, by Monblanch by Villafranca and Montserrat, by Cardona, or Seu d'Urgel; in a word, by the centre or the extremities of the provinces, as he saw fit. If at any time the 7th corps succeeded in penetrating to the environs of Tarragona it was only when combined and in force; such approaches were merely temporary, and the army in making them, carried along with it neither the means nor had they any intention of undertaking a siege. O'Donnell in these cases, immediately divided his forces and made his escape from our troops by retreating in various directions, and in a short time the want of provisions compelled the French to withdraw once more to the neighbourhood of Barcelona. The Spaniards, in that case, were again left free to operate as they pleased; to seize or to avail themselves of opportunities for attacking us where we happened to be weakly defended or on disadvantageous ground; all which occasions they regularly employed whenever they occurred, and though our men, when they could grapple with the enemy, maintained their wonted superiority in the fair field of battle, yet, in the long run, this painful, tedious, and petty warfare, ac-

companied with so many privations, was frequently attended with unfavourable and mortifying results.

On the 13th May, the same day on which Lerida was assaulted, Hostalrich fell into the hands of the army of Catalonia. The coincidence of dates and the distance between the two places prove that marshal Augereau, so far from being able to carry on the siege of Lerida, had not the means of co-operating in it, although in reality it was the business not less of the 7th than of the 3rd corps. Lerida was the point d'appui of Mequinenza; it is a strong and commanding position which, although lying without the confines of Arragon, forms as it were a headland in that portion of the Arragonese frontier, and by its influence may easily disturb a country that has already submitted or is ready to do so. When general Suchet became master of it he saw himself fully secured in the occupation of the province of which he was governor, and in a condition to afford assistance to the provinces in his neighbourhood. The government, however, did not, as was the case in February, leave him for any length of time in doubt or ignorance of its intentions. On the 29th May the head of the imperial staff wrote to him in the following terms: "The emperor supposes that you are now master of Mequinenza; in that case you will take immediate measures for getting possession of Tortosa also.

The marshal duke of Tarentum will at the same time direct his forces on Tarragona. Take care in the meanwhile to collect all your artillery and to adopt every measure necessary for marching on Valencia and for storming that city ; we must, however, in order to undertake that operation have Tortosa and Tarragona in our power."

When this mandate reached general Suchet, he was already master not only of Mequinenza but of Morella, and consequently in a condition to act as he was directed. His only fear, and that was strengthened by his recent experience at Margalef, was, that he should not be supported in so nice an operation as the siege of Tortosa ; the objection was removed by a promise of assistance on the part of the army of Catalonia. The sole object then contemplated by the general was to hasten the execution of his orders, well persuaded that the capture of Tortosa was the first and most important result at which he could aim. This city, by its situation close to the grand route and to the mouth of the Ebro, served not only as a point d'appui but as a connecting link with the Spanish forces of Valencia and Catalonia. To isolate these forces was to weaken them ; and in consequence they combined most perseveringly in their efforts to prevent the fall of Tortosa ; as they were favoured by circumstances they succeeded in doing so or at least, for a long time in retarding that event.

As we have already stated, the fertile plains of Urgel, which were subject to the influence of Lerida, offered a resource against the wants of the 3rd corps; and one of the first cares of the commander-in-chief had been to levy requisitions there on the coming crop, and thus to ensure a considerable store of provisions for the operations to which he was destined. At the same time, general Vallée was instructed to prepare a battering train, which was accordingly formed of a selection of our own artillery, and of that which had been taken from the Spaniards, and when assembled, it amounted to more than fifty pieces of cannon of different calibres. Mequinenza was the principal entrepot for our ammunition and provisions. Between that town and Tortosa there exists a communication by the Ebro, but the course of that river is interrupted in numerous points by bars, and these it is very often impossible to pass over, unless when the river is accidently swollen by rains, or by the melting of the snows. The communications by land are yet more difficult in a country where the hills are so numerous and become more and more precipitous, in proportion as you advance from Caspe or Mequinenza towards Favares, Batea, Gandessa and Mora, and thence towards Pinel, Las Armas, Xerta and Tortosa. A road by which the operations of an army could be conducted, had in consequence almost to be created; although

there existed some traces, or rather recollections, of that which had been formed, it was said by the duke of Orleans in the war of the succession.*

* Many of the rivers in Spain, like the Rhone above Seyssel, appear to have been forced to hollow out for themselves an issue through the mountains, that perpendicularly bar their free passage, in order to reach the vallies that open on the plains beneath, and from thence to the ocean. It is in this way that the Ebro enters by a gully near Haro, into the broad uniform level which forms its bed in Arragon, and when it approaches Mequinenza the river there again finds itself closed in, narrowed, and obstructed by innumerable obstacles in that chain which it is obliged to traverse in its course to Tortosa, previous to its disemboguing near Amposa. This tract, in which are united the limits of the three provinces of Arragon, Catalonia and Valencia, presents a chaos of mountains where the people, like their streams, have only succeeded in effecting routes, by offering violence, as it were, to nature. The passage of *Las Armas* between Pinel and Xerta, is in this way, one of the most formidable defiles in Spain; it has received its name from the circumstance of a rock of great height, having been rudely chisseled into the shape of a scutcheon, with a coat of arms on it. The latter is that of the keys of Arragon, and the tradition of the country is, that king Jayme, surnamed the Conquistador, (the conqueror) who was so celebrated for his exploits against the Moors, on his return from one of his expeditions into the kingdom of Valencia, was carried on a litter, because of the sickness he then laboured under, and died at the very spot where this monument has been erected to his memory. The following is the account given in an old history, touching this defile, and the passage that the duke of Orleans effected through it:—"From Tortosa to Mequinenza, passing through Las Trincheras, — what is now called Las

On the 21st June, general Pâris, with a brigade of infantry, was sent forward in that direction to occupy the principal points, and the villages, to disperse the parties that infested the country, and at the same time to repulse the troops of the line, who still kept the field in the neighbourhood of Tortosa. General Rogniat despatched some officers of engineers and sappers after this brigade with implements to trace and open a road: the infantry furnished daily from 1,000 to 1,200 men as labourers for that purpose.

The soldiers who had been accustomed to this sort of work, entered on it with great zeal, quitting from time to time the pick-axe for the musket, chasing the enemy and routing them, and then returning cheerfully to their task. It was

Armas — you cross the Ebro by the bridge and proceed to Xerta; at a little distance you leave the road that comes from Flix, the same that leads to Mora by the bank of the Ebro, conducts the pass called Las Trincheras; and this way you go to Pinel, Campocinas, Cervera, and by the right to Gandessa. After passing a small stream (the Algas) you then enter Arragon, and get to Favara, and leaving the road that goes to Caspe, on your left, you journey on until you reach the bank of the Ebro, which you pass by means of a boat, and so get to Mequinenza. The whole of this route may be pursued by carriages; it was so arranged by the duke of Orleans in 1708, the year in which he took Tortosa. It is however, very much exposed to danger from the rains, and by fortifying the pass of Las Trincheras, it would be easy to stop an entire army."

as Mequinenza, became the stations for most important dépôts, whence wheat, flour, oats, and biscuit, were regularly conveyed to the troops by convoys of mules, with Spanish conductors, or by the bat horses attached to the army. Saragossa, and all the rest of Arragon, poured in upon those points the provisions necessary for the supply of our men.

The commander-in-chief confided the care of the province to general Musnier, with whom he left general Buget, who was stationed at Huesca, in order to watch the left bank of the Ebro, with twelve squadrons of foot gendarmes, and a couple of battalions of infantry. General Vergès was posted at Daroca with four battalions, and 100 horse, and covered the right bank, as well as occupied Teruel and Calatayud. In addition to the forces that were left at Saragossa, as well as the garrisons of Lerida, Mequinenza, Jaca, Monzon, and Venasque, a connected series of fortified posts, or of strong barracks, had been established along all the principal roads, which served at the same time as lines of operation, and of communication. The object of these stations was to ensure the safety of troops that had charge of the passage of couriers, and to protect the posts of isolated and detached parties, as well as to see to the furnishing of provisions, the collection of contributions, and the due obedience of the Cor-

regidors and alcaldes, who were intrusted with the execution of the general's orders. This system was pursued in every possible direction; on the right bank of the river at Alagon, Mallen, Tudela, Boya, Taraçona, Epila, Almunia, Maria, Villa de Muel, Cariñena, Fuentès, Zeila, Sanper, Alcañiz; and on the left bank, at Pina, Bujaralos, Candasnos, Fraga, Zuera, Ayerbe, Anzanigo, Canfranc, and several of the Cinco Villas. The officers commanding these fortified points, together with a garrison, and a supply of ammunition and provisions proportionate to their wants, had instructions to be most vigilantly watchful in every case, to defend themselves to the last extremity against any party that might attack them, and to keep up a frequent communication with the posts in their neighbourhood, and with Saragossa, in order that they might be able to give every information of any movements, or reported movements, that might come to their knowledge. The whole of this army of stations, which we were compelled to leave in our rear, did not amount to much less than 12,000 men, of every description, scattered to a certain degree over the country; but all of them occupying essential points, and supported by sufficient reserves, to act promptly and combinedly, should circumstances render it necessary.

These dispositions being made, general Suchet

proceeded first to Alcañiz and then to Caspe, in order to direct the movement upon Tortosa with such a portion of his acting forces as he had destined for the siege of that place. In the commencement of July, general Habert assembled the 3rd division at Belpuig in the plain of Urgel, and after a demonstration, the object of which was to induce a belief that he was about to take the direction of Barcelona, he suddenly turned off to the right, directing his march to the banks of the Ebro by Garriga, and arrived on the 5th at Garcia, without being for a moment disturbed or even followed in his movements. He had under his command eight battalions and a part of the 4th hussars, and received orders to hold himself in readiness to proceed to Tivenis and Tortosa by the left bank of the Ebro, and in the mean while to keep his men together and in a proper state to meet the enemy should any make their appearance.

Laval's division, which was 6,000 strong, left Alcañiz at the end of June, after placing a garrison in the fort of Morella and ensuring the defences and provisioning of that point. They advanced from that place on San Mateo, followed by general Boussard, who commanded a battalion of infantry, 500 cuirassiers, and six pieces of light artillery. General Laval, after proceeding for some time in the direction of Valencia, pushed directly and rapidly forward upon Tortosa. The

chef-d'escadron Mesclop, who commanded the advanced guard of the cavalry, pressed close up to the place by the banks of the river, and surrounded in so doing a part of the Spanish troops that remained without the town and made several prisoners. All the remaining Spaniards retreated into the place by the tête-de-pont, before which general Laval had taken up his position. On the 3rd July the investment was formed on the right bank, and on the 4th he extended his right as far as Amposta, and took possession of the ferry on the high road from Barcelona to Valencia, his left the meanwhile touching on Xerta. General Boussard, with his corps of observation, was stationed on the Cenia, in order to serve as an advance guard against the Valencians.

During the double movement of the 1st and 3rd divisions, the general of brigade, Pâris, had advanced as far as Mora, at which town the commander-in-chief fixed his head quarters on the 6th of July. Without waiting for the completion of the new road, he proceeded to occupy Miravet, Pinel and Las Armas, and thus placed himself in communication with general Laval, and also arranged so as to communicate with the troops of general Habert. Two flying bridges, which general Vallée caused to be brought down from Mequinenza, were established at Mora and Xerta for the purpose of connecting the one bank of the river with the other. The general im-

mediately had a tête-de-pont constructed at each of these points and the whole of the vessels on the river, from Mora and above, as far as the mouth were seized. An attempt was made to burn the bridge of boats at Tortosa, by sending down during the night, by favour of the current, some barks laden with fascines which were smeared with pitch and fired, but without success. The works on the road were carried on with the utmost activity, and the formidable defile of Las Armas was at length rendered practicable. Had the army of Catalonia been in a condition to act as that of Arragon was, it ought at this time to have been in front of Tarragona, or at least on the way to it; general Suchet was led to hope that such would be the case from the despatches of the prince of Neufchâtel, but he had no certainty that it would. The delay was beginning to render him uneasy, although it was readily explained by the difficulty of direct communication, when on the 9th of July he received through an emissary the positive intelligence that marshal Macdonald with his corps d'armée was before Gerona.

From that moment the position of general Suchet before Tortosa, was no longer the same; he even regretted that he had been tempted to invest it, but as he felt persuaded that a retreat might be attended with fatal consequences, he determined to maintain himself where he was,

and to endeavour, by redoubling his efforts, to resist the attempts which he was sure O'Donnell would not fail to make against him. That general had under his command an army of 22,000 men, and it was more than likely as he was left free to act as he pleased, that he would direct on the Ebro a portion of his forces, and that, aided by the garrison of Tortosa, and by the army of Valencia, he would disturb the operations of the siege, which from that time was necessarily converted into a mere blockade of the right bank.

From the 6th to the 8th of July, Laval's division had been occupied in intrenching themselves, although interrupted in their labours by two sorties of the garrison, which they repulsed with equal vigour and firmness. On the 10th, a division of the enemy encamped at Falset, attacked our posts at Tivisa, and surprised the rear guard of one of our reconnoitring parties, which were returning after taking some thirty prisoners. Lieutenant Adoue, who commanded this rear-guard, kept his ground intrepidly for several hours, although completely surrounded on all sides, and thus gained time for succour to be sent to him; he lost the half of his little troop, but he brought back the remainder to the camp. The next morning the attack was renewed on the troops that we had at the tête-de-pont at Mora. Colonel Kliski, who was sent

with ninety-six lancers to support the infantry that were opposed to a greatly superior force, charged the Spaniards boldly, drove them back, and killed a great many of them. On the 12th the commander-in-chief directed general Pâris to attack them in front, whilst general Habert manœuvred by the mountains on their flanks. In order to get a fixed position before this division of the enemy, which constituted general O'Donnell's advanced guard, general Habert, together with the brigade of general Abbé, established himself at Tivisa, an advantageous post in advance, on the left bank of the Ebro, and communicating both with Mora and Ginestar, on the route to Xerta. On the same day (the 12th) a fresh sortie was made by the garrison of Tortosa by about 1,500 men; they forced back the advanced posts of our blockading corps that lay before the hamlets of Jesus and Roquetta. General Laval, at the head of the 4th regiment, soon checked this attempt of the enemy, and he was so well seconded by general Chlopiski with the grenadiers of the Vistula, that the Spaniards, after being driven back to their palisades, were forced to fall back precipitately into the town, leaving several dead and prisoners behind them, and having a great many wounded, whom they carried off.

The object of these three sorties of the garrison of Tortosa, made in such rapid succession,

was to harass our blockading corps, by keeping them in constant motion, whilst the enemy's forces from Tarragona and Valencia, made demonstrations and planned movements for the purpose of attracting our attention to other quarters. The commander-in-chief thought it advisable in consequence, to strengthen the tête-de-pont at Xerta, for the purpose of facilitating the manœuvres of the troops from the one bank to the other; he fitted it up accordingly for the reception of several battalions. In the meanwhile the Valencians thought fit to advance against Morella, under the orders of general O'Donohu, but general Montmarie, who was detached for that purpose, speedily raised the blockade of the fort, and at the same time revictualled it.

Soon after this, a note from general Lacombe St. Michel, governor of Barcelona, announced that marshal Macdonald was busily occupied in making dispositions for the siege of Tarragona, and thence it was fair to conclude that the Spaniards would speedily make a last and grand effort to raise the blockade of Tortosa before Macdonald's approach. In fact, on the 30th of July, Henri O'Donnell marched to Falset with the regiment of Antequerra, the Walloon guards, and 300 of the cavalry of Sant' Jago, with that view. Having collected about 10,000 men he attacked general Habert at Ti-

visa about noon. The number of French in possession at that place, was about 5,000 only, but they were ably commanded and habituated to victory; they repulsed the attack without the slightest confusion, and compelled O'Donnell to retreat. He lost a great number of his men, but did not the less attend to another part of his design, which was to march on Tortosa. This officer, who had been nominated commander-in-chief of the army of Catalonia, and who was invested with very extensive powers, was a man of great energy, and possessed, at the same time, much activity and courage; in his army he was lavish in promoting and cashiering, and was in the habit of conferring rank and decorations on the field of battle.

On the 3rd of August, having drawn up in Tortosa some columns of picked men, to whom he addressed, in the presence of the people of the town a speech, in order to stir up their enthusiasm, he sallied out by the *tête-de-pont* at four o'clock in the afternoon, and marched straight forward on our intrenchments without firing a musket. Our advanced posts were drawn in by this brisk attack, but they soon recovered from their surprise; the men in the camps hastily took up their arms; general Laval put himself at the head of the troops, and while the several points attacked were sustaining themselves as well as they could, he led a column straight against the

enemy's centre, and thus threatened his retreat by the tête-de-pont. This bold manœuvre changed in a moment the aspect of the contest; the Spaniards fell back, and were pursued with great vigour. They were pressed on every side, and got back to the town in complete disorder, leaving behind them a great number of killed and wounded, besides 220 prisoners, almost all of them cavalry.

A letter found on the person of a colonel of the regiment of Grenada, who had been taken prisoner on the 6th of August, in the environs of Lerida, confirmed the reports of Uldecona, which had led us to fear, about the same time, a new movement on the part of the Valencians.* The combination of these efforts though tardily made, appeared to general Suchet, who constantly reckoned on the immediate march of the duke of

* Tarragona, 1st August, 1810.

O'Donnell set out yesterday for Tortosa, taking with him the cavalry of Sant'Jago and two regiments of infantry. I believe he intends to make some attack in that quarter. This movement has taken place in consequence of the arrival of Rodrigues, aid-de-camp to Caro, the commander of the troops of Valencia, who arrived here yesterday morning early. He told me that his commander, Caro, was at San Matéo, and that he had with him 20,000 men; one half of them troops of the line, and one half *Somatens*. We shall soon see what is to be the result of all this, and if it be fortunate I shall let you know. Tell me all that is passing in your quarter, and believe me to be your friend,

Signed CEVALLOS.

Tarentum, to indicate an intention of preventing the junction of two French armies. He resolved, in consequence, to make a powerful effort to get rid of the Valencians also, after having repulsed O'Donnell. With the 12,000 men that he had under his command, all of them old soldiers and full of confidence, he found himself perfectly able, if not to undertake the siege of Tortosa without the assistance of the army of Catalonia, at least to make head both in manœuvring and in fighting against the 30,000 Spaniards, who, from Tarragona and Valencia were continually harassing him and interrupting his operations with more obstinacy than concert. We had not begun any works at the spot where we lay; we had no battering train collected near the town, and could march, in consequence, without difficulty and without fear against any enemy, whether on the right or on the left of the Ebro. To engage the troops that were destined to succour Tortosa was, besides, the best preparatory step that the general could adopt for ensuring the success of the siege.

In consequence of this resolution, he despatched general Harispe with some troops of reserve to the 1st division, gave the head quarters at Mora in charge to general Rogniat, and appointed general Pâris to the command of the tête-de-pont; the whole of general Habert's division was removed to Xerta, and he himself set out on the 13th of August to join the division of Laval. He left

to the blockading corps what troops were necessary for that purpose, and taking with him eleven battalions, partly of the 1st and partly of the 3rd division, 800 horse that had been assembled on the 14th at Uldecona, marched to meet the army of Valencia. General Caro, who commanded that army, instead of making the attack which he had contemplated was encamped at Cervera; as soon as he heard of our troops having abandoned the blockade in order to attack him, he immediately took up a position and awaited our approach. A reconnoitring party of 100 hussars routed his advanced guard and pursued them as far as Vinaros; the hussars were commanded by the chef d'escadron, Galbois, an officer belonging to the staff of his highness the major-general. At Vinaros there was a keenly-contested rencontre, in which we lost captain Charron of the 4th hussars, who was run through the body with a lance; we took fifty-two prisoners and a stand of colours.

General Caro's position was well chosen. The approach to it was difficult; his right rested on Benecarlo, and his left on San-Matéo, in such a way as to render him master of the two grand communications with Valencia. General Suchet was in hopes that the enemy would wait for him there, and with these hopes he advanced by Calig with ten battalions and his field train, while at the same time, he kept his cavalry ready to act

as occasion required. The enemy, however, on our approach, withdrew on Alcala de Chisvert, whither we followed him, leaving a few troops before Peniscola to watch the garrison. General Harispe succeeded in coming up with his rear guard, on which the army once more presented itself in array drawn up in two lines, and we began to form in order to attack it: but without waiting for the completion of our dispositions, the Spaniards dispersed, and continued their retreat rapidly, but without disorder, in different directions. We made a few prisoners, and but a few. It was useless to prosecute farther a movement the object of which was no longer attainable; our troops, therefore, took once more the route to Tortosa, and on the 20th of August the commander-in-chief re-entered his head quarters at Mora. An aid-de-camp of marshal Macdonald arrived there at the same time from Reuss, by way of Falset; he stated that the enemy had precipitately abandoned those two points, and the whole of the neighbouring country on the approach of the army of Catalonia. Had the duke of Tarentum intended to commence the siege of Tarragona, it would have been necessary to take with him his battering train, and he should have had magazines established beforehand, instead of which, his troops found the plain of Tarragona so completely exhausted that they had the greatest possible difficulty in subsisting even

for a few days. O'Donnell had carried off all the grain, and as soon as he saw the 7th corps establishing themselves at Reuss and in the environs, he took up a position for starving them by occupying, with the troops he commanded, Tarragona Valls, and the Col de Ribas, in such force, that although he could not at any of these points stand a general attack, yet he could check detachments and intercept convoys.

The duke of Tarentum was by no means disposed to remain for any length of time in this troublesome position, and with the brave troops that he commanded, he could cut his way in any direction that it was required to direct his operations. The government had instructed him to advance on Tarragona, in order to assist in the siege of Tortosa; but as he himself was not in a condition to besiege the first of these two places, he adopted the resolution of marching to Lerida, in order to communicate with the army of Arragon, and to concert measures with its commander. On the 25th of August, accordingly, he set out with his whole force, which was previously assembled. His advanced-guard took in the first instance the route of the Col de Balaguer, but afterwards changed the direction of its march for the defile of Ribas and Monblanch, where the French and the Italian infantry had a most brilliant affair; the army arrived before Lerida on the 29th of August. Ge-

neral Suchet was informed of this movement by the aid-de-camp of the marshal, and left Mora on the 23rd, passed through Mequinenza, and arrived at Lerida before the duke of Tarentum, in order to receive him at that city. The two generals had no difficulty in agreeing as to what was advisable, and what was practicable in the state of affairs. Before considering those more distant operations, contemplated by the government, it was absolutely necessary to occupy Tarragona and Tortosa, agreeably to the instructions of the prince of Neufchâtel himself.* Prudence, however,

* Rambouillet, 17th July, 1811.

General count Suchet, the emperor has directed me to inform you, that his wish is, as soon as you have made yourself master of Tortosa, you should place that fortress in the hands of the duke of Tarentum; and that you should then concentrate your forces in Arragon, in order to be in a condition to second the expedition, which the emperor will then be ready to direct upon Portugal, an expedition which he intends to make as soon as Tortosa and Tarragona are captured. You will there receive the last instructions of his majesty to divide your troops into two corps d'armée, to march with the first, composed of about 15,000 men, upon Valladolid, manœuvring in such a way as to support the general operations until the English are beaten, and compelled to embark. While thus employed, you will leave a corps of 12,000 men in Arragon; and as soon as the English are driven from Portugal, you will return to Arragon with your 15,000 men; and having united the two corps d'armée, advance upon Valencia, at the same time that the army of Catalonia will direct a division by way of Tortosa; and the duke of Dal-

demanded that they should begin by the siege of Tortosa, and that they should mutually aid each other in that operation. General Suchet found himself quite capable of undertaking it with his own forces, provided he were supported, and Marshal Macdonald in a condition to protect the operations of the siege, if he were furnished with provisions, of which he stood much in want. It was arranged, therefore, that the former should hasten the arrival of his artillery before the fortress; and that the latter should occupy Lerida, in order to collect the produce of the

matia. will co-operate with your expedition, on his part by marching with a corps of 15 or 20,000 men.

In the mean time, it is absolutely necessary to take Tortosa; and to attend as soon as that is done, to the re-assembling of your men, that you may be ready to execute the emperor's orders. You must, of course, take counsel from events as they occur; but you must not, after the capture of Tortosa, quit the country without the emperor's orders.

Signed ALEXANDRE.

Paris, 26th July, 1810.

General count Suchet, agreeably to the last orders transmitted to the duke of Tarentum, he is to march upon Tarragona, while you lay to siege Tortosa. The duke de Feltre, minister of war, has had instructions to inform the duke of Tarentum of the arrangements which I ordered in my letter from Rambouillet, of the 14th June.

Signed ALEXANDRE.

harvest and form magazines. General Suchet gave up to the marshal the amount of the requisitions for provi sions agreed to by the *communes* of the plain of Seu d'Urgel, which is looked on as the granary of Catalonia. He did more; he placed at his disposal 10,000 quintals of wheat, the stores of the 3rd division, which had been collected with great labour at Monzon and at Barbastro. By this distribution, which necessity demanded, he deprived himself of all the stores he might otherwise have procured from Mequinenza and the left bank, and limited his supplies to the remainder of Arragon. The environs of Tortosa offered nothing of the kind for his use; the division of Laval had consumed the whole crop of the left bank, after having got it cut down and thrashed out, and the left bank presented nothing but arid mountains and marshes. The army was in consequence compelled to draw its substance from Saragossa, Teruel, and a number of points in Arragon, at a distance from Tortosa of more than sixty leagues. The difficulty of getting transports very much enhanced the difficulty of provisioning the troops, for at Mequinenza there were but a very small number of barks, which had been collected for the use of the artillery. This service, which was become one of the highest importance, was attended with numerous diffi-

culties, arising out of the season of the year and circumstances which were well calculated to render the general uneasy.

The waters of the Ebro are generally low during the summer, and the enormous cargoes that we had to transport to Tortosa, might, it was foreseen, be detained for a long time on the voyage, or in the port where they then lay. Moreover, the march and the stay of the army of Catalonia, in the neighbourhood of Lerida, as they again left the Spanish army at liberty to manœuvre between Tarragona, Monblanch, and Tortosa, made the navigation of the river extremely perilous. Previous to his quitting marshal Macdonald, who departed early in September, first for Agramont, and then for Cervera, general Suchet took advantage of a moment of security and of a rise of the stream, to despatch the first convoy of artillery from Mequinenza, under the protection of a Neapolitan division of 2,500 men whom the marshal placed for the time under his orders. This corps was composed of a set of fine fellows, but they were badly armed, worse clothed, and had been spoiled, in consequence of incorporating with them most imprudently, a mixture of vagabonds and of persons who had been condemned, or who had been punished as criminals. The discipline of the division felt the effect of this, and the example which was displayed of pillage and of desertion at times, was most fatal,

although the valour of the great mass of the men, and the excellent conduct of the officers, frequently redeemed all their faults. The marshal proposed to the general to dove-tail, as it were, this division, which was commanded by prince Pignatelli, into the main body of his army, and to endeavour to derive some advantage from them, by giving them a stationary position, which is more calculated for supervision, and for the maintenance of order, than marching and countermarching are. The division sometimes displayed the good effect of the pains employed in its behalf, but without entirely losing those vices which were inherent in its constitution. By marching from Lerida down the banks of the Ebro, by way of Llardican, they ensured the safe passage of a convoy of twenty-six breaching cannons of large calibre, which arrived by water at Mora, and were transported thence to Xerta, on the 5th September and there parked. The Neapolitan division was afterwards established at Garcia. On the 3rd the commander-in-chief retired to his head quarters at Mora. General Habert once more took up his old station at Tivisa, and Mas de Mora continued to be occupied by the reserve. As soon as the army of Catalonia had retired from Reuss, the Spaniards again established themselves in force at Falset.

General Laval who had been ill for nearly twenty days, died on the 16th September; he

was deeply regretted by the army and left behind him a reputation of courage and probity, which did honour to his memory. His division, during his absence had been confided to the brave general Harispe, an experienced campaigner, who knew well, not only how to lead his men, but, by the force of his authority and of his example, to make them follow him. The commander-in-chief was of opinion that he could not commit into more steady hands the command of Laval's division and the charge of the blockade of Tortosa; he accordingly requested, and obtained for that officer the rank of general of division, which he well merited by his services and his wounds. General Harispe was replaced in the duties of chief of the army-staff, by the adjutant commandant St. Cyr Nugues, who had filled the office of sub-chief, from the month of May, 1809. He had been formerly an aid-de-camp, the friend and companion in arms of the commander-in-chief, who entertained a real affection for him, and entirely confided in him. Rights so acquired to confidence and esteem, are perhaps with a general, who has charge of an army, the chief merit of the person whom he selects to be his second, before whom, and with whom, he meditates his plans and prepares his operations, and on whom he reposes for ordering their execution when he has matured them for that purpose by counsel and meditation.

As the Valencians whose army had not been subdued, were continually watching an opportunity for advancing to disturb the blockade, count Suchet determined to leave a portion of the brigade of Montmarie, in conjunction with the troops commanded by general Boussard at Ulldecona, and placed this army of observation under the command of the general of division, Musnier, whose place at Saragossa he directed to be occupied by general Pâris; general Vergès came to Mas de Mora. Colonel Kliski, with whose activity the commander-in-chief was well acquainted, received the command of the detached corps that covered the right bank of the Ebro, alternately at Teruel, Montalvan, Daroca and Calatayud, to defend that portion of Arragon from the incursions of Villacampa. That indefatigable partizan was watching, on the frontiers of Castille, for an opportunity of disturbing the operations of the army of Arragon. He kept up a constant correspondence in Saragossa, which compelled the commander-in-chief to take measures of precaution, and occasionally to employ both severity and menaces. He obstructed wherever his influence extended, the supply of provisions to the French, and especially the requisitions of cattle necessary for the subsistence of the troops assembled on the banks of the Ebro. On the 7th of August at Las Cuevas,

colonel Plicque, who was bringing 6,000 sheep with a detachment of the 114th regiment and of the 14th hussars, was surrounded and attacked by nearly four thousand men. He maintained an obstinate fight, in which he lost three officers and a number of soldiers, and only got back to Alcañiz by leaving his convoy behind him. The following evening captain Cantiloube, a brave officer, who commanded a detachment that was conducting some cattle, was surrounded and taken at Andorra, on the side of Montalvan. About the same time the Guerillas of Navarre, under the direction of general Reilly, who had just assumed the command in that quarter, penetrated into Cinco Villas, where they surprised and killed the war-commissary, Gondoin, who with a detachment of gendarmes, was occupied in collecting provisions. These several losses affected us very sensibly. The army of Arragon, which had been master of a fertile province, above all things in wheat and wine, had yielded to an auxiliary corps the whole of its magazines. It could neither send out to seek for provisions, nor bring them safely in when obtained; it was, in consequence, in imminent hazard of wanting food altogether, was reduced to drink water for want of boats to bring wine, and had, in fact, nothing on which it could safely reckon but its rations of bread, which were procured with great difficulty, and

by efforts that were constantly to be repeated. Chief commissary Bondurand, who had, for a long time, been attached to Suchet's division in the grand army, at length arrived, and took charge of the administration of the 3rd corps. His probity and intelligence were known to the commander-in-chief, who had requested his services as head commissary, and who had afterwards the highest reason to congratulate himself on having obtained them. By thus surrounding himself with men who merited his confidence, and whose only aim was to justify his good opinion, he obtained advantages which his position, very frequently, did not entitle him to expect. The privations endured by the army were rare, and never arose out of imprudence or disorder, and when they were inevitable, the devotedness of the men, rendered them light, from the courage and patience with which they were borne.

General Suchet had soon an opportunity which he eagerly seized of repairing the injury inflicted by Villcampa, in carrying off his sheep. That partizan, in the month of September, advanced towards Montalvan with his troops, which were greatly augmented by recruits and armed peasants, and threatened to disturb the tranquillity of a part of Arragon. In the hope of getting up with, and defeating him, general Habert was detached from the camp before

Mora, with the 5th regiment of light infantry. By a rapid movement, he rallied round him the troops which colonel Plicque had at Alcañiz, and those of Kliski at Muniessa, and marching straight upon Villacampa, the latter was compelled to disperse, and to re-cross the frontiers of Cuenca and Valencia. A general search that took place, in consequence of this event, gave us back the sheep we had lost, and furnished the army with the provisions they so much required.

The only thing that especially pressed on the attention of the commander-in-chief after this success, was, the transport of the artillery that had been used in the siege of Mequinenza, and that was now to be employed in that of Tortosa. At the former place every thing was ready: guns, ammunition, gabions, fascines, and every other requisite. An attempt was made to float another convoy of artillery, but the water was so low that it was found impossible, and the commander-in-chief determined to begin the transport of the guns by land. The new road, though exceedingly well made, traversed rugged hills and a desert uninhabited country, which presented no resources for the purpose; a single convoy by water would have brought down more in three days than 15 or 1,800 horses could in a month. But perseverance consists in always advancing

towards its object speedily if possible, but if not at least steadily though slowly. Several convoys of guns were brought by land; some of the Valencians and Catalonians attacked one that was passing through the defile of Las Armas on the 29th; but captain Claudot of the 117th regiment, who commanded in that quarter, defended it with as much intelligence as courage, and nothing was lost.

During the months of September and October the army of Catalonia continued to occupy the plain of Urgel to considerable purpose, but notwithstanding a large quantity of grain it afforded them, they were not yet in a condition to approach the army of Arragon and to co-operate with it, and our corps in consequence found themselves shut up in the lower Ebro without the power of effecting any thing. The only chance of the commander was in a rise of the waters and in the assistance that circumstances might render him; his expectations were deceived. On the 28th of October marshal Macdonald wrote to him: "The governor of Barcelona has announced to me the approaching departure of a convoy from Perpignan between the 2nd and the 4th of November, and he presses me in the name of general d'Hilliers to favour its advance. Were this convoy taken or dispersed, Barcelona might be lost, and there can be no doubt that the enemy will

try every means of intercepting it. My presence alone can ensure its safety, and you are well aware that even were the chances equal, we could not expose ourselves to this hazard which if it happened to be against us would be without remedy." The preservation of Barcelona was an object before which all others must of necessity yield. The passage of a convoy by Figueras, Gerona, and Hostalrich, might have appeared to be sufficiently assured by the body of troops which the duke of Tarentum had left in upper Catalonia, but that corps had recently met with a check at Abisbal, which rendered it a matter of prudence not to leave it unsupported by the efforts of O'Donnell's army on so important an occasion. O'Donnell had by a bold coup-de main just succeeded in cutting off general Schwartz and the men he commanded on the sea coast between Palamos and the mouth of the Ter; in the action he had received a severe wound which incapacitated him from acting, but not from commanding, and the vigour and activity of his men seemed rather increased than diminished by the accident. General Suchet who, with a view to soften the rigours of war, never allowed an opportunity to escape him of establishing honourable connexions with the generals of the enemy, sent a messenger to request the exchange of a wounded officer who had been taken prisoner, young Detchatz, lieu-

tenant of the 5th light infantry, and at the same time to make an offer to general O'Donnell of a surgeon. The Spanish commander did not accept it; but he expressed extreme gratitude on account of it, and sent back the officer on his parole.

CHAPTER VII.

Suspension of the operations of the siege of Tortosa.—Espoz y Mina in Navarre.—Affairs at Alventosa and Fuenta Santa.—Continuation of the blockade.—Meeting of a junta at Mora.—Battle at Falset.—Battle at Ulldecona.—Arrival of the 7th corps and marshal Macdonald.

The removal of the army of Catalonia once more postponed the opening of the siege of Tortosa, and in relation to the subsistence of the army, very much augmented the difficulty of that operation. The two months which subsequently passed away were not destitute of incidents, in the province of Arragon, on the one side and on the other; in the army of the lower Ebro there were a number of military events which, as they are directly connected with our future narrative we shall briefly describe. If some of those affairs in detail appear to have lost their interest, it must be recollected that the commander-in-chief made it his study and had succeeded in persuading all the individuals under his command wherever they were or however posted, that every one of them

was of sufficient importance to be watched and appreciated. Even now, though so long a time has since elapsed, it constitutes a large portion of his enjoyment to let them know that he has never forgotten them, and that their services are ever present to his recollection.

At the period of the equinox some rains fell, which appeared to favour the navigation of the Ebro. On the 17th September, we attempted to put in motion a convoy of boats laden with artillery, with a view to their conveyance from Mequinenza to Xerta. The Neapolitan battalion which was established at Flix, was sent to the left bank, to protect the passage of the guns, where it was attacked by a strong column of the enemy. The soldiers of the battalion did not stand the attack, although the nature of the ground offered every facility of resistance or retreat. They allowed themselves to be surrounded, and then threw down their arms. Their commander, Labrano, made every effort in his power to prevail on them to fight, but in vain; he himself, with all his officers, was taken, after being wounded in the action; fortunately the convoy, from want of water, had not been able to leave the port. On the 21st it was detained by the same cause, at the moment its safe transit was ensured by a new disposition. The commander-in-chief was willing to afford to the remainder of Pignatelli's brigade an opportunity of wiping out

the affront that they had suffered in the presence of an army accustomed to conquer, and where a generous spirit of emulation animated the whole corps, both Frenchmen and foreigners. Eight hundred Neapolitans, joined to 800 of the soldiers of the 116th, attacked the enemy, who occupied in force the heights on the left bank; the Neapolitans took the lead in the attack, and showed the greatest courage; the Spanish positions were carried, and the enemy put to flight.

About this time, 30,000 men coming from France, entered Biscay and Navarre. General Reilly intended at first to profit by their stay, for the purpose of destroying the bands, and to clear the frontiers of Arragon of their visits, but he had no time to effect his purpose, as these troops were almost all sent into Portugal. A new partisan, Espoz y Mina, the uncle and successor of the younger Mina, who has since become much more celebrated than his nephew, by the high talents which practice rapidly developed, had just assumed the command of the whole of the Guerillas of Navarre, and had taken up his station in the Cinco Villas. From that moment none of our strong posts remained unthreatened, and frequent attacks compromised the small garrisons who occupied them. Afterwards, however, the chef d'escadron of the gendarmerie at Exea, and the Polish captain, Venzesky, at Tarraçona tried what a stand would

try, and obey the instructions given to him, he must get up with Villacampa, and defeat him.

On the 12th of November, he drove in the vanguard of the Spaniards to Villastar, which is in advance of Villel, and established himself before the Fuente Santa, which the enemy occupied in force, his position being intrenched and his corps echeloned and leaning on the Guadalaviar, and upon a series of inaccessible precipices. About one o'clock of the day, after having drawn up his troops he gave the signal for attack. Two battalions of the 121st, commanded by colonel Millet, with the voltigeurs and grenadiers of the 1st of the Vistula, conducted by the chef de bataillon, Fondzelski, marched in array under the orders of colonel Kliski, having for their second line colonel Kozinowski, with the fusileers of the second of the Vistula; the rest of the troops were kept in the rear, in order to be used as a reserve for the troops that attacked, and to assist them if necessary. The fire of the enemy was terrible; the Spaniards, indeed, always opposed us most obstinately from behind intrenchments, or in positions where they could not be turned. Colonel Millet had no sooner arrived at the bottom of the hill than his horse was shot under him; he then led his troops on foot, and in so doing a ball carried away a finger of his right hand; his advance was not checked by that

accident, but in a minute or two after, a ball struck him and knocked him down; it was at first thought he was killed, but he speedily scrambled up again and put himself at the head of his men, who despite of every obstacle, continued to clamber up the steep under a most tremendous fire. The Poles, meanwhile on the right, displayed a degree of courage not less exemplary. Neither the precipitous ascent, nor the resistance of the enemy could keep back our intrepid fellows, who, after a most sanguinary contest, took possession of all the positions of the enemy, and reached the top of the mountain as conquerors. Terror and route led to the immediate disappearance of the Spanish army; they threw down their arms with precipitation and made for the bridge of Libras in great disorder. The bridge which was encumbered with the fugitives, broke down under their weight, and a large number of them were drowned. The loss of the vanquished was very considerable, and ours was not less than 130 men disabled, and a Polish officer and five men of the 121st were killed. Colonel Millet, who had just obtained the command of this regiment, made, it will be perceived, a most brilliant debut; and the regiment as well as its leader, were thenceforth to the end of the war, well worthy of being ranked among the brave of the army of Arragon.

After this rapid expedition, general Chlopiski

returned with his brigade to Tortosa, while colonel Kliski remained in charge of 1,200 men, to defend the right bank of the stream against Villacampa. While these engagements were taking place, on a sudden on the 1st of November, after having been so long and anxiously waited for, the waters of the Ebro began to rise. We were eager, of course, to take advantage of this circumstance, and to embark at Mequinenza the remainder of the materials required for the siege. Seventeen barks set out on the 3rd at six o'clock in the morning, escorted by a body of troops on each bank of the stream. In a short time, however, the rapidity of the current, in spite of every attempt that could be made to retard the advance of the convoy, hurried it on, and when it came before Ribaroya it had drifted a great way ahead of the escorts: it was, in consequence, attacked by 700 Spaniards in a narrow defile, before our troops had time to overtake it. Compelled to give way to the fire of the enemy, the boats steered for the right bank, but two of them were caught in the current, and drawn by its violence within the powers of the enemy, and the gunners who were on board were, in consequence, made prisoners. Lieutenant Jauney, a distinguished pupil of the polytechnic school, saved himself by swimming, and regained the right bank. The enemy meanwhile continued their attack on the convoy. Colonel Raffron and captain d'Esclaibes, aid-de-camp to general

Vallée, displayed as much presence of mind as bravery; fifty artillery men, who were ably posted for the purpose, returned for two hours the fire of the musketry on the left bank until the arrival of the escorts, and also of general Abbé, who marched up the stream from Garcia with a column of troops. The Spaniards burnt the two boats and then retreated; the mortars that formed their lading were, however, got out of the river, in the course of the next and following day, without damage. In this affair sixteen artillery men were killed or taken, and one Neapolitan soldier was killed and ten wounded; some of the Arragonese boatmen were wounded; during the contest they had displayed as much zeal as courage.

From the 4th to the 7th the recession of the waters again placed the convoy in a hazardous situation. The commander-in-chief determined on a diversion from Mora to succour it. General Abbé was reinforced, and by several sharp attacks kept the enemy at a distance from the river; general Habert, with the same object, was directed on Falset with 1,500 men, to occupy the attention of the Spanish troops. Habert surprised two of the enemy's camps as well as a flying hospital. Lieutenant du Fillion, with eighty carbiniers of the 5th light infantry, stood repeated charges of the Spanish cavalry, and on every occasion drove them

back. Under favour of these efforts, the convoy kept descending, although not without difficulty, (in passing the bar at Flix, two more boats were wrecked, although their cargoes were saved) and at length arrived at its destination. Thus, on the 9th of November, the artillery and the engineers found themselves, in spite of all the obstacles, that had been opposed to them, in possession at Xerta, partly by water carriage, partly by land carriage, of every thing that was necessary, and were ready whenever they were called on, to commence the siege.

While matters were in this state of forwardness, however, the governor of Barcelona, in a letter dated 20th of November, informed the commander-in-chief that general Macdonald had gone to Gerona. The situation in which these impediments placed the besieging army, became daily more difficult, for although we had contrived, up to that date, by very great efforts to ensure subsistence for our soldiers, it appeared quite impossible to make provision for the lack of forage for our horses employed in the cavalry, artillery, and in the transport service. A combination of events augmented our difficulties, at the moment when we conceived we had arrived at the end of them. During the forced stagnation, which arose out of this state of things, general Suchet convoked at Mora, a junta consisting of the principal authorities of Arragon, among whom were the heads of the

clergy, who next to the grandees of Spain, are the richest proprietors in that kingdom, and in concert with this junta, concerted such measures, as well for the pressing necessities of the army, as for its future wants, as will be more fully detailed in the following chapter. With a view to second the approach of the army of Catalonia, which was from day to day expected, the commander-in-chief determined on an expedition against Falset; this took place on the 19th November; general Habert proceeded directly thither, with the 115th, and the hussars of the 4th, whilst general Abbé, with the 116th, advanced against the right of the position, and the chef de bataillon, Avon, who was posted at Garcia, marched against its left, for the purpose of engaging the enemy's attention, and dividing his force. This manœuvre should have procured us a great number of prisoners, but the rapidity of the attack on the centre, did not leave us time for that purpose. The camps were carried after a sharp but brief resistance, in which the enemy had fifty men killed; but the combat was terminated by the approach of general Abbé towards the route of Reuss. The enemy was pursued into Falset, and beyond it; their magazines, ammunition, and a great number of muskets fell into our hands, as well as three hundred petty officers and soldiers, besides fourteen superior officers among

whom were the count de Cañada, mayor of Grenada, and brigadier Garcia Novarro, ex-governor of Tortosa. In one of the cavalry charges connected with this affair, there was an individual contest between the leaders of the two troops, that is not undeserving of notice. The officer of the Spanish cavalry, a man of lofty stature, menacingly challenged the lieutenant of hussars, Pate, a brave soldier, who had previously lost an eye during the war. The challenge was accepted, and the combat between the two troops, was for a moment, as if by tacit accord, suspended, in order that its issue might be the better observed. In a very short time the two leaders were hand to hand, and fortune favouring the Frenchman, the Spaniard was thrown from his horse, and our hussars charging at that instant, routed and dispersed the detachment of Spanish cavalry.

On the 26th of November, a flotilla that had come from Peniscola, advanced to attack our posts at Rapita and Alfaques, whilst the governor of Tortosa, with whose knowledge it took place, made also some demonstrations as if he meant to disturb us at Amposta and at the mouth of the Ebro. On the night of the 26th the commander-in-chief of the Valencian army, general Bassecourt, advanced to attack general Musnier at Ulldecona. A column of infantry was directed on Alcanar, for

the purpose of attacking Ulldecona on the right; another set out from Traiguera, and marched behind the mountains in order to take up a position at LasVentallas, in the rear of the road that leads to, and so cutting off our communication with Tortosa. The mass of the attacking force advanced direct upon Vinaros in front, and when it was near, a fresh column of infantry was detached to the left, to occupy the height that commanded Ulldecona. General Musnier had just received, by the return of his reconnoitring parties on the right, information of the approach of the enemy, and was issuing orders to the troops at Ulldecona, to stand to their arms when general Bassecourt, who hastened the march of his cavalry, during the obscurity of the night arrived at the camp of a battalion of the 14th which covered the town, having previously driven in our advanced posts. Our men immediately sallied out of their barracks, drew up in the twinkling of an eye, and without any direction, and merely the cry of "the Spaniards!" checked the advance of the enemy by an admirably kept up fire. The colonel of the queen's regiment with a great number of others were wounded, and remained abandoned by their companions, who fell back to take up a more distant position. At the same moment, general Musnier, together with generals Boussard and Montmarie, advanced with the hussars, the cuirassiers, and

the 114th regiment of the line; day beginning to dawn, discovered to us the whole of the heights in the neighbourhood on the right and left covered by the enemy. Colonel Esteve of the 14th of the line, with one of his battalions, was immediately directed against an old tower on the summit of the hill, of which the Spaniards had taken possession. His assault was so impetuous, that he dislodged them from their position. He had with him but a mere handful of hussars, he made his soldiers cast off their knap-sacks, and dashing onwards with great swiftness overtook the Spaniards, put them to the rout, and made 300 prisoners. The detachment of the enemy that had been placed in the rear of Ulldecona, at Las Ventallas, was no sooner aware of this, than it withdrew in the direction of the mountains. Meantime, general Montmarie marched in the direction of Alcanar, and general Boussard, at the head of the cuirassiers, advanced by the high road. The Spaniards now retired, and took up a position behind Cenia, but it was not difficult to perceive that, although they had thus rallied, they could not withstand a vigorous attack. General Musnier therefore combined his forces, and advancing directly upon the enemy he threw the cuirassiers by a rapid movement into the road from Venaros to Benecarlo. The cuirassiers got to their station in good time to intercept and pick up the

fugitives, for the dispositions we had made speedily converted the retreat of the Spaniards into a complete rout. They immediately dispersed, threw away their arms, and the majority of them escaped by favour of the woods and ravines; more than 1,500 were however taken by the cavalry. General Bassecourt sought an asylum in Peniscola.

Whilst our advanced guard was thus engaged, general Harispe, who lay before Tortosa, being informed of the movements of the enemy by sea, had sent captain Sieyes with a detachment and some artillery to the succour of the posts of Rapita; that officer ably acquitted himself of this commission. The enemy's vessels, kept in check by our howitzers, were afraid to attempt any thing, and ultimately retired in the direction of Peniscola. The garrison and population of Tortosa expected a happy issue of their double assault, and the fort during the whole day kept up a brisk fire on our camps, without however attempting a sortie.

A rather numerous column of prisoners who had been taken in the different affairs, in the end of November were sent to France by way of Saragossa and Jaca, under the escort of a party, commanded by Haxo general of engineers, who had been summoned to Paris by government. This officer, who had assisted general Laval in the arrangements for the blockade of Tortosa, left

with the commander-in-chief, when he set out a plan of attack, which at a later period was put in practice.

The commander-in-chief, having succeeded in transporting the whole of this artillery to Tortosa, was anxious to employ the same means which had been used in doing so, to ensure a supply of provisions for the army of Catalonia, and to form magazines for it at Mora. On the 27th of November thirteen boats laden with grain started from Mequinenza to descend the Ebro. Fearful of not being able to keep pace with the convoy, the detachments appointed to escort it, got before it, and general Abbé with the 116th, marched up to the left bank from Vinebre, as high as Flix and Ribaroya. Six hundred Spaniards who had concealed themselves in the neighbourhood of Mequinenza, contrived to elude our soldiers, notwithstanding all their precautions, and to attack the boats before they could get up with the escorts. Sixty-six men belonging to the garrison of Mequinenza, partly gunners, and partly infantry, had been placed in eschelon at a little distance merely to ensure the safe departure of the boats. They were commanded by captain Cory of the 121st, and by lieutenant Guillardin of the artillery. These brave fellows, notwithstanding the inequality of their numbers, rushed forward to protect the boats which had pushed over to the right bank, under the protection of the musketry, of their

directors who had landed for that purpose. The whole of the Spanish attack was then turned against the handful of men on the left bank. An obstinate combat was the consequence, which lasted for several hours; our men bravely defended themselves with the butt ends of their muskets, and with their bayonets, until both their ammunition and their strength were exhausted. At length the Spaniards having received news of the near approach of onr reinforcements, and irritated at their losses, made a last attempt; the officer of artillery was killed, together with fifteen men, and captain Cory and the whole of the detachment, the greater portion of them wounded and disabled, were taken, except one or two who threw themselves into the river and escaped by swimming. The convoy was saved and arrived at Mora next morning; even this advantage however did not console the general for the loss of brave men who were well worthy of a better fate.

At length, after such long expectation, general Suchet saw the moment at hand, when his army, which had lain six months before Tortosa, might commence the siege of that place. In order to acquire a new title to glory, our soldiers had only to exert their wonted courage. On the 2d of December marshal Macdonald apprised them that he had got a large convoy safely conducted to Barcelona, that he had left in that place

a garrison of 6,000 men, and that general Baraguey d'Hillier was at Gerona, and Figuères with 14,000 the greater part of whom were effective, and ready to take the field; and lastly, that he himself was on the eve of marching towards the Lower Ebro, with 15,000 men: in fact, the marshal arrived at Mora on the 13th.

General Suchet had made every preparatory arrangement; Habert's division was close to Xerta, together with the reserves of the artillery and engineers; the army of Catalonia on arriving at the position which we had occupied, immediately established itself there, and general Suchet having concerted with the duke of Tarentum the measures he intended to pursue, removed his head-quarters to Xerta.

CHAPTER VIII.

Description of Tortosa.—Investment of the fortress.—Opening of the trenches.—Operations of the breaches.—Occupation of the tête-de-pont.—Descent of the ditch.—The fortress offers to capitulate.—The firing re-commences.—General Suchet enters the town, and compels the governor to capitulate.

The fortress of Tortosa is washed by the Ebro and its rear rests on a chain of hills that rise behind it. It is defended by an outer wall furnished with bastions, part of which takes in the elevated ridges of the Col d'Alba, which terminates in the town itself; the other part encloses a portion of the plain which extends up and down the river between the foot of the heights to the bank. On the south side stand the two bastions of San Pedro and San Juan, united by a curtain without terraces which is covered by the half moon battery of the Temple. The outer wall then rises on the plateau of rocks where the three bastions of Santa Cruz, San Pablo, and San Juan are situated. On quitting the last named bastion, the outer wall descends into a deep

ravine, and joins a precipitous rock on whic
castle is situated. The space that remain
tween the castle and the river is shut up
very narrow front, and the whole of this
from the bastion as far as the suburbs an
Ebro, is enclosed by another wall of which
a few parts are terraced. The approache
the castle are defended by works conn
with the outer wall. The north side, more
is protected by a horn-work called the
axas, placed on a height over the suburbs,
commanding both the plateau and the plain.

In the war of the succession the duke of Or
took Tortosa by an attack in front, but the
thus assaulted was strengthened after the sie
the construction of a fort to which the na
Orleans is still attached. This fort is comp
of a lunette with a ditch cut in the solid rock
a covered way, and of an irregular work o
right which descends and takes an opposite d
tion towards the plain of the lower Ebro.
town, which lies wholly on the left bank of
Ebro, communicates with the right bank, by m
of a bridge of boats covered by a tête-de-pont,
defended and sheltered from all attempts at in
The increase of the defences and the combinati
the whole rendered the place much more diff
of capture than in 1708, especially when we c
der that the duke of Orleans, who was suppo
in Catalonia by the duke de Noailles as we

by the duke de Tarentum, possessed an advantage which we did not. Not only had he nothing to fear on the side of the sea, but he had been master of the country of Valencia from the period of the battle of Almanza, and it was thence that he drew his principal means of attack, the corps of the chevalier d'Asfeld and its artillery.

Placed in a very different situation, general Suchet was obliged to leave the corps of general Musnier, for the purpose of observation at Ulldecona, during the whole course of the siege, because he had every reason to fear that the Valencian army, by some manœuvre, would endeavour to disturb his operations. On the 16th of December, general Abbé, with the 114th and 115th regiments, relieved at Roquetta, in front of the tête-de-pont, a part of the division of general Harispe. The latter, who left the 3rd of the Vistula there, took with him the 2nd of the Vistula, and the 44th of the line; and on the night of the 16th instant, reached Xerta, where there were three battalions of the 117th. In the course of the same night, general Habert, who had with him the 5th light infantry, the 116th, and 300 hussars, occupied the convent of the desert, whence he had driven some parties as far as Perello, and advanced by the mountains upon the Col d'Alba, a commanding position, where the Spaniards were at the time intrenched. He was ordered to take possession

of it as soon as possible, to capture or drive out the troops that held it, to establish a strong post there, and afterwards to come down upon the town with his division. Before day-break the commander-in-chief crossed over with all the forces that were assembled at Xerta to the left bank of the Ebro. Having assembled eight battalions on the tête-de-pont, together with the sappers, and 150 hussars, he formed his columns, and marched forward by the route of Tivenis and Biten, which runs along the Ebro, and the foot of the hills, directing his course towards the fort of Las Tenaxas, on the north side of the place. The 117th, which was in advance, having arrived in view of the fort, began the investment on the right. A battalion was left in reserve, to cover the road of Xerta, and another was established in the ravine that approached nearest to the fort, observing at the same time the bank of the river; the third, which supported the right of the second, was placed at those points which commanded the fort, and the advance to the castle. General Harispe followed the movement of the 117th, across ravines and precipices that were very difficult to pass. He continued to prolong his march round the place, and was on the point of capturing a column of Spaniards that was coming down the mountain, and which was close pressed by ge-

neral Habert. The latter, who was now master of the Col del Alba, advanced to fill up the interval on the left of the 117th, and occupied with the 5th light infantry and the 116th, a very favourable position, whilst general Harispe completing the same work, and finishing the investment to the bank of the Ebro below the town, established his camp near the road to Amposta, which forms the grand communication with Tortosa, and joins the royal road of Barcelona and Valencia. A few reserves, the cavalry, the camps of the battering train and of the sappers, were placed in the rear of the camp of general Harispe; in front, on the right bank, were those of the 3rd of the Vistula, and of the 114th and 115th regiments, commanded by general Abbé.

The first care of the commander-in-chief was to establish communications between the two banks of the stream; unfortunately, the two or three boats and the pontoons that the army had in its possession, were not sufficiently numerous for the construction of a bridge. General Vallée provided, however, for this service with great celerity. On the night of the 15th, three flying bridges were established above and below the place, and the number was ultimately augmented to four. It was in fact necessary to ensure considerable means of transit, for almost all the guns, fascines, gabions, tools,

and provisions had to be brought down behind the Roquetta, and in the front of the camps of general Harispe, and thence to be carried over from the one bank to the other, at a spot where the stream was at least 100 toises wide. Neither the fire of the garrison, the shallowness of the waters, nor the violence of the winds, all of which they had occasionally to encounter, could weary out the constancy, or conquer the courage of our pontoon-men.

The 16th and 17th were employed in rectifying our positions, in driving in the enemy's advanced posts, and sending reconnoitring parties towards divers points of the place, both by day and by night. The commander-in-chief published the regulations to be observed by the working parties, and the price to be paid for the digging of the trenches, as well as for the shells and balls that might be picked up, and brought to the dépôt of the artillery, and appointing the means for carrying off, and for attending to the wounded. On the 18th, after all the various reports had been given in, and the respective generals had been consulted, he determined to commence the siege, by the demi-bastion of San Pedro, conformably to the design left by general Haxo, of which we have already spoken. In fact, the surrounding surface presented a soil easy to be dug for our trenches, and by that point we could get at the outer wall,

without being called on to take any advanced work. This bastion, as well as the half-moon battery in its neighbourhood, is commanded and enfiladed by the heights, in advance of fort Orleans; it was, therefore, an indispensable preliminary of the attack, to occupy those heights, where the enemy himself would otherwise have enjoyed over us, that very advantage which it was absolutely necessary that we should possess against them. They had already designed some works on these heights, but they were not sufficiently firm and compact to admit of being defended. On the 19th we took possession of them, and on the evening of the same day, the trenches were opened against fort Orleans by 500 labourers, supported by 400 grenadiers, or voltigeurs, who were protected by a flying sap and posted within eighty toises of the covered way, in a line extending about 180 toises. At every point however the solid rock was met with, and it was necessary, in consequence, to employ the miner, and to form parapets with bags of earth. Next morning, this very imperfect work was found to have suffered greatly by the fire of the fort; but no ground was lost in consequence. The chef de bataillon, Plagniol, who directed the assault, displayed great energy, and by his personal example, greatly encouraged his men;

the captain of engineers, Séa, was on this occasion killed by a shot in the head.

On the 20th of December the principal attack against the demi-bastion of San Pedro commenced. Under favour of a violent wind and hazy weather, which kept the enemy from hearing or seeing, 2,300 workmen and twenty select companies, under the orders of the general of brigade, Abbé, colonel Robert of the 117th, and colonel Meyer, first aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, were led to the ground arranged for the opening of the trench under the direction of the officers of engineers. The parallel was opened from the rear as far as the foot of the heights in front of fort Orleans, and terminated on the right, opposite to the left end of the trench that had previously been opened by the chef de bataillon, Plagniol. The whole work was 280 toises in length; towards the left it approached within about eighty toises of the salient angle of the place of arms of the demi-bastion of San Pedro. We opened at the same time two communications; one, on the right of the parallel of 160 toises, terminating in a ravine, called the ravine of the Capuchins; a natural shelter of which it was thought right to take advantage, and the other on the left, which ran in a straight line to a hollow way about 800 toises in the rear, which connected our camps. These works, which were as bold as they were

simple, were planned and directed by general Rogniat, and saved us a great deal of time, which the approaches would otherwise have cost us. The execution of them was confided to the chef de bataillon, Henry, who conducted the attack on the centre. The chef de bataillon, Chulliot, on the right bank with 400 labourers, supported by 300 grenadiers, caused at the same time a trench to be opened against the tête-de-pont, at 100 toises distance, with a communication in the rear. Next day these works were continued and completed. General Valée had the marking out of the batteries, and a large portion of the labourers was placed at his disposal.

Whilst our preliminary works were in progress at Tortosa, the duke of Tarentum marched on the 1st upon the village of Perello, to cover the siege and to stop any movements of the enemy from Tarragona. The difficulty of procuring a sufficient means of carriage to enable his army to subsist in the midst of a sterile and desert country, determined him, however, to return to Ginestar, whence he despatched a division of infantry to act under the command of count Suchet, commanded by general Frère, consisting of 6,000, which formed part of the Palombini Italian brigade, together with a regiment of cavalry, the 24th dragoons. This was a real service rendered to the besieging army. General Suchet placed these troops in the rear of the di-

vision of general Harispe on the Amposta road, by which the enemy, when coming from Tarragona must have advanced. Being thus placed in a condition to meet the enemy wherever he showed himself, and being at liberty to employ the whole of his infantry in the very fatiguing service of the trenches, his thoughts were now wholly bent on the means of accelerating the fall of Tortosa.

On the 22nd the parallel of fort Orleans being in a great measure finished, we debouched by a passage of twenty-five toises in length, executed by flying sap with an amorce of the second parallel on the edge of the ravine. We attempted to debouch in a similar manner on the right, but the ground was so difficult and so bare of earth that during the day the guns of the fort destroyed the works, and compelled us to abandon them. In the attack on Saint Peter we opened two trenches, by which to push forward, the one opposite the half moon of the temple, where we gained about thirty toises in advance, by means of a zig-zag of eighty; and the other, which was forty toises, and which lay opposite to the demi-bastion of San Pedro. By these several approaches, we got within forty toises of the place of arms. During the night the enemy threw a number of fire balls on our men, and kept harassing us by showers of grape and musketry from the covered ways. On the right we were obliged to suspend our

operations in consequence of these interruptions; and in the centre, several attempts at sorties were repelled. The labourers of the 2nd and 3rd of the Vistula rendered themselves conspicuous for their bravery on these occasions, and fought under the command of the captains of engineers, Hudry and Foucauld, as guards of the trenches. The two sides of the second parallel were amorced at thirty toises only from the demi-bastion, but at fifty toises from the half moon, in order to protect it, in the latter case, from the destructive fire of the castle of Orleans. On the left bank the enemy attempted a sortie by means of the tête-de-pont, but were checked by the 114th and 115th. As the left of our trench admitted of being turned, it was strengthened with a redoubt; and in the meantime the erection of the batteries was carried on with the utmost activity. Those on the right had to be established on a piece of rocky ground, and frequently on the rock itself, and thus demanded much painful labour; a great number of our men were wounded in the course of their erection, as the Spaniards did not fire less than 1,000 or 1,200 balls in the course of a day.

On the night of the 25th, about eleven o'clock, a tremendous fire opened from the fortress, and under cover of it a sortie was directed against the second parallel of attack at San Pedro's battery. This sortie was met and repulsed by the soldiers of the 44th. The fire then re-commenced,

and our trenches were inundated with showers of grape, grenades and stones, and at one o'clock in the morning another sortie was made. But the enemy was hemmed in by our works, and found it impossible to open his ranks; the guards of the trenches in consequence, and the labourers themselves, repulsed his attempts and compelled him once more to enter the fort. The captain of engineers, Poussin, took advantage of this moment to advance by sap from the second parallel, and pushing forward upon the place of arms of the demi-bastion of San Pedro, succeeded in arriving within twelve toises of the palisadoes. We debouched also upon the capital of the half moon of the Temple by a double sap, the one straight and the other traversing; in front of the fort Orleans also, we lengthened the second parallel as far as the reverse of the plateaux, and continued to work it deeper in the rock on the right bank: in the meanwhile we had finished the parallel and the redoubt on the left. At day-break on the 26th, the fire of the enemy was much less brisk than usual, in consequence of the second parallel being lined with sharp-shooters, stationed behind bags of earth with loop-holes, who, by the uninterrupted fire kept up, very much annoyed the Spanish gunners, and compelled them to close their embrasure. General Valée, who had charge of the construction of the batteries, distributed the command of them according to the number

of points to be attacked between the chefs-de-bataillon, Ricci, Capelle and Duchaud; Ricci taking those on the right, Capelle the centre, and Duchaud the left, which were situated on the right bank of the Ebro. The batteries Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were intended for the attack on fort Orleans and the works of the place which lay in the rear of it; Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 were directed against the town, but principally against the demi-bastion of San Pedro, which was the real object of our attack; Nos. 8, 9, 10* were to second the attack on the demi-bastion and to fire at the same time on the bridge and quays of the town. The battery No. 1 could not be commenced until after the labours of the engineers had advanced to the very spot fixed on, and it was commenced in open day and without any cover, at length within fifty toises of fort Orleans. These various works were prosecuted with the constancy that is peculiar to the artillery. The gunners set the example, and the officers and chiefs who conducted the attack, excited to the utmost the zeal of every one engaged, while the commander-in-chief sustained the spirits of the men by his presence and the encouragement he held out to them. The advance upon the place of arms of the demi-bastion of San Pedro, was continued by sap from the 26th till the 27th. The enemy, who had thrown an immense number of grenades from the salient angle of the demi-

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 10.

bastion suddenly passed through the palisadoes of the covered way, and falling pell-mell on the head of the sap, threw our workmen into confusion. Clause, a sergeant of the sappers, a brave fellow who bore the cross of the legion of honour, stood firm as a rock, and kept the Spaniards that charged him at bay by his solitary opposition, until he was struck down severely wounded. The captain of the sappers, Foucauld, with his customary activity, placed himself at the head of the troops of the trenches, drove the Spaniards back to the place of arms, followed them thither, and chased them from it. We made immediately every exertion to finish, by flying sap, a communication as far as the salient angle of the place of arms, where our brave fellows had effected a lodgment. In this sharp action captain Foucauld was struck by a ball, and Lemercier, the lieutenant of engineers, received one through his arm; we had, besides two officers, twenty-five men—infantry—killed, and a number of others, as well as many of our sappers, wounded. The work was, notwithstanding, finished and the enemy finally driven from the place of arms. The advance on the capital of the half moon was prosecuted during the same night, and we gained about fourteen toises; but at day-light, the artillery of the enemy so harassed the heads of our sap that we were compelled to suspend our labours.

Next day we followed up the crown-work of the place of arms by flying sap, but our workmen were

in so doing, received by so sharp a fire of musketry, that they first hesitated and then fell back in disorder, although the captain of engineers, Tardivi, by his firmness, and the officers of infantry, by their example, at length succeeded in restoring order among them. We did not, however, push this crown-work farther, lest we should impede the fire of the artillery, which was then ready to open against the place. The advance upon the half-moon was continued for ten toises farther, and we amorced a demi-place of arms in order to support, if necessary, the heads of our saps, which were now at a considerable distance from the second parallel.

The Spaniards, alarmed at the increasing rapidity of our works, and perceiving our batteries rising all along the front of attack, determined to prevent their effect. On the 28th, about four o'clock in the afternoon, they made a sortie by the gate of Rastro to the number of 3,000 men, who advanced to attack our works on the height, whilst other columns in the plain marched directly up our central intrenchments. A shower of bullets, bombs, and howitzer shells preceded the attack, by one of which we lost the brave captain of engineers, Ponsin, an officer of great merit. In an instant they darted forward against our works and burst into them, and in the first moment of the assault we were completely driven from the crown of the covered way. It was in

vain that the lieutenant of engineers, Jaquard, attempted to withstand their fury with a handful of his sappers; this gallant young officer, whom nothing could induce to abandon his post, was killed by a bayonet wound. A few of the Spaniards even penetrated as far as the second parallel, where they were immediately cut down. Our labourers had now assumed their arms and rushed forward to the point where the enemy was making a grand effort; a general Abbé had put himself at the head of the reserves of the 44th, who formed the guard of the trenches, on observing the Spaniards arrive at the parallel, boldly quitted the trenches, marched directly upon them with fixed bayonets, and first checked and then drove them back. In the mean time, general Habert on the right took the select companies of the 5th light infantry and of the 116th, and without a moment's hesitation, threw himself on the flank of the Spanish columns that had issued by the gate of Rastro. A most sanguinary melée was the consequence, and at length the enemy, who was routed before he was able to attain his object, retired towards the town in the greatest disorder. Captain Bugeaud, of the grenadiers of the 116th, and captain Guillemin, of the engineers, rendered themselves particularly conspicuous by the intrepidity with which they followed the flying foe to the last moment. The Spaniards at length got back to

the town again, leaving about 400 dead and wounded in the fosse and upon the glacis. During the short period they had possession of our trenches, they had been busily employed in setting fire to our gabions, and had succeeded in overturning a portion of the works, principally in the crown of the place of arms; the night of the 28th was set apart for the repair of the damages. At this point a second communication was formed parallel with the first, and a trench was opened from the extremity of the approach against the half-moon as far as the place of arms at San Pedro, which trench became the third parallel; the object of this was to shut up the enemy within the half-moon, and thus to guarantee the safety of the crown-work of the place of arms that projected from the covered way.

The moment so impatiently expected by the whole of the army, and which the commander-in-chief had daily, by every means in his power, endeavoured to accelerate, at length arrived. Our batteries, on both banks of the stream, were finished and armed; forty-five pieces of cannon* were now in a condition to commence the work of destruction; and, on the 29th of December, at day-break, the fire opened. The demi-bastion of San Pedro, was in a few hours reduced to silence, as was also the half-moon. The fort, and advanced batteries of Orleans, still retained a few serviceable pieces, and the bastion of San Juan possessed

* See notes and explanatory documents No. 10.

one, and one only, in its flank; but the embrasures of the demi-bastion were destroyed, and there was an open breach in the curtain. If our batteries on the right bank had not been very solidly constructed, they would, doubtless, have been destroyed by the combined effects of the whole fire of the castle, of the quays, and of the tête-de-pont, but they withstood all. Our artillery men succeeded, in the meantime, in sinking five of the boats of the bridge, the floor was in consequence detached, and floated on the water, but it still afforded a road to individual passengers.

Taking advantage of the tenth night, namely that of the 29th, a double crown-work of the covered way was formed in the place of arms, and a lodgment effected in the plain of that work, on a line of twenty-nine toises. The parallel begun the evening before, was also completed, and this communication, which was one hundred toises in length, completely secured us against sorties, and also connected our different points of attack. The superintendent of the attack, had in tracing these works, never failed to display the most eminent proofs of talent and intrepidity.

On the 30th, at day-light, our batteries recommenced firing, and soon almost silenced the few pieces of the front attacked, which had still continued to be served. The artillery of fort Orleans was rendered completely useless,

the breach which had been begun in the body of the place was rendered practicable, and the parapets on the two faces of the demi-bastion, were entirely destroyed. The site of a new battery which formed No. 11, was traced out that same day in the rear of the battery No. 8; it was composed of a couple of mortars, and was designed to play on the castle only. It was finished by the next morning, and its fire at break of day was conjoined with that of the batteries previously erected.

The eleventh night, namely, that of the 30th, was occupied in crowning with a lodgment the counterscarp of the fosse of the right face of the demi-bastion from the entrance angle of the place of arms to the point opposite the flank. It was found that this portion of the counterscarp was not faced, and we took advantage of that defect in the fortification, to trace out at once, a descent into and passage of the ditch, in order that the miners might be brought in contact with the foot of the counterscarp. But this attempt was not successful, in consequence of a brisk fire from a couple of pieces, that were placed on the flank of masonry which defended the fosse, and after driving out the sappers that had taken possession of it, by shells and grenades, which were thrown from the top of the ramparts, they sent down fascines pitched and lighted which set fire to our gabions. From the moment of our being driven out, we limited our endeavours to

the consolidating of our lodgment on the counterscarp, to form the amorces of the descent into the fosse, and to connect the two lodgments by a communication. During this night our mortar and howitzer batteries continued to fire on the castle, and on that portion of the town that surrounded it, and several parts of both were set on fire in consequence.

At break of day the other batteries again opened, although their fire had greatly slackened, the enemy no longer returning it. The open breaches in the advanced works of fort Orleans and in the body of the place were considerably widened.

We now established ourselves in the tête-de-pont, which the enemy had evacuated during the night, after burning all that was combustible; we found in it only three pieces of cannon. Our batteries on the right bank had succeeded in destroying the flank which defended the right face of the demi-bastion and in dismounting a couple of pieces. The fosse was no longer defended, and we began the descent of it immediately; this was promptly completed. We defended ourselves in the bottom of it by an epaulement of gabions and bags of earth; the miners then placed against the scarp of the bastions pieces of wood in the form of a pent-house, which they covered with sheets of tin plate to prevent them from being set on fire, that under the shelter of this covering

they might work the mines in safety. This dangerous operation cost a great number of these poor fellows their lives. The artillery next commenced the construction of the breaching battery No. 12 in the covered way, and in the counterscarp of the right face of San Pedro's bastion at about ten toises from the face; it was furnished with four twenty-four pounders.

On the night of the 31st of December we strengthened the epaulement, and the passage of the fosse, which had been marked out the preceding evening as far as the adit which was forming by the miners. The old masonry of the scarp was found by the latter to be harder than the rock itself; they advanced in consequence but slowly, although they were relieved every half hour. We now pushed forward towards the place of arms, situated at the entrance angle of the half-moon by a double trench, one cut direct and the other traversing, and established a circular lodgment in that work, in order that we might take advantage of the breach in the curtain, on the day that was appointed for the assault. In this operation captain Hudry of the engineers was killed. On the right bank at the same time we completed a communication in order that we might get with security at the abandoned tête-de-pont.

The gradual widening of the breaches, the labours of the miners, and the impatience of the

troops who were clamorous for the assault, peared seriously to alarm the garrison, and acc ingly on the 1st of January, 1811, at ten o'c in the morning the white flag was displa The commander-in-chief immediately ordere firing of the batteries to cease but the works continued. Two officers instructed to make posals were conducted to his presence; they posed, in the name of the count Alacha, gov of Tortosa, a suspension of arms for fifteen after which, unless they should be succoured, should surrender, on condition of being condu to Tarragona, with their arms, baggage, and pieces of cannon. The commander-in-chie fused these conditions, but consented to p the chief of his staff, the adjutant-comman to accompany the flag of truce into the city. was instructed to propose to the governor an council intrusted with the defence the plan capitulation which should ensure to the chief officers their swords and baggage, but in virt which the whole garrison should be made soners of war and sent to France. As it often happens in difficult cases during wa council discussed the matter for a long time yet came to no resolution, and their indec produced such doubt and embarrassment i governor that he could send back no po answer. He kept colonel St. Cyr for a

bonds of discipline were broken or about to be broken, and that no capitulation was yet signed. It was of importance, notwithstanding, to take advantage of the day light for the purpose of collecting and disarming a numerous and dispersed garrison, and such a case demanded one of those bold measures which a moment of exigency prompts and which success justifies. The French troops were under arms, and the commander-in-chief, accompanied by his generals and the officers of his staff, marched up to the advanced work of the castle, followed by only a single company of the grenadiers of the 116th, and addressing the sentries told them that hostilities had ceased. He left a few grenadiers at the first Spanish post, and advancing, commanded the officer of the works to conduct him to the governor. This old man, who was not without apprehensions of mutiny among his soldiers, and who entertained unpleasant doubts himself, was not a little astonished on beholding the commander-in-chief of the enemy enter the castle. The garrison was meanwhile under arms, the gunners had their matches in their hands ready to fire, when the word was given, and their countenances plainly indicated that there was not a moment to lose. The commander-in-chief assumed a high tone, complained loudly of the delay in delivering up to him one of the forts. He stated that he could with difficulty restrain his soldiers, who burned with impatience to

penetrate through the breaches, and threatened to put the whole garrison to the sword, if, after having offered to capitulate, they hesitated to do so conformably to the laws of war, large breaches being opened in the walls and the mines ready to explode the moment he gave the signal. Whilst he was thus addressing the Spaniards, general Habert led on the grenadiers, and the governor, who was intimidated and struck dumb, determined to lay down his arms. He commanded his soldiers to obey no voice but his own, and promised to execute at once the brief capitulation which was drawn up and signed on the carriage of a gun. The custody of the fort was immediately given up to our grenadiers and the news of this event being conveyed into the town, the whole of the troops obeying the orders of the governor, took their arms for the purpose of filing out and piling them. General Abbé, who was nominated governor of Tortosa, immediately placed sentries at the gates of the town, and at the breaches, and entering at the head of six hundred grenadiers, established picquets and patroles, occupied the squares, the magazines, and the public edifices. The commander-in-chief then came down from the castle, saw the garrison file out, and after depositing their arms, directed them to be immediately marched to Xerta, whence they were passed to France.

Without including a sort of half blockade of

about six months, Tortosa sustained a siege of exactly seventeen days, during thirteen of which the breaches were opened, and for five of which the batteries were employed against it. The garrison, previous to the commencement of the siege, was eleven thousand strong, but when the place surrendered, it had been reduced by about sixteen hundred, the number of prisoners being nine thousand four hundred and sixty-one.* We captured at Tortosa one hundred and eighty-two cannons mounted, thirty thousand shells and balls, one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of powder, two millions of musket cartridges, and lead sufficient for making a million more, from ten to eleven thousand muskets, and nine standards. The besieged had fired twenty thousand cannon shots, and we had fired, in the course of the five days, three hundred shots per gun. In the course of thirteen nights, we had dug a trench of not less than about two thousand three hundred toises in length.

To the officers and men of the artillery and engineers belonged the chief merit in the capture of Tortosa. The distinguished talent and persevering activity of general Valée were very eminently displayed in the midst of numerous obstacles which he contrived to overcome. The labours of the engineers were conducted by gen-

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 11.

eral Rogniat with a skill and rapidity of execution which greatly contributed to our success. On the seventh night from the opening of the trenches, before it was possible to fire a single gun, he had finished the crown-work of the covered way of the body of the place. The officers that conducted the attack in both branches of the service, also merited especial notice.

The soldiers of the 3rd corps knew as well as did those of the Roman legions, how to labour and to fight with equal zeal. Our ordinary troop officers, both French and Polish, were beginning to understand perfectly the principles of a siege. The whole of the infantry was animated with the liveliest emulation, and longed for orders to storm, as affording an opportunity of displaying their valour, and of enabling them to rival the services of the officers of the artillery and of the engineers. The auxiliaries, commanded by general Frère, shewed a similar devotedness; and the Italians when placed amidst Frenchmen, differed in nothing from our veteran bands. If the enemy had attempted to raise the siege, the corps of observation would not have failed to reap its fair share in the general glory. But the position taken up by the duke of Tarentum checked all serious attempts on the part of the Spanish army of Catalonia, which contented itself with sending forward two convoys of provisions, with a view to in-

troduce them into Tortosa, in which object they did not however succeed. Their commander-in-chief, Henri O'Donnell, in consequence of his wound, was obliged to give up the command of the army to general Campoverde, and some new projects were planned by the latter to succour the town; but its fall infused a spirit of inactivity and discouragement into the Spanish troops generally, and gave a fatal blow to the combination formed against the French army by the Valencians and Catalonians.*

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 12.

CHAPTER IX.

Taking of the fort of San-Felipe at the col de Balaguer.—Return of the army to Arragon.—The Arragonese are favourably disposed towards the army.—Partial engagements. Preparations of defence at Valencia and Tarragona.—Various actions on both banks of the Ebro.

The inhabitants of Tortosa were in the highest possible state of excitement; and the military chiefs had taken advantage of it, to prepare the requisite measures for defending the town; a whole suburb, and upwards of 10,000 olive or carob trees, forming the principal wealth of the small province of Tortosa, which lies isolated as it were, in the midst of a desert, had not only been destroyed without a murmur, but the population had even assisted with alacrity in the work of devastation. General Suchet availed himself in his turn of the aspect of affairs, and strictly enjoined that neither dwelling houses nor plantations of trees should be replaced within such a distance as he deemed requisite for the unobstructed defence of the place. A thousand peasants were immediately employed in removing our trenches and batteries.

Several of the inhabitants who had fled to the country for shelter, re-appeared at Tortosa as soon as they found a prospect of returning order. The clergy, flattered by the protection extended to them, manifested indications of a friendly feeling. Upwards of 150 of the neighbouring peasantry, belonging to the armed bands who infested the country, returned within three days, laid down their arms, and took a solemn oath never to resume them against us. The public coffers were empty; one of the first cares of the commander-in-chief was to re-organise the local administration. The general of division, Musnier, was named governor of the province. He was well calculated for the command, by his strength of mind and his acquaintance with the Spanish language.

Whilst making these arrangements, general Suchet conceived the idea of attempting to surprise the fort of San-Felipe at the col de Balaguer, by availing himself of the first moment of terror which the fall of Tortosa had created in the minds of the Spaniards. He thereby hoped to avoid laying siege to that post, which commands and intercepts the road leading from Tortosa to Tarragona. General Habert, who was stationed at Perello with the 3rd division received orders to make the attempt, and acquitted himself of the mission with no less skill than bravery. He proceeded at night with the 5th regiment

of light infantry and the 117th, advanced close up to the fort, in spite of the passages cut through the road, and erected a battery of four howitzers under a fire which killed or wounded five of his soldiers. After making these preparations for an attack, he sent an officer with a flag of truce to the commandant of the fort, in order to sound his intentions by proposing a capitulation. The latter asked for a delay of four days, promising to surrender if, in the interval, he should not receive any relief. The proposal was rejected; our fire was immediately opened, and our skirmishers rushed upon the soldiers, doing duty at the outposts, who partly escaped into the ravines instead of returning to the fort. Our howitzers soon set fire to a powder magazine, and the garrison betrayed evident symptoms of indecision. General Habert seized this favourable opportunity, and ordered his men to cross the palisadoes; a few ladders had been brought, which were planted against the walls; our soldiers penetrated into the fort; part of the garrison fled along the road to Tarragona; others escaped to the bastions, whither they were pursued and thought fit to capitulate. The commandant of the fort, thirteen officers, ninety soldiers, eighteen artillery men, eleven brass pieces of cannon, and 100,000 cartridges fell into our power. General Habert, in his report of this expedition, made particular mention of captain Doria, and of lieutenants Bore

and Pépin of the 117th regiment, as well as of lieutenants Crouzet of the artillery, and Guillemin of the company of miners.

General Suchet set a high value on this little conquest, of which he had justly estimated the consequences, as will be proved in the sequel. He deemed himself warranted in laying aside for a moment all ordinary considerations of prudence, for the purpose of making an impression upon the minds of the Spaniards, a nation that quickly gives way to despondence on the first reverse of fortune, and as quickly recovers from it with renewed energy, and resumes its wonted obstinacy of disposition. At a later period, that regular little fort would only have been taken after a siege. A fortunate act of resolution spared us much loss of time and as well as the resources we should have consumed in the operation.

The Spanish flag was left waving over the walls of the fort of San-Felipe, and on the following morning, a captain and fifteen men who were the bearers of instructions for the garrison, approached the shore in full confidence and landed at the foot of the rock adjoining the fort. They were ignorant of the recent occurrence, which the fugitives had, doubtless, made known at Cambrils, whither they had proceeded by land. They were allowed to approach, and were made prisoners on their entrance into the

fort. Two English gun-boats came close to the shore and were immediately fired upon.

General Musnier, who was left in the command of Tortosa, was especially directed to provide for its defence, to close the breaches, to repair the bridge and the tête-de-pont, and to collect immediately a quantity of ammunition sufficient to enable 3,000 men to sustain a six months' siege, besides a supply of meat, vegetables, and all kinds of provisions requisite for the army. It was natural to foresee that Tortosa would now become the pivot of our operations either against Tarragona or Valencia. The besieging artillery brought from Mequinenza having been added to the artillery captured at Tortosa, this place was intended to be our dépôt, and the point at which the horses for the train were to be assembled. The commander-in-chief ordered a large quantity of straw to be collected. This is the only forage of the country, and is most difficult to store up, not only from the delay in transporting it, owing to its bulk, but also because a great part is consumed by the beasts of burden who bring it into the town; so that it is indispensable to be provided with an ample supply before any organization can be given to the system of transport. Prudence required that we should lay in a stock long beforehand. Two hospitals were also ordered to be established, for the reception of 1,000 to 1,200 sick.

The port of La Rapita was intrusted to the command of captain Pinot of the engineers, an officer of great merit; every measure was adopted for placing it in a state of defence, for taking possession of the tower of San-Juan, and becoming master of the mouths of the Ebro. The fort of San-Felipe was immediately put in proper repair. The corps of observation which had been stationed during the siege at Ulldecona was withdrawn, as no longer necessary at that place, and Musnier's division was directed to occupy the corregimientos of Albarracin, Teruel, Morella, Tortosa, and Alcañiz, with its principal advanced posts in the towns of Teruel, Morella, and Tortosa, for the purpose of intimidating and watching the country in the neighbourhood of Valencia. The Neapolitan division was left at Mora and on the Ebro, to secure the navigation and requisite transports for the army of marshal Macdonald, whilst engaged in carrying on operations against Tarragona. In order to be in readiness to assist him in his enterprise, Habert's division remained at Tortosa and at Perello, so as to be available for manœuvring on the left bank of the Ebro. With the exception of the 14th regiment, which took the road to Mequinenza and Lerida, for the purpose of accelerating the collection of corn and the formation of the magazines intended for the use of the army under the command of the duke of Taren-

tum; all the troops of the 2nd division were marched towards Saragossa, and escorted to the frontier the garrison of Tortosa as prisoners of war.

This general had withdrawn Frère's division on the 5th of January, and proceeded across the mountains in the direction of Reuss with the main body of his army. He approached Tarragona on the 10th of January, and found, as usual, the country completely laid waste. Campoverde occupied with his forces the position of Valls; the marshal advanced to meet him, drove him back, and afterwards moving towards Monblanch, returned to Lerida for the purpose of making preparations for the siege of Tarragona, and collecting the means necessary for such an undertaking. He preferred occupying Lerida and its dependencies, although the government had assigned to him the command of Tortosa; and general Suchet shewed the utmost readiness to accede to his wishes. He went further; whilst waiting for instructions from Paris, he offered to place at his disposal the troops of artillery and engineers belonging to the 3rd corps with part of the infantry The marshal accepted this proposal. Having established himself at Lerida and in the plain of Urgel, he directed his utmost care to the formation of a large supply of provisions. He soon afterwards received and communicated to general Suchet the information that twelve ships which had sailed from Toulon under the escort of three

frigates and a smaller vessel, had just entered Barcelona with 29,000 quintals of corn, 1,500 quintals of rice, and 50,000 pounds of gunpowder. This fortunate circumstance removed all further uneasiness respecting the fate of that important city, and was calculated to facilitate our operations in lower Catalonia.

General Suchet on his part had returned to Saragossa, where some objects of importance required his presence. He recollects, with feelings of the liveliest gratitude, the proofs of attachment bestowed upon him in his journey through the province, by the inhabitants of the towns, and the country people, and the friendly reception given to his soldiers at their stations and cantonments.* He deemed himself fortunate

* On the road between Tortosa and Saragossa, at Sanper, at Caspe, and many other places, the inhabitants assembled on the arrival of the commander-in-chief, for the purpose of greeting him with their acclamations and performing before him certain dances possessing a peculiarly national character. Ten or twenty young men, dressed in some ancient costume, of a light and brilliant appearance, and holding short sticks in their hands, mixed together, separated, formed different groups, and a variety of figures, without any vocal or instrumental music, but striking their sticks against each other, in perfect cadence, and thereby offering a pleasing picture of a battle converted into a sport. At Caspe, and at Saragossa, whilst the clergy and public authorities repaired to the general's residence, for the purpose of receiving him on his arrival, the masquerade of the giants and dwarfs (*gigantes y cabezutos*)

in finding so friendly a disposition on the part of the Arragonese, and availed himself of it to

perambulated the town, in the midst of a crowd no less animated than peaceful in their demeanour, who gave a free vent to their sentiments, and kept up their extemporary serenades until a late hour of the night. *La Jota* is a national air peculiar to the people of Arragon, consisting of a single bar, which they sing in a tone not altogether devoid of melody, the perpetual repetition of which is somewhat monotonous, but at the same time expressive; and each singer, may, with his guitar in hand, attach to the tune whatever ideas he thinks proper. The Arragonese, in a series of couplets following each other in rapid succession, sang in this manner, the praises of the count and countess Suchet, of the generals, the chiefs, and officers who happened to be the guests or private friends of each performer. General Suchet, who had been lately married, and could fully appreciate domestic happiness, had availed himself of his situation of commander-in-chief, in a country adjoining the frontiers of France, to send for his wife to join him. She may be said to have exhibited an extraordinary degree of courage; she accompanied him in most of his excursions, and was constantly by his side during the expedition to Tortosa. This was an interesting spectacle for the whole population of Arragon. The intercourse which was naturally formed with the ladies of the country not only proved a source of satisfaction and enjoyment, but was productive of advantage; and this circumstance, no doubt, had some influence over the public mind, in its friendly disposition towards us, the consequence of which was, that the whole of Arragon submitted, by degrees, to the authority of the French governor who commanded in that province.

The habit of residing together familiarized the 3rd corps with the inhabitants, a circumstance which acted reciprocally upon both. The 115th regiment, for instance,

counteract, by the most energetic measures, the system of famine which the enemy were bringing

had occupied Caspe at the commencement of the war, and was, thenceforth, almost always cantoned in that place. It would be difficult to form an adequate idea of the attachment which sprung up between that regiment and the inhabitants. The French soldier, to be correctly estimated, should be known in his private habits; the greater his ardour and impetuosity, previous to, or during an engagement, the more sociable and mild he becomes, when restored to his natural composure. Generally quartered upon the poor, where he can recall to mind the picture of his own family, he lays down, when he enters the dwelling of his host, the haughty manners, the tone of authority; whatever, in short, is known by the name of *la furia francese*. He pays every attention to the master and mistress of the house, caresses and plays with the children, voluntarily offers his services, and exerts them with no less goodwill than disinterestedness. Colonel Dupeyroux had established a paternal discipline in the 115th regiment; the inhabitants had occasion to discover and applaud it. Each of them knew his officer or soldier in the regiment, greeted him as a friend, offered up prayers for his safety when he was called away on duty, waited for, and without either billet, request, or order, never failed to welcome him on his return. When the 3rd corps took the name of the *army of Arragon*, and that army obtained a run of successes in Catalonia, and in the kingdom of Valencia, the circumstance was almost hailed by the *Arragonese* with satisfaction. They felt a growing affection for the general and his troops, from the habit of seeing and becoming familiar with them. *Los nuestros* they always said when speaking of us, not only in contra-distinction to other French forces that penetrated through Arragon, on their way from Catalonia and Navarre, but what is still more remarkable by way of comparison, with some of the Spanish armies. They

into operation against him. The regency and the juntas of Castille and Valencia, were exerting every endeavour to carry off all the corn from the province of Arragon. This project, which was entertained for the first time when it was found that our army was concentrating on the lower Ebro, was no longer a mystery. The gazettes of Valencia loudly proclaimed it, and its effects were beginning to be felt. The price of corn had already rapidly increased in Saragossa. It was found necessary to compel the monopolisers, who naturally endeavoured to profit by the high prices, to pay the contributions in kind. Arragon was a complete granary to us; it fed our army whilst besieging the towns of Lerida and Tortosa; from Arragon we had it in our power to procure the means of subsistence for the troops on the lower Ebro, or before Tarragona, which were destined to support marshal Macdonald's operations. Notwithstanding the severest injunctions, we had failed, up to the 30th of January, in procuring any rations from the administrative authority of Tortosa. The impossibility of finding a single quintal

considered our steady and regular occupation as a means of escaping the frequent inroads of Mina and Villacampa, which from the very circumstance of their being of a transitory nature, were attended with disorder, and only left evil consequences behind them, without being productive of any salutary result.

of straw, within a circuit of ten leagues round the place, greatly impeded our means of transport, which were already circumscribed and nearly exhausted. The presence of the commander-in-chief at Saragossa, and that of the troops on the principal points of the province were soon productive of a salutary influence, by preventing the grain from being removed out of the country, and by supporting the local administrations, whilst they carried into effect the orders that emanated from the French authorities.

This was more particularly the period at which the system of administration, established by the commander-in-chief, improved by experience, and strengthened by the submission or assent of the inhabitants, assumed that solidity which was indispensable towards providing for the exigencies of a corps d'armée destined to proceed upon remote operations. It will not, in our opinion, be superfluous to develop it in some of its details, as an event claiming a share of importance amongst those which we have undertaken to describe: this will therefore, form the subject of the succeeding chapter. We will first conclude the narrative of some military occurrences which took place in the interval that elapsed between the sieges of Tortosa and Tarragona.

On the 19th of December Villacampa, who was collecting all his forces on the side of Ojos-

Negros, had met with a severe check. Colonel Kliski being informed that a detachment of cavalry had advanced as far as Blancas, set out from Daroca during the night with a column of lancers and cuirassiers, and two battalions of the 121st regiment of the line, and of the 1st regiment of the Vistula, led by colonel Kozinowski. By a rapid march of ten hours, which was effected without the knowledge of the enemy, he routed the advanced posts and surprised their detachment in the village. The Spaniards had barely time to mount their horses; a few were killed and wounded; and the remainder, amounting to 150 men, including seven officers, fell into our hands with their horses, arms, and baggage. This dexterous coup-de-main was the more honorable to colonel Kliski, as we had seldom had the good fortune to take any Spanish cavalry prisoners in the open country during the whole course of the war, so circumspect was their mode of attacking us. Villacampa retreated; since the month of January, however, l'Empecinado, another chieftain who had obtained some successes in Castille, had approached the province of Arragon, and forming a junction with the corps of Villacampa, had taken up a position at Checa, between Molina and Albarracin. These fresh forces amounted to about 2,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, and although they were on the other side of the frontier, might have greatly annoyed us in

Arragon, had not a part of our troops been rendered available by the fall of Tortosa, and returned back to that province as we have already mentioned. General Suchet despatched general Pâris from Saragossa with a column of troops against those two chiefs; and with a view to ensure the success of this operation, sent orders at the same time for general Abbé, to break up from Teruel for the purpose of outflanking the position of Checa, and prevent, if possible, the enemy from dispersing as heretofore without coming to an engagement.

General Pâris reached l'Empecinado within a few leagues of Molina, ordered the cuirassiers to charge, and completely routed his advanced guard. The enemy retreated towards Villacampa's position; general Pâris followed with the determination to bring him to an engagement, overtook him on the 31st of January, and instantly prepared to attack, without waiting the arrival of general Abbé, and regardless of the numbers of the enemy and of the advantageous position which he occupied on the mountain in advance of the village. At day-break, the column, preceded by sharp-shooters, marched up to the position in spite of the snow and ice which impeded their progress; during the night, a detachment had made a flank movement towards the village. The 121st regiment and the 1st

of the Vistula, displayed no less gallantry than at Fuente Santa; and the Polish lancers vied with the cuirassiers in steadiness and bravery. The Spaniards being forced from their position, and finding themselves cut off from the village, which was their natural place of retreat, disbanded and took to flight. Generals Pâris and Abbé only effected a junction at Frias on the 4th of February; when they continued together in pursuit of the retreating enemy, for the space of two days, without allowing them any respite. They afterwards separated for the purpose of giving effect to an important part of their instructions. General Abbé marched against the Empecinado, who was at Cuenca, kept possession of this town during forty eight hours, captured some stores, drove before him general Carbajal and his staff who had retreated to Moya, put to flight the insurrectionary junta of Arragon, and destroyed a considerable dépôt of arms. General Pâris, on the other hand, pursued Villacampa in the direction of Alvalate de las Nogueras and of Cañaveras, was on the point of surprising him, by a forced march, in the night from the 7th to the 8th February, proceeded towards Beteta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, places situated amongst the mountains, and containing manufactories of arms, which had been kept constantly at work ever since the breaking out

of the war.* He destroyed and burned the arms and tools, and broke up the establishments. This expedition, which kept two of our brigades in the province of Castille for a period of twelve days, was only productive of a few hundred prisoners; but the destruction of the manufactories of arms was of more real service to us than the momentary dispersion of the two hostile corps of troops. Continually did those numerous bands of Guerillas by which we were surrounded, re-appear in the open plain; they were rather dispersed than defeated, and never yielded to despondency.

After the fall of Tortosa, the Spaniards did not fail to perceive that Tarragona or Valencia would soon be attacked by one or other of our armies. The Valencians had, accordingly, given up all idea for the present of molesting the army of Arragon, and directed their whole attention to the defence of their territory and of their capital. They were carrying on very important works at Murviedro upon the rock of ancient Saguntum, were mounting guns upon

* This elevated region is the highest point in the Spanish Peninsula. In this spot are the sources of the Tagus on the one hand with several of the rivers running into it, and on the other of the Xiloca, which uniting itself with the Xalon, discharges its waters into the Ebro, and of the Guadalaviar, the Cabriel and the Xucar, which flow towards the Mediterranean, after passing through the kingdom of Valencia.

the castle of Oropesa, and cutting broad and deep ditches in the roads and principal defiles. Valencia had become a point of still greater importance for the regency since the investment of Badajos and the fall of Tortosa. Nevertheless, although we might not then have found much difficulty in obstructing the defensive preparations making by the inhabitants of Valencia, which might prove so seriously detrimental to us at a later period, we were unable to undertake any thing in that quarter, until Tarragona should have fallen into our hands. Experience had demonstrated the necessity of prudence and harmony in all our operations, in order to triumph over a people who are elated at the least success, and never depressed but for a short time by the most signal reverses of fortune.

Catalonia was exerting the most strenuous efforts to expedite and complete the immense fortifications undertaken at Tarragona. The whole attention of the two French generals was justly directed to this city; the marshal duke of Tarentum had reconnoitred it in the month of January. During the night from the 7th to the 8th of February, general Habert proceeded by a rapid march from the col de Balaguer with a hundred hussars and a few companies of skirmishers, made some prisoners within three leagues of Tarragona, obtained information respecting Campoverde's army which

occupied Reuss, Villaseca and Canonge, and returned without allowing the enemy time to pursue or overtake him. This little piece of bravado excited the spleen of general Campoverde who shortly afterwards made an attempt against fort San-Felipe, and endeavoured to drive colonel Robert in his camp from Perello. At four o'clock in the morning of the 3rd of March, six thousand men made an attack upon two thousand, who retreated with great steadiness notwithstanding their being surrounded, and repelled several charges of cavalry. Generals Habert and Bronikowski having received timely notice of this circumstance, came in all haste from Tortosa with the 116th regiment, the cuirassiers, and some pieces of cannon. The gallant 117th regiment maintained an unequal fight until their arrival; but the Spaniards no sooner saw the reinforcement than they rapidly retreated. During this engagement, a rear guard of 2,000 men had been left by general Campoverde before the fort of San-Felipe, and had lost no time in erecting a battery which kept up a brisk fire against the fort; but the latter returned the fire, and soon silenced the battery. This circumstance did not prevent the enemy from sending an officer as the bearer of a flag of truce, who had the audacity to offer the chef-de-bataillon, Durand, the commandant of the fort, a sum of 60,000 francs in gold, with a promise that he should be

conveyed in safety to England, where he would not fail to be employed, provided he would consent to open the gates. Such a proposal implied a thorough ignorance of the high sense of honour which animated the French army. The bearer of the flag of truce was dismissed with scorn, and was wholly indebted for his safety to the respect shewn to his character, and to the rights of nations. Campoverde with all the forces he had brought with him for this coup de main, returned to Tarragona without obtaining any result from their movement.

The fort of la Rapita having been placed in a state of defence, did not disappoint the expectations entertained of it, and rendered us at this time the essential service of securing to us the possession of the mouth of the Ebro. Two privateers, one of which was armed at Tortosa, the other at Barcelona, captured and brought in some vessels laden with rice and other provisions.

Called upon to fight at all the points occupied by the 3rd corps, our soldiers were constantly engaged in isolated encounters, the success of which was determined by the advantage of position or of numbers, more or less vigilance or activity of the officers, and occasionally even by the mere effect of chance; nor did victory uniformly reward their courage. We will not disguise the fact that the enemy obtained the advantage over us on several

occasions. It is by speaking in an impartial manner, that we hope to give a correct idea of the war in Spain, so different from what we had waged for the last twenty years in every other part of Europe.

The Spanish armies had, for some time past, received a fresh impulse and activity by the recruiting system, or by being supplied with men, horses, funds, and ammunition; in Arragon, we could not fail to discover on all hands that the local effect of our successes was fast diminishing. Notwithstanding the fall of Badajoz, which the marshal duke of Treviso had taken after a glorious siege of thirty-five days, a far more serious event, the evacuation of Portugal by the prince of Essling, restored confidence to the Spaniards, revived their hopes, and excited them to renewed efforts at resistance, with the aid of the English army. The inhabitants of Arragon, and of some other provinces which were tired of the war, of its burdens, and its vicissitudes, took very little part in such measures. The heads of armies, however, as well as the Guerilla leaders, either received or conveyed the impulse with the greatest alacrity, and availed themselves of the opportunity to augment their forces, and extend their operations. Mina, who had been unable to molest the 3rd corps during the three sieges we had lately undertaken, re-appeared in Arragon on the 7th of April, and

advanced towards the Cinco-villas. The commandant of the small town of Sos, sent to Sadava for assistance, as he had only a squadron of gendarmerie to defend himself. 126 foot and 23 mounted gendarmes, were sent to him on the 8th. This small troop met, within half a league of Sadava, 900 of the enemy's troops. Yielding to the impulse of courage, they charged the enemy, routed and pursued them for an hour, until Mina having come up to the support of his advanced guard, and perceiving that our detachment was inferior in numbers, and unsupported by any reserve, assumed the offensive. Animated with the confidence with which they were inspired by their recent success, our brave gendarmes instead of retreating, resolutely withstood the attack. But they were soon surrounded and overwhelmed by superior numbers; they were annihilated after three hours' fighting, all those who were not killed having been taken prisoners. General Suchet regretted the loss of those gallant and choice men, but he lauded their courage, and held it up to the army as an example worthy of imitation. With a view to avert such disasters, he ordered general Chlopiski to proceed in pursuit of Mina, with a column of 200 hussars and 1,000 grenadiers or skirmishers of the 114th regiment and of the 2nd regiment of the Vistula. This officer discovered Mina on the 15th of April at Biota,

followed him in the direction of Sofuentes and Castillescar, and still driving that chief before him as far as Coseda, pressed him so closely that the band of Navarrese dispersed in disorder, throwing away their arms and ammunition, and withdrew from our frontiers considerably weakened in numbers, and in the utmost consternation.

In the beginning of February, a detachment of the garrison of Fuentes, consisting of fifty men of the 1st and 2nd regiments of the Vistula, was employed in collecting supplies at the village of Azuera, near Belchite. Milawski, the officer who commanded the detachment, having neglected to adopt the usual military precautions, was surprised in bed at one o'clock in the morning, by a daring Guerilla chieftain, who was hovering in the very centre of the province of Arragon. The fifty men were all carried off, except two who succeeded in effecting their escape. Such an occurrence had never before taken place in the 3rd corps. Our detachments had, sometimes, yielded to superior numbers; but they never allowed themselves to be taken by surprise, so indispensable was watchfulness admitted to be on all hands, and so habitual had it become to us. The order of the day addressed to the army on the 12th of February, was couched in the following language: *The commander-in-chief signifies to M. Milawski his displeasure at this officer*

having omitted to adopt proper military precautions, and occasioned the loss of forty-eight gallant men of the 3rd corps, by such culpable neglect! This was the first, and it also proved the last time that count Suchet was under the necessity of publicly noticing the fault of a Polish officer, whilst he was daily called upon to congratulate the generals of that gallant nation, on the courage and zeal displayed by their officers and soldiers.

On the 11th of April, a column had been sent from Ulldecona, where we had a cantonment of cavalry, to Vinaros and Benicarlo, in order to enforce obedience to some requisitions for supplies. A body of the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, advanced through San-Mateo, and attempted to surprise 100 horsemen who had remained at Ulldecona in perfect security. Lieutenant Delmart, at the head of a few hussars, made a rapid movement against the enemy's advanced guard, charged, and completely routed it. The chef d'escadron, Rubichon, with eighty cuirassiers, followed the hussars, and suddenly found themselves in the presence of 500 Spanish cavalry, who broke up their ground with the intention of coming up to them. This officer immediately cried out to his troops to charge, without reckoning the numbers of the enemy. The encounter was alike sudden and desperate. The Spanish horsemen could not resist the shock; they were broken in; lost in

a few moments about fifty of their number, and betook themselves to flight. The enemy's infantry was pursued for some time across the woods and mountains. The cuirassiers of the 13th regiment uniformly sustained their character for boldness and decision; this occasion furnished a fresh proof of it, which was highly honourable to M. Rubichon, their commander.

On the 4th of April, colonel Dupeyroux, of the 115th of the line, being on his way from Teruel to Morella, with 1,000 soldiers of his regiment, learned that 1,500 Valencians had advanced as far as the small town of Cantavieja, in the heart of the mountains. He marched against the enemy without a moment's hesitation; found them posted in a narrow defile in front of Cantavieja, and resolutely attacked them, without allowing them time to recover from their surprise: he had ordered, at the same time, the position to be turned by 150 skirmishers, who, crossing some steep heights, proceeded to place themselves on the flank and in the rear of the Valencians. This was the signal for their retreat; they dispersed, and were pursued for upwards of six leagues. Colonel Cevallos, their commander, did not bring back twenty men of the corps to Castellon de la Plana.

The 3rd corps d'armée, after having pacified Arragon, and entered upon the work of bringing

lower Catalonia under subjection, by the capture of Lerida and Tortosa, had still to contend against the different armed bands by which it was surrounded, whilst waiting until the operations for the siege of Tarragona could be carried into effect. The marshal duke of Tarentum had returned to Barcelona to which place he was recalled by the general aspect of affairs in Catalonia. The Catalonian mountaineers attempted to establish themselves in the town of Balaguer, at the gates of Lerida; Colonel Henriod directed captain Lecomte, of the grenadiers of the 14th regiment, with 500 men of his battalion, twenty dragoons, and a four-pounder, to drive them from that position, which possessed some importance, on account of its bridge over the Segre. This officer ordered the occupation, during the night from the 30th to the 31st of March, of the roads through which the Catalonians would have to retreat, and made a brisk attack upon the town before day break. After an obstinate defence, the Catalonians were defeated and found themselves involved in a fresh encounter during their flight. The dragoons with lieutenant Bignon, their commander, greatly distinguished themselves. We collected 600 muskets; a great number of Spaniards were either killed or taken prisoners, and scarcely 2 or

300 succeeded in effecting their escape. This event restored tranquillity, for a short time, to the vicinity of Lerida, and the fertile plains of Urgel, the resources of which it was of such vital interest for us to preserve, with a view to provide for the subsistence of the army.

CHAPTER X.*

The 3rd corps ceases to be a burden to France.—Exhausted state of Arragon.—Statistical details respecting that province.—The Arragonese are called to take a share in the administration of the country.—Ordinary contributions.—Extraordinary contribution.—Payment of the troops.—Removal of the extraordinary contribution.—Organization of the district of Tortosa.—Imperial canal in Arragon.—Hospitals; police.—Supplies collected in Arragon during the sieges.—Meat market.—Arrival of an intendant-general from Paris.—Results of an administration of two years' duration.

It has been asserted, that *the art of conquering is of no avail, unless combined with the art of procuring means of subsistence for the troops.* This

* This chapter embraces a connected series of administrative operations, comprising a period of thirty months, that is to say, a part of 1809, and the years 1810 and 1811. Nevertheless it has found a place between the siege of Tortosa and that of Tarragona, though subsequent to the latter in chronological order. The order of matters has, however,

is a truth which cannot be denied, when we consider of what those mighty assemblages of men denominated *armies* consist; what consumptions of all kinds are called for by a state of war; how advantageous it is for the inhabitants of a country, that the soldiers should be furnished with what they might otherwise forcibly seize upon, and how it behoves a general to preserve them in health, strength, and courage, on which, in the day of battle, may possibly depend the success of an engagement which might decide the fate of a campaign. We trust that we shall be able to furnish a fresh proof of this, and to establish the fact, that the regular administration of an army, and the proper application of the resources of the country which it retains under its sway, should be considered as its most powerful auxiliaries.

The administration of the English armies during the war in the Peninsula, has been

appeared to claim the preference on this occasion, over that of dates. Whilst the army of Arragon was concentrated at a distance, and in front of a city on the point of being besieged, it stood more particularly in need of being supplied with provisions, since it could no longer proceed in quest of them. The administration of Arragon was, therefore, from that moment, the basis on which it relied for its successes, and for its very existence. We have no doubt that the sieges undertaken by that army will be better understood, if attention be first bestowed upon this chapter.

quoted as a model worthy of imitation. It is, indeed, an undoubted truth, that they penetrated into Portugal and Spain without being burdensome to the inhabitants; they distributed a profusion of money on their way: provisions, means of transport, every thing was paid for. But their position did not bear the slightest analogy to ours; they acted in the character of allies, and had the advantage over us of possessing a fleet which held undisputed possession of the ocean and of the coasts. By this means, they received from England every kind of assistance which a wealthy and powerful government could supply; or else they felt no difficulty in procuring, at an exorbitant rate, whatever they stood in need of. At the same time, their administration, whilst it paid for every thing that was consumed by the troops, had the power of introducing, through every harbour of the Peninsula, the produce of English industry or commerce; the supply of arms, clothing, and equipments for the Portuguese and Spanish armies, enabled it to receive and export more money than it had occasion to expend, or at least to make its allies debtors for very considerable sums. As France possessed no such means of drawing from the Peninsula the treasures which it laid out in the country for the maintenance of its armies, French coins were seen every where

in circulation, whereas English money was seldom to be met with. The British government, by this wise mode of proceeding, has obtained an important result; its land forces, after many signal defeats, have succeeded of late years in almost rivalling the glory acquired by its fleets, and claim a distinguished rank among European armies.

Our situation in Arragon was materially different; we were, from the very outset, surrounded by a hostile population, and could not venture to send a boat down the Ebro without an escort of soldiers. At that very period, however, the French government, instead of upholding our administrative measures, left them to their fate and to the resources which the country itself might afford. Notwithstanding these difficulties, if general Suchet, without failing in the mission assigned to him of defeating and conquering his opponents, succeeded on the one hand in pacifying an oppressed and exasperated country, and on the other in providing for the pay and subsistence of the army, laying siege to several fortified places, and lodging a sum little short of 8,000,000 of francs in the public treasury at Madrid, we are warranted in maintaining that the system of administration, to which these successes were mainly to be attributed, need not shrink from a comparison with that pursued by the English armies. The various circumstances

This letter was accompanied with another of the same date and of the following tenor:—

"General, I transmit to you an extract of the "emperor's decree relative to the formation of "the government of Arragon, of which his ma- "jesty confides the command to you, with the "title of governor. You will lose no time in "officially communicating the clauses of this de- "cree to the several local authorities, and from "that moment you will conform to the emperor's "orders therein contained. You will make "known to me the period at which you shall "have entered upon the exercise of your new "functions. His majesty relies upon your "wonted energy which will enable you to derive "from the national resources all the advantages "that may fairly be expected from them, and "especially to prevent their becoming, in the "smallest degree, available to the insur- "gents.

"Agreeably to the emperor's intentions, you "are to continue addressing to the staff of the "army your reports respecting military opera- "tions, and the situation of the provinces be- "longing to your government; but with regard "to the systems of local administration, justice, "police, and finances, you can only receive "orders from the emperor, which it will be my "duty to transmit direct to you. Consequently, "&c. &c."

It was easy to foresee the numerous obstacles that would necessarily oppose the execution of such a system; but there was no course left but to obey. The commander-in-chief thenceforth used all his endeavours to acquire a correct knowledge of the resources he could apply to the pay, subsistence, and other wants of the army.

Previously to the invasion, Arragon derived from its soil a sufficient quantity of corn, wine, and oil, to meet its demands; it even exported to Catalonia and Navarre a considerable portion of those articles. Oppressed, however, for nearly two years by the requisitions of several national and foreign armies, that province was impoverished; agriculture was considerably impaired; a great number of vines and olive trees had been destroyed; the enormous consumption of sheep, the only species of cattle which offers a means of subsistence in that country, had nearly exhausted all the breed. Albarracin was the only place in the whole province where a manufactory of coarse cloths was to be seen; not a single loom was at work; there still existed a tan-pit; but a pair of shoes could not be had under nine francs, nor a pair of boots under fifty.

The financial condition of the province was still more deplorable; as money was considered the sinew of war, the Spanish government had not neglected measures that were calculated to remove it from general circulation. The

exintendant of the province had carried away to Seville 3,000,000 of francs, the proceeds of patriotic donations and contributions collected previously to the siege of Saragossa. The wealthiest families had emigrated, and removed all the ready money they could obtain. A million of reales, and 3,000 marks of plate, derived from the suppressed convents, had just been transmitted to count Cabarrus, the minister of finances at Madrid. The royal treasury of Spain was indebted 500,000 reales for expenses, and did not possess a single real wherewith to face its engagements. All taxable objects were fast disappearing; the local administrations were partly dissolved; several sources of public wealth were dried up; and the annual pay of the army alone required 8,000,000 of francs, for which we had to call upon a country which, in its most prosperous days, never paid more than 4,000,000 to the Spanish government.

The above is a faithful picture of the state of affairs. The decree respecting the formation of the military governments was scarcely made known, when every one began to comment upon it; and the most intelligent Spaniards fancied they could discover through the clauses upon which the official object of that act principally relied a motive of far greater importance. It was supposed that a misunderstanding existed between

the cabinets of Madrid and of the Tuileries, and that the emperor contemplated the extension of the boundaries of France to the banks of the Ebro. Those fears could only add to the embarrassment of our position; had the commander-in-chief considered it of a transient nature, he might easily have provided for the wants of the moment by the most expeditious course, a compulsory one, and instantly seize upon the main resources of the country. Nevertheless, having been appointed governor of Arragon, he felt the necessity of acting upon a different principle. It behoved him not only to avoid exhausting the province, but even to retrieve its resources by his fostering care; his first object was, accordingly, to restore public confidence. He acted in this respect with more prudence than the Spanish government. In consequence of the repeated orders of M. Cabarrus, the minister of finance the plate of Nuestra-Señora del Pilar was to be sent off to Madrid. This church which was held in veneration by the Spaniards, and enriched with the gifts of many sovereigns, possessed a great number of vases, candlesticks, and statues, in massive gold or silver. The people of Saragossa set a great value on their being preserved; and the commander-in-chief took upon himself not to allow of their removal. This first feature of an administration which indicated a respect for property, was duly appreciated by the Arragonese. The commander-

in-chief's conduct, on this occasion was not thrown away upon them; it greatly contributed to calm the excitement of a province agitated by political convulsions, and by the wants which were inseparable from a state of warfare, at a time when the very laws of war had been trampled upon.*

* A few traits will afford some idea of the rage and excitement with which the Spaniards were animated against us during this war, whether these feelings arose in their own breasts or were instigated by their chiefs, who have not only repeatedly violated the laws of God and man, but even commanded and rewarded such violation.

It has already been seen that generals O'Donohu and Renovales, who were prisoners upon their parole, effected their escape by abusing the confidence reposed in their good faith. A multitude of Spanish officers followed their example. How could such conduct create astonishment! A regulation was printed at Cadiz by the order or with the sanction of the supreme regency, which promised promotion to every military man amongst the Spaniards who should thus effect his escape from the hands of the French.

In a catechism which was also printed and circulated in every direction, questions were laid down of the following nature:

"What duty do we owe our neighbour? We are bound to "love him, and to do him all the good in our power. What is "meant by our neighbour? All mankind excepting French-"men. Are we at liberty to kill the French? Not only we "may, but it is our duty to do so."

At the time when Sarraza, the Guerilla leader, infested the frontier of Navarre, an alcalde appointed by the French was publicly assassinated in a village; the murderers were known, and openly boasted of their crimes, we succeeded in seizing two of them, who were hung at Pampelona. Sarraza issued on

With a view the more correctly to illustrate the following statement, it has appeared to us that some historical and statistical details respecting the province of Arragon would not be superfluous in this place.

Arragon is the ancient Celtiberia of the Romans. The Goths converted it into a province of Spain. When that part of the kingdom submitted to the Moorish yoke, the inhabitants retreated to the Pyrenees, and established amongst those mountains a petty state, known under the name of So-

this occasion a proclamation which was published, and contained the following phrase: *because some honest men have killed such a one, as they were justly warranted in doing, the French governor has presumed to resort to a measure of reprisals! (Porque algunos hombres de bien, con todo derecho y toda justicia, mataron à fulano)* &c.; upon this ground he devoted the governor of Navarre to public vengeance.

The same Guerilla leader said, in a letter which was intercepted, that he was on the look out for the wife of general Suchet, who was returning to France by way of Jaca; adding, that he was the more anxious to fall in with that lady as she was said to be in the family way, (which was the fact) so that the child would perish with its mother.

However horrible these facts, as they bear a close affinity to what civil or revolutionary wars seldom fail to exhibit, we are not so much shocked at them as at the depravity of ideas and sentiments of which they afford a melancholy instance.

The above details will furnish some estimate of the difficulties we had to contend with before we could succeed, after conquering the inhabitants of that country, in bringing them to the opposite extreme, of cherishing and esteeming their conquerors.

brarve, which was afterwards incorporated with the kingdom of Arragon.*

At a later period, the provinces of Catalonia and Valencia were under the dominion of that kingdom; the former was annexed to it in 1137, by the marriage of Raymond de Bérenger, count of Barcelona, with Petronilla, the daughter of king Don Ramiro, and heiress of the crown of Arragon. The latter was taken from the Moors by king Don Jaïme, in 1238. Those three provinces formed, with the Balearic islands, what was called *La Coronilla*, or the small crown. On the occasion of the marriage of Ferdinand of Arragon with Isabella of Castille, they were annexed to the crown of Spain.

Arragon Proper was divided into thirteen corregimientos, or districts, named as follows:

Tarrazona, Borja, Calatayud, Daroca, Albarracin, Teruel, Alcañiz, Benavarre, Barbastro, Huesca, Jaca, Cincovillas, and Saragossa.

Each corregimiento was under the superintendence of a magistrate, called corregidor, whose various functions afford too clear a proof of the confusion which existed in Spain at that period, with respect to the distribution of powers. We shall convey a sufficient idea of this fact by observing, that the duties devolving upon that functionary comprised the several branches of justice, police, finances, and war, and that

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 13.

the titulary magistrate was dependent upon the governor of the province as well as upon the real audiencia, or court of appeal.

Saragossa was an archbishoprick, which had for suffragans the bishops of Albarracin, Barbastro, Huesca, Jaca, Tarrazona, and Teruel.

The court of appeal, called the real audiencia, held its sittings in Saragossa. It consisted of two civil courts and a criminal one. Justice was administered in the first instance under the presidency of the corregidors, by the alcaldes of towns and villages, who were in many instances appointed by the lords of the manor.

In former times, the provinces of Arragon, Catalonia, and Valencia were subjected to a system of contribution known by the name of provincial revenues. Philip V substituted the land tax for it, better described by the name which it bears of *unica contribucion*. Those three provinces are indebted for their subsequent prosperity to an alteration imposed upon them by way of punishment. This contribution is founded upon the basis of an estimate of the produce of lands and of property in general. It might, in most respects, have been compared with our rental book, had it not included in its provisions the income derived from commerce, from manufacturing industry, and even the amount of the profits, or the wages of the manufacturer and daily labourer.

The administration of the customs and the general revenue comprised the collection of import and export duties upon certain merchandise, and the exclusive sale of such things of which the government had reserved to itself a monopoly; such as tobacco, lead, sealing wax, sulphur, gunpowder, playing cards, stamped paper, salt, and even papal bulls. The revenues derived from the post office and from couriers were established on the same footing as in France. The government received one and a half per cent upon the revenues of corporations, consisting of the privilege of farming out the right to grind corn, to make oil, to establish tolls upon rivers, and to retail bread, wine, meat, and other articles of primary necessity; lastly, by a pontifical decree of the month of October, 1801, Pius VII had granted to Charles IV the ninth part of the church tithes. The total amount of these taxes in the province of Arragon was estimated, in 1787, at fifteen millions nine hundred thousand reales de vellon, or about four millions of francs. The real is the fourth part of a peceta, the current coin of the kingdom, which is worth rather more than the livre of twenty sols.

These data, respecting the public revenue in ordinary times, may serve as points of comparison from which to estimate the sums collected by the French administration, notwithstanding the suppression of several taxes effected in favor of local

industry, and the exhaustion of other productive means which the war had swept away.

According to a census made by order of the government, in 1776, Arragon contained at that period twelve cities, two hundred and forty boroughs, nine hundred and ninety-five villages, and a hundred and sixty-eight hamlets; and its population amounted to a hundred and seventeen thousand one hundred and twelve heads of families,* equivalent to five hundred and twenty-seven thousand and four individuals, exclusively of four thousand five hundred secular priests, four thousand monks, and fifteen hundred religious women.

Another census made in 1788, rates the population of the province at six hundred and twenty-two thousand three hundred and eight individuals. A comparison between the two statements would indicate that the population of Arragon has increased, a result which is confirmed by several writers, who estimate at nearly two millions of individuals, the general increase of population throughout Spain, from the close of the war of the succession to the commencement of the reign of Charles IV. Dating however from the latter period, it has been uniformly on the decrease.

There are, besides, in Arragon, 149 villages,

* In order to ascertain the number of individuals, it is necessary to multiply by four and a half the number of heads of families, who, in this point of view, are called *vecinos*.

long since deserted, and 393 villages in which very few houses are left standing. Nothing, therefore, is so common as to travel a distance of five or six leagues, without meeting with a single habitation.

We have already stated, that the wheat harvest was not only sufficient for the subsistence of the inhabitants, but admitted, moreover, of being exported in quantities which, in ordinary years, amounted to 50,000 cahices for Catalonia, and 20,000 for the kingdom of Valencia. The culture of the vine produced an excess of 80,000 nietros.* The growth of olives, likewise, afforded a very considerable surplus, which was chiefly exported to Castille or Navarre. The corregimiento of Alcañiz alone produced what far exceeded the wants of the province of Arragon.

The flocks, which amounted to upwards of 2,000,000 of sheep, furnished about 35,000 quintals of wool, of which only one third was required by the manufactories of the country.

This was also the case with respect to hemp, the crop of which was calculated at 100,000 arrobas, Castillian weight. About 30,000 arrobas were consumed in the province; the remainder was sent to the sea-ports, for the service

* The cahice of Arragon, containing twelve barchillas, is a measure nearly equivalent to 180 litres and a half; the nietro contains sixteen cantaros, equal to sixteen litres each.

of the king's navy. The arroba is the fourth part of a quintal.

The annual produce of silk amounted to 200,000 pounds, one half of which was sent to Catalonia.

We might easily quote many other articles of produce. The soil and climate of that beautiful province yield an abundant harvest to labour; the latter alone is wanting to one of the finest countries in Europe.

It can hardly be said that commerce was considered as a distinct profession. Every one sold the excess of his crop. Even the export trade was generally carried on by means of merchants of the provinces of Catalonia and Navarre, who sent their agents every year to collect the rich tributes of raw materials.

With respect to manufacturing industry, it was confined to a very limited number of manufactories, the work of which was of the coarsest kind.

Arragon had two universities, the one at Saragossa, the other at Huesca; but they imparted neither solid nor brilliant instruction: it was much more calculated to keep youth in the darkness of ignorance, than to extend their natural genius. This defect, however, was common all over Spain.

Although there existed no colleges, nor public schools, teachers of Latin were to be met with in every direction; the poorest workman could easily, and at a cheap rate, procure

his children a knowledge of that language, which was sufficient for the admission into a convent of monks. This mode of education is evidently owing to the wealth and preponderating influence of the clergy.

The observer's attention is more particularly attracted to the fact, of the extensive knowledge possessed by the very limited number of those who are really informed, in the midst of so general a state of ignorance. In Spain, there are so many obstacles to conquer on the road to instruction, that none but minds of a very superior order are likely to overcome. There is no limit to the success of those who have once fairly started in the course; the rest keep in the beaten track of antiquated customs.

The Arragonese are proud, obstinate, jealous of their liberty, and take it for granted that their country surpasses every other in the world. The still powerful influence of their primitive institutions on the national character, raises them in the scale above the other inhabitants of Spain in respect to political customs. In society, they are silent and reserved; their exterior deportment is grave, cold, and pensive; but they are religious observers of their promise.

The rivalries between one province and another subsist, perhaps, in a greater degree in Spain than in any other country. The Arragonese fancy that they possess more physical strength,

and spring from nobler blood, than the Castillians, because they are less inclined to bend to their superiors. They are vain of a circumstance that distinguishes them from their neighbours, which is, that the Catalonians and Valencians have a dialect peculiar to their province, whereas in Arragon all classes of the people speak the purest Spanish.

In no part of Spain is the cause of justice more loudly advocated. The native of Arragon spontaneously yields obedience to what he considers right, but revolts against any arbitrary act. This characteristic feature, added to a natural enthusiasm for glory, explains the conduct of the Arragonese towards the French army during the war of invasion. The name of Saragossa recalls the first and the most strenuous resistance ever offered to the French; and it also exhibits the first example of candid and sincere submission to the government which the law of necessity had compelled that city to acknowledge. They exerted in their defence every effort that might be expected from a heroic people; but after they had been reduced to the most dreadful extremity, and had lost all hopes of relief, they opened their gates to the conqueror, and yielded, without reserve, to all the consequences which their situation entailed upon them. Their feelings were of far too dignified a nature to warrant their indulgence of those

revengeful acts which exceed the bounds of a legitimate defence, and are alike disowned by the laws of war and of humanity.

The invasion of the Peninsula by the French army had, from a combination of circumstances, been the means of introducing extraordinary changes in the situation of Arragon, such as we have just described it. On the one hand, the inhabitants had made the most determined resistance; on the other, the necessity of conquering by force of arms had led us into excesses which it was unhappily beyond our power to avoid. During the siege of Saragossa, the bands of discipline had become relaxed; the military administration was in the utmost disorder, the hospitals without provisions, the distribution of supplies uncertain, and attended with difficulties. The abuses arising out of this state of confusion recoiled upon the inhabitants, and the excitement of the public mind was gradually increasing in consequence of the daily vexations to which the people were subjected. Accordingly, all the young men of Arragon, who had assembled at Saragossa, were preparing to second general Blake's army whenever it should make its appearance under the ramparts of the city. Notwithstanding this prevalent feeling, it was no sooner perceived, after the defeat of general Blake, that the governor was endeavouring to establish a regular system of administration and

discipline, than confidence revived, and a disposition to submit again became manifest. This was the time when the commander-in-chief was called upon to give effect to the emperor's orders.

Unwillingly compelled to embark in an attempt which he had at first considered wholly impracticable, general Suchet drew around him the few men of talent who had remained in the province, and upon whose uprightness of conduct he could place some reliance. Foremost in the list was the titulary bishop of Saragossa, afterwards bishop of Huesca, and appointed archbishop of Seville, the truly venerable father Santander, whose persuasive eloquence instilled a peaceful and conciliatory disposition into his flock. This prelate pointed out the means to be adopted with the view of securing to the clergy a portion of their revenues, and the protection to which they were entitled. At his recommendation, the commander-in-chief appointed to the vacant place of dean of the metropolitan chapter of Saragossa, the curate of Val de Algorfa, don Ramon Segura, a man no less distinguished by his virtues than by his mental accomplishments. The military ex-intendent of general Palafox, don Mariano Dominguez, had recently displayed consummate ability in the defence of Saragossa; he was well acquainted with all the resources of the province, and by attaching himself to France he rendered us very signal services. Villa y Torre, the president of

the real audiencia, who had received his appointment from Charles IV, was retained at the head of the department of justice; he was entitled to general esteem by his profound knowledge, and his attachment to his country. The chief accountant of the province had acquired much practical experience in the mode of apportioning the contributions, and was also retained in his situation. The governor selected for that of general secretary to the government, M. Larreguy the elder, a Frenchman of Spanish origin, and a highly talented and zealous young man, who greatly distinguished himself in that capacity.

We also succeeded, though not without some difficulty, in obtaining the accession of don Agustin de Quinto, one of the lawyers of the province, the most distinguished by his knowledge and the general confidence he enjoyed. He was one of those few individuals in whose person talents and virtue are combined in an equal degree. To the enlightened councils of those meritorious men, the governor is indebted for his having conquered public opinion in the very exercise of the rigorous measures which he was directed to carry into effect. Fully considering the situation of the country, they accepted the honorable mission of interposing moderation and justice, in the intercourse between the inhabitants and the soldiery, and watched the interests of their fellow countrymen with a per-

severance which never relaxed in the pursuit of that object. If any odium has attached to the administration, we owe it to ourselves to declare that their character ought to stand unblemished in the minds of the nation; the blame should be ascribed to no other cause than unforeseen circumstances, or the errors into which we may have involuntarily fallen.

General Blake's army had scarcely been defeated in the plains of Maria and of Belchite, when it became necessary to advance against Lerida; but the commander-in-chief resolved not to quit the capital of Arragon, until he had first regulated the march of the public administration during his absence.

The order of judicature remained unchanged; a watchful and active police was established; no alteration was yet introduced in the mode and principle of collecting taxes.

A contribution in kind having been imposed, with a view to secure the subsistence of the army, and the provisioning of the fortresses, a director of supplies residing in Saragossa was appointed to the duty of opening an account against each district; and the statement of the deliveries made in the province, was compared, each month, with the effective strength of the respective corps.

It was of importance to concentrate the receipts and expenditure, and to confine the latter within proper limits; a general receiver and a general

paymaster for the army were installed in Saragossa. These two agents, who had been sent to the army by count Mollien, minister of the imperial treasury, had assistants under their orders who represented them in the local districts; from that moment all the revenues found their way to one and the same chest, just in the same manner as all the expenses were defrayed by only one agent, upon regular orders and within the limit of the credit which had been assigned for the service.

The old contadoria was a kind of office of accounts, and justly enjoyed the confidence of the inhabitants. It was however divided in such a manner that each administrator had his separate accountant. With a view to concentrate the mode of superintendence, and simplify the machinery of that useful establishment, all the private accountants were united under the direction of the accountant of the province, and this functionary, in virtue of fresh powers, was invested with the right of deciding upon every difficult question, of investigating the abuses which might obstruct the progress of the collection of the revenue, and of securing a more effectual assessment of the public burdens.

Monopoly, which exercises an arbitrary controul over the wants or tastes of the people at large, and checks the natural tendency of commerce to satisfy them, had secured to itself every chan-

nel of public consumption and closed all the avenues to industry; it was partly suppressed.

After having thus broken some of the chains which curbed the faculties of the people, and confided to the Spaniards themselves the care of watching over their interests, the commander-in-chief took his departure in the month of April, 1810, for the purpose of attacking Lerida, and left the public mind, hitherto so much agitated, more favourably disposed towards us. Having obtained possession of Lerida on the 14th of May, he imposed upon that town and upon the 149 villages, forming its corregimiento, a war tax of four millions of reales, and lost no time in organising the departments of justice, police, and finances upon the same footing as in Arragon, a uniformity of system which had become indispensable to the government over both provinces.

The public revenues, however, yielded no returns; the arrear was daily increasing, and it became necessary that we should take advantage of the moment for creating new resources.

On the 12th of June an extraordinary contribution of 3,000,000 of reales per month was imposed upon Arragon. It was painful to resort to this extremity; but whilst we were before Lerida, numerous Guerilla bands had penetrated into the province, and prevented the collection of the regular taxes. The privations to which the army was exposed afforded a ready excuse for a mea-

sure which was moreover founded upon the wants created by a state of warfare. The basis adopted for the apportioning of this tax was the land tax, which extended to all classes of people without any distinction. The clergy being called upon to contribute towards it, fixed their own quota, and displayed on this occasion a disinterestedness highly creditable to them.

But it was not sufficient to impose fresh taxes, and to compel the people to pay them. It was of importance that the money with which they were obliged to part should return to them, and that a constant circulation should prevent any stagnation, and supply the wants of the military chests without uselessly encumbering them. The commander-in-chief ordered that the pay of the troops should be issued every five days: soldiers are not slow in disbursing the money they receive. The inhabitants were soon convinced that the tax levied upon them was no more than an advance, which would shortly revert to their hands by their bringing supplies to our cities and camps. Upon the same principle, every article manufactured in the country for the clothing or equipment of troops, was carefully sought and paid for to the furnishers in ready money.

At the end of every month, when an account of the pay of the army was drawn up, the retired allowances and the pensions to widows of military

men, such as they had been granted by the former government, were punctually liquidated. The salaries of those who were employed in the various branches of the administration, almost exclusively composed of Spaniards, were paid with the same regularity and at the same period. These arrangements produced all the good effect that might be expected; industry and commerce revived; the circulation of money became more rapid than before, and the recovery of taxes was no longer attended with the same difficulties.

At the end of 1810, the commander-in-chief solicited of the French government an indemnity for the supply of 10,000 quintals of corn, which he was obliged to give up to the army of Catalonia, and for replacing to a certain extent the resources of which he was now deprived by the cession of the corregimiento of Lerida. He only obtained 300,000 francs; nevertheless this relief, however small, was not wholly without its influence, by increasing the amount of coin in circulation.

The siege of Tortosa, which was undertaken in the month of June, having been suspended until the month of December, the commander-in-chief attempted to turn this compulsory delay to the advantage of the administration. He summoned to his head-quarters at Mora, on the Ebro, the principal authorities of Arragon, in order to regulate, in concert with them, the budget of 1811, to

consider of the means best calculated for facilitating the collection of taxes, and to grant to the inhabitants whatever relief might be compatible with the existing state of affairs.

In furtherance of this object, indispensable alterations were effected in the division of the territory, and in the civil and judicial functions. Fraga, which derived from Philip V the prerogatives attached to a chief town, was created into a corregimiento. The fourteen corregimientos, of which the province of Arragon at that time consisted, were separated into two grand divisions, the one on the right, the other on the left bank of the Ebro. M. Menche, a man of high character, who had been sent to Madrid as intendent of Arragon, was retained in his situation, with the title of head commissioner of the province. MM. Dominguez and Quinto, in their capacity of superior commissioners, were respectively entrusted with the duty of superintending the administration of both banks. The judicial powers were withdrawn from the corregidors and alcaldes, who remained invested with the civil authority only, whilst the principal alcaldes were exclusively charged with the duty of administering justice under the direction of the regent of the audiencia. The corregidors of districts received the appellation of principal corregidors, and the alcaldes that of corregidors of communes.

A correct idea may be formed of these various

functions by observing that the superior commissioners might be compared to our prefects, the principal corregidors to our sub-prefects, the corregidors of communes to our mayors, the principal alcaldes with the judges of first instance, and the real audiencia with the courts of appeal. These changes tended to establish a clearer line of distinction between the several powers, and to give a more efficient impulse to the administration.

At this period, all the acts of the government were promulgated in the emperor's name, without any indication being given by the Spaniards of their feeling dissatisfied at the change.

We had yet to perform the task of framing the budget of 1811, and doing away with taxes that were either unnecessary, or opposed by their very nature to the public welfare, as well as to re-model upon fresh bases those administrations which had only been imperfectly organized.

The lottery was suppressed: the manufacturing and disposal of those articles, of which the Spanish government had reserved to itself the exclusive monopoly, having been declared free and open to all, a reduction took place amongst the persons hitherto employed in duties no longer required of them. It had been proved by experience, that the extent of power given to the contadoria of the province had presented solid guarantees to the communes against arbitrary

taxation, and secured to them the regular payment of all the supplies which they had furnished; to its functions was accordingly added the duty of examining and passing the accounts of all public accountants. The dilapidations detected by that fostering administration were repressed by measures of severity, and led to important restitutions of funds.

The customs were organized on a principle similar to that which prevailed in France; and out of regard for the Arragonese, as well as for ourselves, the corps of custom-house officers was principally composed of veteran Spanish officers and soldiers, who had voluntarily tendered their services. The administration of national domains was likewise definitively settled, and the small districts were authorised to work on their own account the estates which it was found impossible to farm out, under the condition of their paying three fourths of their former produce. With a view, in short, to complete these measures, the receiver and paymaster were directed to furnish every month to the contadoria a statement of receipts and expenditure, and to make it public, in order to satisfy the inhabitants that the government rigidly and exclusively devoted the produce of the revenues to the service of the army and the administration of the province.

The governor-general soon had occasion to convince himself that the inhabitants of Arragon

had appreciated his good intentions, and relied upon his justice. Such was the happy influence of these arrangements upon the state of our finances, that it enabled him to lighten the burden of the extraordinary war contribution, of five hundred thousand reales per month.

During the month of September 1810, the emperor directed that all British merchandise found in Arragon should be confiscated and burnt. The commander-in-chief represented that such an order, if carried into effect, would prove a fatal blow to commerce, which was barely reviving and commencing a new existence; he proposed that a duty of fifty per cent should be levied upon those goods, according to what had been done in Holland, rather than that he should arbitrarily take them from their rightful owners. His proposal, however, was not attended to; all British merchandise found in commercial warehouses was consigned to the flames, in the public square of Saragossa, where a similar act of authority had formerly been exercised by command of Charles IV. Articles of colonial produce not having been specifically named in the emperor's decree, a tax was imposed upon them, the produce of which, though inconsiderable, contributed towards the resources of the public chest. No means were neglected that were in any way calculated to soften down, in the mode of execution, the odium and the arbitrary

character which attached to such a measure in the minds of commercial men.

The capture of Tortosa opportunely occurred, to crown the first year of the existence of the government of Arragon, and to hold out to us a brighter prospect for the future. During the course of this siege, which lasted until the 2nd of January, 1811, our expenses were increased by the necessity we were under of maintaining a corps of six thousand men, which the marshal duke of Tarentum had placed at our disposal. On entering Tortosa, our funds were exhausted; the country was so completely drained of provisions and money, that we were compelled to draw from Arragon, during several months, the means requisite for the pay and subsistence of the troops. As soon as tranquillity was restored, an extraordinary contribution of three millions of reales was imposed upon that corregimiento, which contained no more than thirty-two villages; but a considerable time elapsed ere we could succeed in obtaining the money so levied.

With a view to afford relief to the indigent class of the population of Arragon, extensive works had been undertaken in that province. Immense plains, which must have remained barren and uncultivated had it not been for the advantage they derived from irrigation, were

wholly indebted for their fertility to the imperial canal, so called from its having been commenced in the reign of Charles V. The sluices, the dykes, and the large basin of the Monte-Torrero, which served the purposes of a port, had been destroyed by the army; means were adopted for repairing all the damage done to the canal, and in a short time it was restored to commerce and agriculture. Works were also undertaken for the beneficial object of supplying water to the city of Saragossa, which possessed no public fountains. The requisite level was taken, and measures were employed for the purpose of conveying water through the basin of the Casa-Blanca to a fountain which was erected in the public square, near the ruins of the convent of San-Francisco, in the middle of the Cosso. The quarter between that part of the city and the gate of Santa Engracia was wholly uninhabited since the siege, and a mere heap of ruins. A plan was adopted for clearing the ground, and opening a broad street, planted with trees; it was carried into effect at a later period, to the manifest satisfaction of the inhabitants.

The hospital of the Misericordia was repaired; the revenues of that establishment were restored, and 700 foundlings, who had found an asylum in it, were engaged in the dressing of wool, the tanning of leather, and the manufacturing of cloths. The hospitals of Huesca and

Teruel were likewise re-established, and juntas appointed to superintend the administration of them. The spacious and elegant civil hospital of Saragossa, the existence of which bore witness to the generosity of the inhabitants, was also restored to its former condition, together with all the revenues annexed to it; and was likewise used as a military hospital.

The artillery stood in need of saltpetre for the manufacturing of gunpowder. This object was attended to, and afforded means of subsistence to many families. The circus destined for bull-fights had been partly destroyed; it was repaired, and the population of the neighbourhood flocked to the city, in order to witness some of those national amusements. The academy of the Friends of the Country was revived; funds were applied to the school for drawing, architecture, and mathematics, which was daily attended by 150 youths of the province.*

The city of Saragossa was secured against a coup-de-main, by the construction of several works made of earth or masonry. The fortifications of the castle were extended and improved, so as to place the capital of Arragon in a condition to defend itself, at a moment when the army might be called away to other points. With a view to give the Arragonese a

* See notes and explanatory documents No. 14.

more direct interest in the success of our operations, and to find employment for those Spanish officers who had attached themselves to our cause, the commander-in-chief formed four companies of fusileers, and two of gendarmes; they were soon clothed, equipped, and armed for service; the soldiers were all able-bodied men, indefatigable, and excellent guides. They were paid and subsisted like the rest of the army, and claimed our warmest praise by the zeal and valour they displayed on several occasions.

The regulations laid down by the principal corregidor, don Mariano Dominguez, and his personal activity, were the means of keeping up an excellent police in the capital. During a period of sixteen or eighteen months, there never existed the slightest disturbance, not even when the course of military operations had compelled us to leave a very weak garrison in the town. Not a single assassination was committed, whilst at a former period, according to the extracts from the registers, upwards of 300 were computed to have occurred every year, in a time of profound peace. A great number of distinguished families, who had fled from the province in consequence of their political opinions, or from the fear of military events, had voluntarily returned, and the sequestration laid upon their property had been accordingly set aside.

Whilst these improvements were taking place,

the commander-in-chief learned with considerable astonishment, on the 19th of March 1811, that in virtue of a decree of the emperor, he was directed to lay siege to Tarragona, and that lower Catalonia was placed under his orders, as well as the active portion of the army then assembled in that province. By an increase to his forces of 18,000 men, and the management of an important siege, he was, no doubt, afforded the means of honourably serving his country; but he had also fresh difficulties to surmount. The troops of the army in Catalonia had been paid, and in a great measure subsisted by France; but the pay of several corps was eight months in arrear, whilst others were paid to the day. The state of the public funds did not afford the means of at once bringing up those arrears. The high price of corn increased the disadvantages of our position. The monopolising system, favored by the English, had raised the price of wheat from sixteen to thirty-two francs per quintal. These circumstances called for the utmost exertions on our part; the requisite orders were immediately issued.

Three extensive dépôts of provisions were to be formed at Lerida, Tortosa, and Mora. Eight battalions of infantry were directed to scour the mountains and collect all the sheep they could find. Our regiments had commenced their march from the different points of Arragon for the pur-

pose of forming new divisions of the army, when the news which arrived on the 21st of April of the capture of Figueras, compelled the commander-in-chief instantly to proceed to Lower Catalonia.

As the course of events no longer admitted of a moment's delay, he ordered the principal dépôts of provisions to be established at Mora; first, because that point presented to us the shortest though the most difficult road for transporting corn to Reuss; in the second place, because the road from Tortosa to Tarragona was reserved for the artillery; and, lastly, because the road to Lerida did not offer sufficient security, as the Catalonians always kept the open field. Notwithstanding the inclemency of the season, we succeeded in a short time in collecting 9,500 quintals of corn and flour at the town of Mora, 11,000 at Mequinenza, 6,000 at Caspe, 12,000 at Saragossa, and 4,000 at Huesca. Regular and safe convoys were organized by the active vigilance of the director, Bondurand; 4,000 quintals of flour, a quantity of biscuit, every thing requisite for an hospital, and medicines of all descriptions, followed our first columns. Numerous means of transport were collected between Mora and Reuss, and if the enemy should fail in an attempt to break our line, we were in hopes of meeting, for some time, all the wants of the besieging army.

We had subsisted until now without resorting to the ruinous system of contracts; this was an incalculable advantage in our situation; for the whole of the sums destined for paying the troops would have proved inadequate to satisfy the demands of contractors. Our resources were very nearly exhausted. Upwards of 120,000 sheep and 1,200 head of cattle of a small size, procured from Lower Catalonia, Valencia, and Arragon, had been consumed in the vicinity of Tortosa during the last six months. We had to guard against the danger of a scarcity of meat in the midst of our siege operations. Yielding to the urgent representations of the authorities of Arragon, and compelled, moreover, to give way to necessity, the commander-in-chief authorized, for the first time, the director, M. Bondurand, to make a public contract for the supply of the cattle required for the service of the army. In virtue, however, of a special clause in the contract, the cattle were to be brought from France and distributed alive.

It is right that we should enter into some explanation on this subject. Experience had long taught us that in a hostile country, the service of supplies which is so essential to the success of an army, might be usefully entrusted to military accountants. The fellow-feelings they entertained for their comrades, their sense of discipline, the tastes and habits

of a military life which support them in the midst of danger, render them better calculated to protect the trust confided to their care; whereas civil employés, whose presence in the corps is not only accidental, but also fails to hold out the same guarantees, generally enter upon the temporary exercise of their functions with views of self-interest, which compromise the safety of the service. Such were the considerations which led the commander-in-chief to direct that the cattle should be distributed alive to the respective regiments. Owing to this arrangement, the heads of corps were charged with the duty of superintending the proper distributions to their soldiers, and requiring that they should be always provided with meat for two days' consumption. The consequence was, that the cattle being thus divided amongst the troops, could subsist with less difficulty, were more effectually watched, never occasioned any delay in our movements, and that, on reaching his bivouac, the soldier was not obliged to quit his quarters or to go out marauding in quest of food. This plan, which was followed during the whole campaign, proved no less advantageous than economical to us. If the regulations of the service were to establish its adoption in the different situations in which our army might be placed in an enemy's country, it might be attended with the advantage of faci-

litating the movements of the troops, of securing at a less expensive rate a main branch of the subsistence of an army, and of preventing the system of plunder which every where spreads desolation.

Towards the end of April, 1811, baron Lacuée, master of requests in the council of state, who was sent to fill the office of intendant-general to the army, arrived at our head-quarters at Saragossa. He was accompanied by six auditors, MM. Combes Sieyes, Dumées, d'Arthenay, de Montigny, d'Hautefort, and d'Arlincourt. One of them remained attached to the general administration; the other five were to be employed in the provinces.

This fresh organization did not in any manner affect the system of administration we had adopted; the commander-in-chief continued to unite in his own person the civil and military powers; he was specially entrusted with the high police of the province, and his superintendence extended over whatever constituted the intendant-general's duties.*

On the 3rd of May, 1811, the whole army had reached the camp in front of Tarragona.

On the 28th of June, after a most obstinate defence, Tarragona fell into our hands. During the progress of this operation, Arragon con-

* See notes and explanatory documents, No. 15.

tinued to furnish supplies to the army. We have known some of the peasantry of Teruel to have travelled to the town of Mora, a distance of fifty leagues, in order to bring their quota of provisions. A great number of communes had solicited and obtained arms to enable them to resist the inroads of the Guerillas; others had requested that French garrisons might be left to protect them. The municipalities, curates, and public functionaries had shown the utmost zeal in pointing out the places of retreat of malefactors and of the enemies of public tranquillity; private individuals had given precise information respecting the approach of armed bands. In short, many traits of humanity had been shewn towards our stragglers, who had been picked up by the peasantry and kept concealed from the fury of the Spanish guerillas These were no equivocal signs of the general feeling; they held out to the administration a prospect of improvement in the minds of those whom it was appointed to govern.

After taking possession of several places in Catalonia, the commander-in-chief had returned to Saragossa in the beginning of August. Eighteen months had elapsed since he was directed to feed the war by the war, to draw from the country whatever was required for the subsistence of the army, and he had in that space of time succeeded in clearing off fourteen months' arrears of pay, of

general charges, and of extraordinary allowances. The expenses of the artillery and of the corps of engineers, the extraordinary requisites for a siege and for the hospitals, the horses required for the cavalry, and the cost of transport had all been liquidated. The charges of administration, of justice, of the police, of finances, the expenses of public works, the ecclesiastical pensions, those assigned to widows, and the retired allowances of military men, had been paid with no less punctuality. Upwards of ten millions of francs, either proceeding from the old taxes laid in the time of the Spanish government, from extraordinary war contributions, from national domains or the private domains of the crown, had been lodged in the military chest, which still contained a reserve fund exceeding 600,000 francs. The army and the fortified towns had been provisioned by requisitions of corn, wine, brandy, oil, and cattle.

Public order had never been disturbed, notwithstanding the collision produced by a state of war; the inhabitants of the country had resumed their labours as they were wont to do in profound peace; commercial industry, being no longer fettered, had considerably extended its speculations; manufactures had been established in Saragossa; the ruins of that splendid city were beginning to disappear, and public walks or establishments of general utility were substituted for them. These results far exceeded our expectations.

It is no doubt an easy task to levy contributions and to incur expenses; but to allay almost on a sudden the hatred of a people enthusiastically attached to their country, to modify their institutions, usages and habits, and whilst overburdening them with taxes, to acquire such an ascendency over their minds as to induce them to second our enterprises without the slightest manifestation of further resistance on their part, without our revolting the national pride, such was the success at which it behoved the superior administration of the government of Arragon to aim, and it was beginning to indulge the hope that it had nearly accomplished so desirable an object. We shall find it perseveringly adhering to the same system in the province of Valencia, at a later period, and obtaining a similar result.

NOTES

AND

EXPLANATORY DOCUMENTS.

NOTE 1.

PAGE 4, VOL. I.

EXTRACT FROM THE SPANISH WORK ENTITLED:

HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PRINCIPAL MOVEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES IN THE PENINSULA, DURING THE WAR CARRIED ON BY SPAIN AGAINST BONAPARTE;

DRAWN UP BY THE SECTION OF MILITARY HISTORY.

Being one of the sections composing the commission of generals and officers established at Madrid under the superintendence of the minister of war.

The Spanish armies received, in the first instance, the names of the provinces or districts in which they were organized; but the central junta had no sooner met, than they gave them an organization and names analogous to the points of the frontier where they were called upon to act against the enemy.

The armies of Asturias and of Gallicia, as well as the troops which came from the north of Europe, under the orders of the marquis de la Romana, formed the army of the left. It occupied the left of the line of battle held by the allied troops, and operated upon the upper Ebro, and in the Biscayan provinces.

The armies of Castille, Estremadura and Andalusia composed the central army, which operated on the centre of the general line in the provinces of Burgos, la Rioja and Navarre.

The armies of Arragon, Valencia and Murcia formed the army of

reserve, which leaned upon the immortal city of Saragossa, took up a position in Arragon, and shared with the central army the battle of Tudela.

Lastly, the army of the right was composed of the troops from Catalonia and the Balearic islands, of those which had arrived from Lisbon, of some detachments from Arragon and of a division from Grenada; this army was constantly engaged in Catalonia.

The above organization and names were retained from the beginning of November 1808, until December 1810.

In the month of December 1810, the regency of Spain and of the Indies divided the Spanish troops engaged in the Peninsula into six corps d'armée, in the following manner.

The army of the right formed the first army; the second army was composed of the troops which were in Valencia and Arragon; the third, of the army of the centre occupied in Murcia; the fourth of the army of Estremadura with the troops stationed in the island of Leon, at the camp of Gibraltar and in the condado de Niebla; the fifth, of the army of the left which operated in Estremadura and had some detachments as far as the lines of Torres Vedras; the sixth, of the troops belonging to the said army which were employed in Gallicia and in the Asturias. Soon afterwards, the regency decreed the formation of a new corps, composed of the troops of Porlier, Mina and Longa, under the denomination of the seventh army; the several bands of Guerillas and the free corps were likewise destined to form part of the above mentioned forces.

In December 1812, a final organization was given to the Spanish troops in the Peninsula, and it was determined that the seven corps d'armée composing them should be re-modelled into six corps, in the following manner.

The first army retained its name.

The second was formed out of the second and third armies.

The fourth took the name of the third army; and out of some of its corps was formed the army of reserve of Andalusia, to which were added some other detached troops drawn from different points.

The fifth, six and seventh armies were united for the purpose of forming the fourth corps; and out of the detachments of different corps was formed the army of reserve of Gallicia.

The only remarkable changes that occurred in the Spanish armies, since that period were the following:

The first army did not quit Catalonia.

The second constantly remained in the kingdom of Valencia.

The third passed from Andalusia to the kingdom of Valencia, for the purpose of replacing the Anglo-Spanish Sicilian army in May 1813. In the month of July, it repaired to Catalonia and afterwards advanced towards France through Arragon, Navarre and Biscay, with a view to join lord Wellington's army.

The reserve of Andalusia quitted that province in May 1813, and proceeded through Estremadura and Castille to Navarre, to join the forces commanded by lord Wellington, duke of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The fourth army, which had sent some of its divisions on detached operations, broke up from its positions, and marched to the frontiers of France, where it acted in conjunction with the Anglo-Portuguese army until the termination of the war.

Lastly, the reserve of Gallicia remained stationary in that province.

The British army quitted England in July 1808, and in August following landed in Portugal, in the bay of the Mondego, whence it commenced its operations, which were brought to a close during the same month by the capitulation of Cintra. Although that army had been placed under the orders of general Dalrymple, sir Arthur Wellesley assumed the immediate command in the engagement at Roleia and Vimiera, because neither general Dalrymple nor general Burrard, the second in command, had yet arrived when the operations commenced.

After the convention of Cintra, and the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops under the order of general Junot, the English army in that kingdom was placed under the command of Sir John Moore in September 1808, and advanced in four columns towards Spain in the month of October following, for the purpose of acting in concert with the Spanish armies.

The English army being overpowered by the superiority of forces which the French had set in motion against them, and being compelled to retreat, effected this movement towards Corunna, and after the memorable battle of that name, which was fought in January 1809, and in which its commander-in-chief was killed, that army embarked for England; in consequence of this event, there was only left in the Peninsula a small corps of English troops, which remained in Portugal under the orders of general Cradock.

In the month of March of the same year, a British army re-landed in Portugal, and further troops continued to arrive until the month of

April following. Sir Arthur Wellesley, their new commander-in-chief, landed, and assumed at once the command of all the forces of the kingdom. The English army compelled Soult who was stationed at Oporto, to evacuate Portugal in the month of May; and having fallen back upon Abrantes in June, marched from that point along the right bank of the Tagus towards Talavera, where it formed a junction with the Spanish army of Estremadura, and fought the memorable battle of Talavera at the end of July in the same year.

In the month of August after that battle, the English army fell back upon Badajoz; towards the end of September it returned into Portugal, crossed over to the right bank of the Tagus, and took up a position in the province of Beira, where it remained until the middle of the following year 1810; it then effected a movement towards the frontier of Spain, whilst Massena's army was laying siege to Ciudad-Rodrigo.

On the surrender of this fortress, the English army placed itself in the rear of Almeida; and after the taking of the latter place, it commenced its retrograde movement towards the lines of Torres-Vedras with the Portuguese army, which was then completing its organization. It fought the battle of Busaco in September 1810, whilst carrying on this operation.

In the month of February of the above year, a corps of British and Portuguese troops proceeded from Portugal to Cadiz and to the Island of Leon, under the orders of general Graham, for the purpose of assisting in the defence of those important points.

The Anglo-Portuguese army, which was gradually increasing in number, remained within the lines of Torres-Vedras from October 1810 until March 1811. Massena commenced his retreat towards Spain at the latter period, and the English army having then formed itself into two divisions, the first under the orders of lord Wellington marched through Beira and Castille in pursuit of Massena, the second under Beresford proceeded to Spanish Estremadura. The former fought several engagements with Massena's retreating army; the latter took part in the battle of Albuera, in conjunction with the fifth Spanish army and with the expeditionary army.

Those two divisions remained separated during the remainder of that year and the first ten months of 1812, frequently sending reinforcements to each other; for instance, during the siege of Badajoz in February 1812, and on various other occasions. It was only after the memorable events which took place that year in Old Castille, that they formed a junction on the river Tormes, subsequently

to the movements they had effected from Burgos and Madrid in the month of November 1812. In October, the Anglo-Portuguese division, forming part of the garrison of Cadiz and of the Island of Leon, joined the second Anglo-Portuguese corps under general Hill's orders.

During the remainder of the war, the Anglo-Portuguese army carried on its operations in a body, without any further separation of importance. In 1813, it quitted the position which it had taken up in 1812, moved to the left of the position on the upper Ebro; and penetrating into France, as far as Bordeaux and Toulouse, in the year 1814, brought the war to a close by the celebrated battle fought near the latter city.

The other English army, which was denominated the Anglo-Spanish Sicilian army, in consequence of its being formed of a Spanish and a Sicilian division, landed at Alicant in July 1812, under the orders of general Maitland, and was successively commanded by generals Murray, Bentinck and Clinton. That army occupied Alicant and its vicinity until May 1813, when it embarked for Catalonia. It attempted in vain to take possession of Tarragona, and re-embarked in June following on its way back to the kingdom of Valencia, whence it returned by land to Catalonia, and followed Suchet's movements in that province. The Anglo-Spanish Sicilian army remained in Catalonia until April 1814, at which period it separated from the Spanish division, and marched across the provinces of Arragon, Navarre and Biscay, on its road to join the British army commanded by the duke of Ciudad-Rodrigo.

The French armies which invaded the Peninsula, also experienced frequent variations in the names which they bore, and in their organization.

In the first campaign, the name of army of Portugal was given to the corps of troops under Junot's orders which took possession of that kingdom; the name of second corps of observation of the Gironde, to the army commanded by Dupont which invaded Andalusia; of army of the lower Pyrenees, to the army which entered Spain with Moncey, and which was soon divided into two corps respectively commanded by that marshal and by Bessieres under Murat's orders; and of army of the eastern Pyrenees, to the army which entered Catalonia under the orders of Duhesme, and established its head-quarters at Barcelona. In June 1808, fresh troops entered Spain, and proceeded

to lay siege to Saragossa, at first under the orders of Lefebvre, and afterwards of Verdier. The remains of the French squadron which had fought at Trafalgar were in the bay of Cadiz. This squadron, which was commanded by vice-admiral Rosilli, was captured by the Spaniards in June 1808, and in July following, the corps d'armée commanded by Dupont experienced the same fate after the glorious battle of Baylen. In the month of August, the troops commanded by Moncey, Bessieres and Verdier retreated to Biscay and Navarre, where, having been reinforced by the corps d'armée under marshal Ney, formed the three corps of the right, the centre and the left under the orders of Joseph and of Jourdan his major-general.

The army of Duhesme retained its position and its name.

In October and November 1808, considerable reinforcements of French troops entered Spain; they formed the materials of the grand army commanded by the emperor Napoleon in person. This army was divided into different corps in the following manner: the first was under Victor, and consisted of recent reinforcements; the second, under Soult, had formerly been the army of the centre; the third, under Moncey, formerly the army of the left; the fourth, under Lefebvre, consisted of troops which had just entered Spain; the fifth, under Lannes, was of the like description; the sixth, under Ney, was formerly the army of the right; lastly, the imperial guard, commanded by Bessieres, which entered Spain with the emperor Napoleon.

In the month of November of the same year, a corps of troops, under Bonnet, made excursions to the mountains of Santander, and to other parts of Asturias. French troops were left to defend the provinces of Navarre and Biscay.

During the same month, general Gouvion-Saint-Cyr entered Catalonia with a considerable reinforcement, which, added to the remains of the old army of the eastern Pyrenees, formed the seventh corps.

The French army retained, for a long time, this organization, subject to the following variations:

In February 1809, the emperor returned to France with the imperial guard.

In the same month, Joseph's royal-guard was first formed at Madrid, which proceeded in the month of June following, to reinforce the French armies subsequently engaged at Talavera.

In January of the same year, Sebastiani replaced Lefebvre in the command of the fourth corps.

In the same month, Lannes was appointed to the chief command

of the third and fifth corps, under the orders of Junot and Mortier, and carried on the siege of Saragossa at the head of these forces. In April following, Suchet relieved Junot in the command of the third corps.

In November 1809, the first, fourth, and fifth corps formed a junction under the orders of Joseph, who had appointed Soult his major-general, and proceeded to carry on operations upon the Tagus against the Spanish army of the centre. Merle temporarily relieved Soult in the command of the second corps, which was shortly afterwards assigned to Regnier.

In May 1810, the French armies in Spain changed their names and mode of organization.

The first, fourth, and fifth corps, which had invaded Andalusia under Joseph's command, formed the army of the south, and were assigned to Soult, with Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier under his orders.

In the same month was formed the army of the centre, which was placed under Joseph's immediate orders, and consisted of his royal-guard, of a few corps organized for his service, and of the French garrisons along the points occupied by that army.

The second and sixth corps, as well as the eighth, which entered Spain under Junot's orders in the month of January, formed the army of Portugal, the chief-command of which was assigned to Massena.

The third corps assumed the name of army of Arragon; and the seventh, in the command of which Augereau had relieved Saint-Cyr in October 1809, was called the army of Catalonia.

In December 1810, the ninth corps, commanded by general Drouet, entered Spain, and proceeded to reinforce the army of Portugal.

In January and February 1811, some troops arrived belonging to the imperial guards, which being united to those in the provinces of Asturias, Santander, Biscay, and Navarre, and in a part of Old Castille, formed the army of the north, the command of which was at first assigned to Bessieres, and afterwards to Dorsenne in July 1811.

In June 1810, marshal Macdonald relieved Augereau in the command of the army of Catalonia, and was relieved in his turn by Decaen in December 1811.

In May 1811, marshal Ney assumed the temporary command of the army of Portugal, which he soon resigned to marshal Marmont; and a corps of that army proceeded, under Drouet's orders, to reinforce the army of the south. Ever since that period, the army of Portugal was no longer organized as a corps d'armée.

Jourdan resumed the command of the army of the centre in August 1811.

In 1812, Marmont was relieved by Clausel in the command of the army of Portugal, after the celebrated battle of Salamanca; and a few days afterwards, Souham relieved Clausel in this command, and Dorsenne in the command of the army of the north.

In November of the same year, the armies of Portugal, of the north, the centre and the south, commanded by generals Souham, Cafarelli, Soult and Jourdan, under Joseph's orders, effected a junction on the Tormes; this organization lasted until the middle of 1813, without any other change than Gazan's relieving Soult in February of that year, in the command of the army of the south, which had ceased to possess the organization of a corps d'armée ever since the month of August 1812.

Lastly, in July 1813, the armies of Portugal, of the north, the centre, and the south, which had carried on joint operations since the battle of Vittoria, formed what was denominated the army of Spain, the command of which was conferred upon Soult; and in the month of September following, the armies of Arragon and Catalonia were united into one under the orders of Suchet, and were thenceforward called the army of Arragon and Catalonia.

NOTE 2, PAGE 10, VOL. 1.

Situation of the 3rd Corps d'armée in the month of May 1809.

DIVISIONS.	REGIMENTS.	BATTALIONS.	SQUADRONS.	MEN.	TOTAL of Combatants.	REMARKS.
1st DIVISION, under General LAVAL.	5th light	1	..	490	4,483	The regiments of the Vistula had several detachments, and the 121st two battalions, in Navarre.
	14th of the line	2	..	1,080		
	44th ditto	2	..	1,069		
	2nd of the Vistula	2	..	880		
	3rd ditto	2	..	964		
2nd DIVISION, under General MUSNIER.	114th of the line....	3	..	1,627	4,798	The whole of the 3rd division, which consisted of the 116th and 117th regiments, was acting in Castille on a detached service.
	115th ditto	3	..	1,732		
	1st of the Vistula	2	..	1,039		
	121st of the line....	1	..	400		
	64th regiment..... Skirmishers of the 40th	1	..	450	450	
CAVALRY, under General VATIER.	4th hussars	..	3	326	796	
	13th cuirassiers	..	4	390		
	Polish lancers.....	..	1	80		
		19	8		10,527	

NOTE 3, PAGE 111, VOL. 1.

Situation of the 3rd Corps d'armée in the month of April 1810.

GENERALS OF		REGIMENTS.	NUMBER of		PRESENT UNDER ARMS.			
					BEFORE LERIDA.		On detached services in Arragon, along the lines or in the fortresses.	
DIVISION.	BRIGADE.		battalions.	squadrons.	men.	horses.	men.	horses.
1st DIVISION. under General LAVAL.	MONTMARIE	14th of the line	4	..	..	..	2,101	
		3rd of the Vistula	2	..	608	..	1,229	
	CHLOPISKI	44th of the line	2	..	..	..	1,416	
		2nd of the Vistula	2	..	..	..	1,568	
2nd DIVISION. under General MUSNIER.	PARIS	115th of the line	4		1,804	..	387	
		1st of the Vistula	2	..	1,508			
	VERGES	114th of the line	4	..	1,689	..	675	
		121st ditto	4	..	1,649	..	514	
3rd DIVISION. General of brigade HABERT		5th light	2	..	960			
		116th of the line	3	..	960	..	539	
		117th ditto	4	..	1,799	..	347	
CAVALRY. General of brigade BOUSSARD ..		4th hussars	..	4	328	317	321	309
		13th cuirassiers	..	4	452	452	373	375
		Polish lancers	..	1	80	80		
ARTILLERY. General of brigade VALEE ..		Horse and foot artillery men, Pioneers and pontoniers	..	..	270	63	141	
		Train	..	..	347	597	193	310
ENGINEERS. Colonel HAXO		1 company of miners, 2 companies of sappers	..	..	260	..	18	
		TOTAL	33	9	12,714	1,509	9,822	994

NOTE 4.

PAGE 122, VOL. 1.

THE emperor disapproved of general Suchet's expedition to Valencia, and seemed to consider that movement as the cause which prevented his co-operating with marshal Augereau on the lower Ebro. The following authentic narrative sufficiently proves that it did not depend upon the 3rd corps to effect a junction with the 7th, at an earlier or for a longer time than it actually did.

.... During the progress of these unfortunate events, to which no remedy could at the moment be applied, considering the distance of the two divisions which were stationed at Reuss, and which must have necessarily been recalled, general Severoli was carrying into effect the order he had previously received, of opening a communication with the army of Arragon along the Ebro. Being apprehensive, however, of an attack from O'Donnell, so long as the latter should maintain his forces in a concentrated position round Tarragona, especially since the fall of Villafranca had had the effect of cutting off all communication between Barcelona and the troops stationed at Reuss, he cautiously abstained from undertaking any movement with the two divisions, or remaining at Reuss with forces inferior in number to those which the enemy might bring against him. He merely despatched colonel Villate, with a detachment of light troops, by the shortest road, to the town of Mora de Ebro, a distance of fourteen hours' march from Reuss, and held himself in readiness to effect his retreat as soon as that officer should have returned to the camp. This important and perilous command could not have been confided to an officer better calculated to undertake it, by his quick penetration and steadiness, which offered a sure guarantee that he would never compromise the safety of his detachment by an over-ardent and imprudent zeal, in the event of his encountering obstacles beyond his

power to overcome in the pursuit of his object, or an enemy too powerful in point of numbers, and too resolutely determined to oppose his progress. The whole army of Arragon had already taken up its position on the Segre and the Ebro, for the purpose of laying siege to Lerida, with the exception of the troops left on the frontiers of Valencia, of Castille, and of Navarre. The division of Musnier occupied Mora, commanded the navigation of the lower Ebro, and observed the garrisons of Mequinenza and Tortosa, as well as the Spanish troops of Valencia and of lower Catalonia. Such was the position of Suchet's army, when that of Augereau advanced to form a junction with it. Early on the 4th of April, colonel Villate left Reuss with his small column, consisting of a battalion of the 5th Italian regiment, another of the 93rd French, and a squadron of chasseurs. He proceeded through Borges to Dosaguas, passed the defile of Argentera, and descended by Fontabella to Falset in the basin of the Ebro. He remained during the night at the latter place, and resumed his march on the following morning; owing, however, to the ruggedness of the road as far as Mas de Mora, he took up a position with his troops, and contented himself with detaching a platoon of horse-chasseurs, supported by a few infantry soldiers, to the banks of the river. This detachment had no sooner arrived in front of the French advanced post, to the great surprise of the latter, and made itself known, than it was greeted with transports of joy. It brought news of the army of Catalonia of which nothing had yet been heard, notwithstanding its proximity and the circumstance that the greater part of that army had been for some time stationed at Reuss. As soon as the troops had communicated to each other, the intelligence they mutually possessed regarding the strength, the position and the projects of the two armies which were acting in the vicinity of the Ebro, colonel Villate hastened to rally his men, and returned the same night to Falset, on the heights of which the armed peasantry were beginning to assemble from all directions. The Spaniards never failed, when the enemy had eluded their endeavours to arrest him in a favorable position, and had succeeded in crossing the mountains, to intercept his retreat by seizing upon the passes through which he might attempt to return, or by compelling him to alter his march, and to fight under every disadvantage. Colonel Villate, however, was sensible that he had no time to lose, and that every moment's delay compromised his safety. He commenced his march, crossed the mountains, and drove back the Spanish advanced

guard, cautiously avoiding an action, and only anxious to extricate himself without loss of time, from the snare in which it was intended to entrap him; he passed the defiles, at the head of his detachment formed into a compact body, and forced his way through the enemy, who having failed in arresting his progress, kept close in pursuit of him; he was wounded with several of his detachment. He reached the town of Reuss on the 6th in the evening, at the moment when pressing orders had just been received from marshal Augereau, through some secret channel of communication, directing the two divisions to rally without loss of time, and to effect their retreat towards Barcelona by forced marches, for the purpose of proceeding thence to Hostalrich and Gerona, which were said to be threatened by reinforcements of O'Donnel's army lately arrived from Tarragona and Manresa, under the command of generals Caro and Campoverde. Accordingly, Villate had scarcely returned to Reuss, when Severoli's army commenced its retreat at nightfall and in the utmost silence. (Extract from the history of the Campaigns of the Italians in Spain, by Vacani, Vol. II, page 236, and following ones).

NOTE 5.

PAGE 131. VOL. 1.

Brigadier-general D. Garcia Navarro was taken prisoner before Mora at the end of 1810, and proceeded to France with general Haxo, to whom he gave the following account of the battle of Margalef.

Composition of Henry O'Donnell's army on the 23rd April.

1st Division, maréchal-de-camp YVAROLA.

Brigade of GARCIA NAVARRO.	Brigade of DUPUIG.
1st battalion of Arragon.	1st battalion of Walloon guards.
2nd *ditto* *ditto*	2nd *ditto* *ditto*
1st *ditto* of Valencia.	1st *ditto* of Santa-Fé.
1st *ditto* of Daroca.	1st *ditto* of Fieles Saragozanos

2nd Division, maréchal-de-camp PIREZ.

2 Swiss battalions of Kaiser. 6 other battalions.

CAVALRY.

1st company of cuirassiers.
1st *ditto* Maestranza of Valencia.
2 squadrons of hussars of Valencia and Grenada.

On the 22nd of May, general O'Donnell reached Vinaxa, at which place the divisions of generals Yvarola and Pirez were assembled. The 1st consisted of a brigade of infantry of the line and of a light brigade, amounting in all to five thousand men; the 2nd numbered three thousand men. On the same day, O'Donnell received a letter from the governor of Lerida, conveying the information that the greater part of the enemy's cavalry had retired, and that there were no more than three hun-

dred horsemen before the town. Upon the receipt of this intelligence, O'Donnell resolved to avail himself of the favorable opportunity thus offered to him, and broke up his encampment on the 23rd with those two divisions, and two hundred and fifty horsemen belonging to the Maestranza, and to the hussars of Grenada. He arrived at ten in the morning at Juneda, where the troops halted until noon. He then moved forward with Yvarola's division, leaving the division of Paris at Juneda. On arriving near the ground which was afterwards the field of battle, he formed the division into three columns, the first of which, consisting of the light infantry of the company of cuirassiers, led the way on the high road, and the other two followed on its flank, though considerably in the rear; their front was protected by sharpshooters. The latter came up to the French advanced-posts who fell back to the vicinity of the place. In the mean while, a thick cloud of dust was seen at a distance on the right, and an order was shortly afterwards brought from O'Donnell, who had remained at a house near the field of battle, directing all the troops to retreat; a movement which was instantly carried into effect. As however the two flank-columns were at a great distance in the rear, their retreating movement was more rapid, and they placed themselves in order of battle with the cavalry on their right, and a howitzer on the left. The French cuirassiers drew up in front of our line, and stood a few discharges from the Spanish troops, who likewise suffered considerably from the brisk fire kept up by the French artillery. At that moment the Spanish light-infantry made its appearance, and formed a column of attack, the head of which inclined towards the right. Our cavalry was attacked by that of the French and put to flight; the enemy's charge threw the whole of the division into disorder; it was unable to resist the attack of their cuirassiers, was surrounded and completely routed. The French kept up the pursuit as far as Juneda, where their progress was arrested by Pirez's division which had remained in that position.

NOTE 6.

PAGE 139, VOL. I.

For the satisfaction of those of our readers to whom the detail may not appear uninteresting, we shall give some idea of the arrangements connected with the trench by transcribing the orders of the day issued to the army on the 18th and 28th of April, and 2nd of May.

Head-quarters at Villanueva del Picat, 18th April, 1810.

" There shall be appointed every day, in virtue of an army order, a general officer to command the trench, and the chief of a corps as superior officer under him; the turn of duty shall be decided by seniority.* The commandant of the trench being personally responsible for the defence of the trenches, and all the guards, pickets, and pioneers being accordingly placed under his orders, must make himself perfectly acquainted with the ground, and be in frequent communication with the engineer officers, with a view to his making every suitable arrangement for the protection of the works, as well as to his being apprised in due time of any attempted sorties, and defeating such attempts. He will divide the superintending duties with the superior officer of the trench acting under his orders. He will never suffer any of his posts to be withdrawn until it shall have been relieved by another. He will report direct to the commander-in-chief, and lose no time in

* This order neither explains, nor could explain the motive for the appointment of two superior officers of the trench; but it will easily be accounted for. As the trench duty was of a very hazardous nature, it was absolutely necessary that the commandant should be attended by an officer to take his place, in the event of his being killed.

apprising him of the occurrences which may appear to claim his attention.

"The chef de bataillon Douarche, attached to the general staff, is appointed major of the trench for the whole period of the siege. He will have two lieutenants or sub-lieutenants under his orders, as assistants of the trench. He will be charged with the duty of holding direct communication with the pioneers, and observing that cleanliness is attended to; he will also give his attention to the removal of the wounded. He will make his report to the chief of the general staff, and inform him whether the pioneers properly perform their duty, are punctual to the appointed time, and muster the required numbers, what have been the casualities of killed and wounded, and what occurrences have taken place either by night or day.

"In conformity with the directions to be issued regarding the daily service, each regiment, or battalion, shall furnish every day a certain number of trench-guards and pioneers. Both the one and the other class must be composed of whole companies completed to the number of eighty men each, in order that by their own officers and subalterns being in command of them, more effectual superintendence may be exercised over their conduct. The number of men required must be punctually furnished; there must not be any contravention of this rule. The trench-guard shall be relieved every twenty-four hours, and the pioneers every twelve.

"The guards and pioneers of a brigade being all united at the spot pointed out by the general, shall be brought from the camp to the rear of the attack, where they are to be employed by an officer of the staff. The latter shall transfer them to the major of the trench, who will turn them over to the officers of engineers. As the work of the trench is of the highest importance, especially during the night, the officers commanding the pioneers will make them punctually perform the task that may be enjoined by the engineer officers, and will not allow them to quit the work, not even to take up arms, except in a case of absolute necessity; the pioneers will then act in concert with the trench-guard, which they will be required to reinforce.

"A special order shall make known the points and nature of the attack, the names of the engineer officers who are to lead the same, the rendezvous of the guards and pioneers on their quitting the camp, and the hours at which they are to be relieved.

"The principal commanders of the engineer and artillery corps will transmit every day to the chief of the general staff a note of the number of pioneers they may have occasion for on the following day,

a specification of the points to which they are to repair, their observations respecting the arrangement of the trench-guard, and such details as may appear to them susceptible of alteration or improvement, with a view to the same being noticed, if necessary, in the daily order of the service connected with the siege."

Order for the opening of the trench, dated 28th April.

General of brigade Buget, commander of the trench
Colonel Rouelle of the 116th regiment, superior officer of the trench
Trench-guards, 3 chosen companies and 1 battalion of reserve, to be named by the commander-in-chief
} for 24 hours.

	GENERALS.	REGIMENTS.		For the night from 29 to 30 April.			For the day of the 30th April.		
					men.				men.
Sharpshooters to be furnished by	Habert.	5th light.....	3	whole	240	2	whole	160	
		116th of the line..	2	comp.	160	3	comp.	240	
		117th *do*....	4	com-	320	2	com-	160	
	Buget..	114th *do*....	4	pleted	320	4	pleted	320	
		3rd of the Vistula	2	at 80	160	1	at 80	80	
	Verges..	121st of the line..	3	men each.	240	2	men each.	160	
	Paris....	115th *do*....	2		160	1		80	

"To-morrow 29th, the 1,600 pioneers brought from their respective brigades, in conformity with the directions contained in the order of the 18th instant, must have arrived with their arms, but without knapsacks, at the close of day, that is to say, towards half past seven at night, at the windmill of Gualda, where the commander of the engineers will cause each of them to be provided with a spade and pick-axe. The officer of engineers, under whose charge they were brought up, is to lead them thence to the dépôt in the rear of the trench, where M. Douarche, the commander, will receive and keep them in proper order, and give them up to the engineer officers in proportion as the latter may require their services.

"The trench-work shall be protected by three chosen companies, two of them along the front and in advance of the work, the third on the left bank of the Segre, in order to drive back any troops that might attempt to sally from the town by the gate of the Carmen. The posts of Buget's brigade shall approach the very foot of the castle-wall, in the manner directed on the preceding nights.

"The general who is the principal officer in command of the trench, will take care that the soldiers clean the pans of their musket-locks, so as to remove all danger of the men accidentally firing their muskets, an occurrence which would unavoidably create disorder, and awaken the enemy's fire. Great care must be taken that no dogs follow the pioneers or trench-guards.

"Independently of the chosen companies appointed for the trench-guard, a space shall be fixed upon in the rear, for the reserve battalion, and one of the companies of pioneers shall be prepared to supply the vacancies occasioned by the removal of the wounded. The major of the trench will procure a sufficient number of litters, and cause the wounded to be removed without disturbing the pioneers.

"The two chosen companies stationed in advance of the border, shall be divided into four sections, with a view to the effectual protection of the whole work. The soldiers shall lie flat on the ground, and maintain the most absolute silence; there shall be three sentries kneeling in advance of each section; but they must not be allowed to fire. If they discover any of the enemy's patrols, they will quickly return to their platoons, and relieve each other in order to drive the enemy back about fifty paces at the point of the bayonet, and afterwards resume their posts.

"The officers of engineers shall place the pioneers along the border, by the aid of a cord, in order that they may the better preserve the ranks. The latter shall likewise lie flat on the ground, until they receive the signal from the right to commence their work; they will then use every exertion to place themselves under cover, by throwing up a protection of earth on the side of the town, and laying their muskets on the opposite side. It shall be intimated to them that they are not to be relieved until thetrench shall be three feet deep and as many broad, each man occupying a point of three or four feet, in order that he may work at his ease. The officers of the companies and the sergeants shall attend to the due fulfilment of what has just been laid down.

"The pioneers shall only fly to arms in the event of the chosen companies being fairly driven back upon them; and the officers must take care that no one spreads a false alarm.

"When the pioneers shall have dug to the depth of about two feet, the general in command of the trench may order the chosen companies to take shelter in the trench, leaving some sentries kneeling a few steps beyond the work. In the day time, if the work has at-

tained the dimensions required, the 1,200 pioneers appointed to that duty shall proceed to relieve those of the night, and use the same tools, which the former are to leave on the side of the trench. The pioneers at work by day must dig the trench to the breadth of seven feet, and to the depth of three.

"The pioneers at work during the night will be paid at the rate of 75 centimes, and those employed by day at 50 centimes each, subalterns and soldiers indiscriminately. The payment will take place at the mill of Gualda, on producing the certificate presented by the officers of the companies, and signed by the officers of engineers on duty, who are empowered to diminish the number of days, if they are not satisfied with the work. Brandy will be distributed under the superintendence of the major of the trench, upon certificates which are also to be signed by the engineer officers.

"This order shall be immediately copied into the registers, and read twice at least to each company, in order that every one may be fully apprised of the duty which will be expected of him."

Order of the 2nd of May.

The shot, shells, and howitzes fired by the enemy, which may be brought to the dépôt of artillery established near the quarters occupied by the major of the trench, and delivered to the artillery-guard appointed to receive them, shall be paid for in cash at the following rates:

12-inch shells	1 franc.	
10-inch do.	—	75 centimes.
8-inch shells and howitzes	—	40
6-inch ditto	—	25
24 and 16-pounder shot	—	25
21-pounder ditto	—	15
8 and 6-pounder ditto	—	10

The artillery-pioneers shall be paid in the manner laid down, respecting the engineer-pioneers, at the military chest belonging to the park of artillery stationed at Torre-Ferrer.

NOTE 7.

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CAPITULATION

Proposed by brigadier-general don José Veguer, second principal commandant of this district, and don Pedro Fleix, notary of the royal councils, an inhabitant of Lerida, both empowered by the maréchaux-de-camp don Jayme Garcia Conde, and don Jose Gonzalés, governors of the town and castle.

And accepted by the general of brigade, Valée, commanding the artillery of the 3rd corps d'armée, and the adjutant commandant Saint-Cyr Nugues, second principal officer of the general staff, in virtue of powers received from His Exc. count Suchet, governor-general of Arragon, and commander-in-chief of the 3rd corps of the French army in Spain.

Article I.

Granted.

The principal gate of the castle shall be immediately given up to the grenadiers of the 117th regiment.

The garrison of Lerida shall march out of the town, this day, 14th of May, by the breach in front of the Magdalen, file off before the French troops with the honors of war, lay down their arms, and remain prisoners of war.

Article II.

Granted.

The officers shall retain their swords, horses, and acccoutrements, and be treated according to their rank.

ARTICLE III.

Granted.

The governor of the castle, who is at present confined to it by indisposition, is at liberty to remain there until his recovery, and to retain his three aid-de-camps.

ARTICLE IV.

Granted.

The wives of military men of all ranks shall be at liberty to follow their husbands at their own expense.

ARTICLE V.

The general reserves to himself the power of granting permission to those who may afford him a sufficient guarantee, as several Spanish officers, prisoners of war, have broken the promises they had given.

All Spanish officers, who shall give their word of honor in writing, pledging themselves never again to take up arms against France, will be at liberty to remain in Spain as prisoners of war, under the superintendence of the French commanders.

The officers of the foreign regiments may return to their own country on the same conditions.

ARTICLE VI.

Granted.

If there should be in the garrison any officers, sergeants, corporals, or soldiers made prisoners on other occasions, full amnesty shall be granted to them.

ARTICLE VII.

Granted.

The catholic religion, its ministers, and property in general, shall be respected.

ARTICLE VIII.

Granted.

Full amnesty shall be granted to the inhabitants, who have taken up arms during the siege, and they will remain at liberty, including those who composed the civic companies.

ARTICLE IX.

Granted.

Protection shall be granted to the persons employed in finance department, to physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, chaplains, and other ministers of the church, to enable them to proceed wherever they think proper, as well as to the inhabitants of Lerida, or to strangers who may desire to quit that town.

ARTICLE X.

Granted.

Those who at present compose the juntas of the corregimiento and of the province, or who have ever formed part of them, shall not be molested in any manner for past proceedings, and may retain their situations.

ARTICLE XI.

The chef-d'escadron Raffron, the chef de bataillon Henry, of the engineer corps, and the war

A French officer of artillery, another of the engineers, and a commissary of war, shall forth-

commissary Bonnefoy, shall immediately repair to the castle. with enter the castle, to draw up an inventory, and take possession of the magazines.

Lerida, the 14th of May, 1810.

Signed José Veguer, Pedro Fleiz, Valée, Saint-Cyr-Nugues.

Approved by the principal commandant of the Segre and the Cinca, and by the governor of the town and castle of Lerida.

Signed Jayme Garcia Conde, Jose Gonzalés.

Approved by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd corps of the French army in Spain, and governor-general of Arragon.

Signed Count Suchet.

Capitulation of the fort Garden of Lerida.

The fort Garden of Lerida agrees to the same terms of capitulation which have been granted this day, 14th of May, 1810, to the principal castle of the town, and are signed by the principal commandant, general Garcia Conde.

The main gate of the fort shall be instantly taken possession of by the French troops.

Signed Francisco Nunes, commandant of the said fort, Haxo, colonel of engineers, empowered by the commander-in-chief.

Approved by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd corps of the French army in Spain, and governor-general of Arragon.

Signed Count Suchet.

CONTINUATION OF NOTE 7, PAGE, 155, VOL. I.

Summary statement, in order of rank and regiment, of the garrison of Lerida made prisoners of war on the 14th of May 1810.

DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPECTIVE CORPS.	GENERALS.	SUPERIOR OFFICERS.	OFFICERS.	SUBALTERNS and soldiers.	REMARKS.
Don Jayme Garcia Conde, marechal-de-camp, principal commandant. Don José Gonzalès, maréchal-de camp, governor. Don José Veguer, brigadier-general, second in command. Don Narcisso Codina, brigadier-general, governor of Tortosa Don Felipe Perene, brigadier-general of infantry. Don José Sangénis, brigadier-general of artillery.	6				This statement does not include two battalions of civic guards, and 346 artillery men belonging to the town, who were sent back agreeably to the terms of capitulation.
STAFF	..	3	10		
2nd battalion of the 2nd Swiss regiment of Taxler	..	2	37		
1st *ditto* *ditto* of Santa Fé	..	2	39	1,427	
1st *ditto* of the regiment of Ferdinand VII	..	2	39	852	
1st *ditto* of the volonteers of Huesca	..	1	69	803	
1st *ditto* of the chasseurs of Murcia	..	2	37	1,415	
1st *ditto* of the Catalonian legion	..	1	41	757	
1st company of the 1st regiment of artillery of the line	..	2	3	907	
7th *ditto* of the light horse artillery	..	..	3	127	
Sappers	..	..	1	123	
Horse chasseurs of Olivenza	..	..	9	122	
Battalion of misquelets	..	..	..	125	
Doyle's sharp-shooters	..	..	4	320	
TOTAL	6	15	292	6,978	475 wounded, found in the hospital of Lerida, were included amongst the prisoners.
			7,291		

Certified correct by the governor of Lerida, *Signed* GENERAL GARCIA CONDE.

NOTE 8, PAGE 191, VOL. I.

Situation of the troops composing the 3rd corps d'armée, in the month of August 1810.

GENERALS OF		REGIMENTS.	NUMBER of		PRESENT UNDER ARMS.				REMARKS.
					Detached on an expedition to Tortosa.		On detached services in Arragon, along the lines, or in the fortresses.		
DIVISION.	BRIGADE.		battalions.	squadrons	men.	horses.	men.	horses.	
1st DIVISION under General LAVAL.	MONTMARIE.	14th of the line.	4	....	1,447	....	462		
		3rd of the Vistula.	2	....	1,851				
	CHLOPISKI.	44th of the line.	2	....	1,503	....	264		
		2nd of the Vistula.	2	....	1,598	....	145		
2nd DIVISION under General MUSNIER	PARIS.	115th of the line.	4	....	1,878	....	599		
		1st of the Vistula.	2	....	500	....	1,487		
	VERGES.	114th of the line.	4	....	1,703	....	675		
		121st *ditto*	4	....	....	....	2,295		
3rd DIVISION under General HABERT.	ABBÉ.	5th light	2	....	751	....	328		
		116th of the line.	3	....	1,212	....	167		There should be added to the number of soldiers on detached services 3,240 men in the hospitals in Arragon.
		117th *ditto*	4	....	1,747	....	552		
	,,	,,	....	.. .	....	....	....	....	
CAVALRY. Genl. of brig. BOUSSARD.		4th hussars.	....	4	759	764	268	169	
		13th cuirassiers.	....	4	425	425	588	508	
		Polish lancers.	....	1	20	20	86	86	
ARTILLERY. Genl. of brig. VALÉE.		....	....	....	980	1,055	577	15	
ENGINEERS. G. of brig. ROGNIAT.		....	....	....	493	84	244	3	
		TOTAL.	33	9	16,867	2,348	8,737	781	3,240 men.

NOTE 9.

PAGE 195, VOL. I.

A Spanish account which was published at the time, (and was ascribed to general Wimpfen, chief of the staff attached to general H. O'Donnell in Catalonia), points out the position and strength of the armies stationed on the lower Ebro, during the operations connected with the siege of Tortosa. We lay the following extracts from it before our readers.

On the 1st of August, 1810, our 1st division occupied the Llobregat, and closely observed Barcelona; the 2nd was still encamped in the vicinity of Falset for the purpose of watching Suchet; part of the 3rd division was at Esterri and protected the approaches of the valley of Aran; the reserve which was divided into two corps occupied with one of them the col del Alba near Tortosa, as well as Arbeca and Borjas-Blancas with the other, in order to keep in check the garrison of Lerida. A corps of hussars, the companies of Almugavarès and other light troops were stationed at Olot, and watched Besalu and Banolas; various corps of Guerillas and sharp-shooters were also scattered over different parts of the country, with a view of annoying the enemy. Tarrogona and Tortosa had garrisons sufficient for their defence; and the several corps brought the total of our forces to twenty two thousand men.

The enemy likewise occupied various positions. Macdonald covered Urgel with 11,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry; the Neapolitan division, under Pignatelli, occupied the right bank of the Ebro on the side of Mequinenza with 2,500 men. Suchet whose head quarters were at Mora had 12,000 men under his orders, of which number 2,000 men were at Ulldecona and closely watched Valencia, 4,000 were protecting the passage of the river at Tivisa, and the remainder were engaged on the right bank of the Ebro in the investment of Tortosa,

the siege of which was delayed until the arrival of the besieging train. Independently of those forces, a division of 7,000 men occupied the valley of the Ampourdan.

.....

Macdonald who was hard pressed for want of provisions and knew the unassailable strength of our position, was no sooner informed of the retreat of the army from Valencia, than he determined to extricate himself from the difficult position in which he was involved, and which must have inevitably proved his grave had he remained in it. In furtherance of this object, he made a feint movement towards the col de Balaguer at the hour of midnight, and afterwards a rapid countermarch which was accomplished in the best possible order towards Alcover by the road of Villalonga, only leaving 700 men behind him who were confined in the hospitals at Reuss.

As soon as the enemy's march became known, our troops broke up their encampment and charged his rear guard, whilst the divisions commanded by Georget and Sarsfield, which occupied advantageous positions, kept harassing his flank. The enemy's progress was considerably retarded by the resistance which our troops opposed to him, and the ruggedness of the road; but as he was superior to us in numerical strength, he was enabled to force the passes and gain the heights at the moment when, by a seasonable sortie, the garrison of Lerida made an attack upon our rear, and called off our attention; the road was thus cleared from obstruction, and the enemy was accordingly able to cross the col de Ribas, to direct his march by Monblanch and Vinaxa to Lerida, and encamp at the foot of its ramparts.

This movement having been carried into effect, our troops occupied the following positions. The baron de la Barre was at Falset with his division; general Obispo at Monblanch and Vinaxa; Georget protected our right flank, and moved towards Santa-Coloma de Queralt; Baron d'Eroles was on the Llobregat; colonel Greffi in the direction of Besalu and Banolas, whence he was ordered to make frequent incursions as far as the walls of Gerona; and colonel don Felipe de Fleires was at Lloveras, whence he covered the valley of Talarn. In consequence of these arrangements, the army had it in its power to oppose the enemy if they should attempt to return to Tarragona, and to charge them in flank, in the event of their attempting to penetrate as far as Barcelona by the road of Lerida, whilst it kept in check, at the same time, the troops which were hemming in the garrison of Tortosa from the right bank of the Ebro.

Towards the end of November, the enemy occupied the principality in the following manner:—Suchet retained his position before Tortosa, where he commanded the right bank of the Ebro, as well as Falset Porrera, and Cornudella; Macdonald had taken up a position in the rear of Monblanch, and was in communication with Suchet; Hillier's division was at Gerona, Abisbal, and along the coast.

Our troops were united partly at Torre-d'en-Barra, and partly at Valls, covering the defile or passage of Ribas, the col de Lilla, and the col de Cabra. D'Eroles and Fleix were at Olot and at Talarn; general Caro had not quitted the vicinity of the Montserrat.

It was easy to conjecture what were the enemy's projects; for his whole attention was directed to the siege of Tortosa, and all his operations tended to that sole object; we were accordingly bent upon frustrating his design, or at least delaying it as long as possible, in hopes that some new plan might meanwhile suggest itself for our adoption.

The presence of Macdonald at Monblanch clearly indicated his intention of keeping our forces in check, in order that they might be prevented from affording assistance to Tortosa, the siege of which was closely carried on by Suchet; it was also apprehended that he might attempt to gain possession of the country in the neighbourhood of Tarragona.

In the doubt which existed as to his intentions, it was determined to send a division of 7 or 8,000 men under the orders of Campoverde against the enemy's forces on the left bank of the Ebro; but it was only to commence operations in the event of Macdonald's drawing nearer to Lerida, and affording a clear manifestation of his ulterior views. Nevertheless, the division of general Yranzo was left unbroken, as it occupied a strong position at Valls with a large body of cavalry, and lined the passes and defiles; so that if the enemy should attempt to descend into the plain of Tarragona, his operations might be resisted by our sending the cavalry in pursuit of him through the plain of Urgel, whilst Campoverde should proceed to occupy the position at Falset, and Obispo's division should by means of forced marches succeed in facilitating our communications, and cut off those which the enemy kept up with their military establishments.

Meanwhile, Macdonald advanced with all his forces to Mas-de-Mora, by Pradès and Cormedella, and having proceeded as far as Ginestar, took up a position in the plain between that village and Tivisa.

With a view to cover his movement, Macdonald detached towards Falset a strong division which extended itself along the right, intercepted our communication with Tortosa, and surrounded a large detachment occupying the col del Alba, which was immediately attacked.* This detachment behaved with so much steadiness and valour, that after a vigorous resistance, it succeeded in retreating into the town, after having inflicted a severe loss upon the enemy; from that moment however, all communication with Tortosa was so effectually cut off, that two convoys which were on their way to the town, were unable to enter it, and compelled to retrace their steps.

Yranzo established himself at Monblanch; Campoverde marched to Riù-de-Cols; and Macdonald, having formed a junction with Suchet, occupied the unassailable position of Ginestar, with his left leaning upon the Ebro.

Having discovered, on our part, the inadequacy of the troops of Campoverde to carry on operations against the enemy, general Obispo was ordered to come up with 3,000 men, leaving the remainder of the forces on the Llobregat, under the orders of general Caro.

[Extracted from the report of general Wimpfen.]

* The movement here alluded to, was executed by the troops of general Habert on the 15th of December, the day on which Tortosa was invested.

NOTE 10.

PAGE 247, VOL. I.

The battery No. 1, on the crest of the plateau of Orleans, facing the projection of the fort, was armed with four 24-pounders; it was destined to batter that work in breach, and to silence its fire, which was likely to obstruct our operations. The battery No. 2, which was divided into two parts, the one somewhat in the rear, the other in the left of the parallel, consisted of two 24-pounders, two 16-pounders, and two 6-inch howitzers. It was intended to sweep the left face of the half-moon, and to enfilade the right face of the bastion of San-Juan. The battery No. 3, of four 10-inch mortars, which was intended to destroy with its shells the fort of Orleans, and those works of the place that were most likely to obstruct our attacks, was established at the back part of the ravine in the rear of the right of the trench, and at a distance of 230 toises from it.

At the centre attack, the battery No. 4, consisting of two 12-inch mortars, and two 6-inch howitzers destined to fire upon the bastion of San-Juan and its counter-guard, as well as upon the plateau and the castle, was erected in the parallel, on the left of its intersection with the road to Amposta. The battery No. 5, consisting of four 24-pounders in advance of the parallel, on the right of the extended line of the right face of the bastion of San-Pedro, was to have a full sweep of the left face of that bastion, to ricochet its right face, and batter in breach that part of the curtain which stands unprotected between the half-moon and the semi-bastion. The battery No. 6, of four 16-pounders, also in advance of the parallel, and along the extended line of the left face of the half-moon, was destined to enfilade that face, to batter the right face, and to destroy the double caponniere, which was used as a channel of communication between the town and the fort of

Orleans. The battery No. 7, within the parallel itself, and on its extreme left, was armed with two 8-inch howitzers, for the purpose of enfilading the works along the river, and throwing howitzes either into the castle, or in the gorge of the tête-de-pont.

The battery No. 8, on the right bank of the Ebro, which consisted of four 8-inch mortars, and was erected on the right of our position, was to throw shells into all the works erected within the body of the place and along the point of attack, which it overlooked by a reverse commanding ground. The battery No. 9, consisting of three 24-pounders, and two 6-inch howitzers, was erected in the rear of the parallel, and intended to silence the fire from the right face of the demi-bastion, and break down its parapet. Lastly, there was a 10th battery of six 12-pounders, and two 6-inch mortars, which was placed in advance of the parallel, and presented two faces; the one armed with two pieces of cannon and two mortars, was destined to cut away the bridge of boats, and batter the gorge of the tête-de-pont; the other, of four pieces of cannon, was to destroy the returning wall which flanked the right face of the demi-bastion, and to batter the terraced wall lining the quay.

NOTE 11, PAGE 261, VOL. I.

Statement of the effective strength of the troops composing the 4th division of the Spanish army, and the garrison of Tortosa, on the day of the surrender of that town.

DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPECTIVE CORPS	BATTALION.	MARECHAL-DE CAMP.	BRIGADIERS. GENERAL.	COLONELS.	LIEUTENANTS-COLONEL.	SERJEANTS-MAJOR.	CAPTAINS.	OFFICERS.	SUBALTERNS AND SOLDIERS.	TOTAL.
Staff	..	1	2	2	6	1	2	2	..	6
Town of Tortosa	..	..	..	2	2	1	6	3	..	14
Royal corps of artillery	..	..	1	2	2	..	6	5	338	354
Naval artillery	1	..	..	1	3	..	8	19	866	897
Infantry regiment of Soria	3	..	1	2	6	..	14	45	1,509	1,577
ditto chasseurs of Origuela	1	..	..	..	3	..	12	21	652	688
ditto 1st Catalonia section	4	..	1	2	5	..	20	57	2,130	2,215
ditto 2nd ditto ditto	4	..	1	3	2	..	21	64	1,413	1,504
ditto volunteers of Arragon	1	..	..	1	6	..	20	33	550	610
Royal dragoons	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	22	22
Sappers	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	151	151
In the hospitals	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	952	952
Volunteers of Tortosa	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	461	461
	14	1	6	15	35	2	109	249	9,044	9,451

Certified an exact copy of the statements furnished by the chief of the staff of this division.

Signed JUAN PRATS.

NOTE 12.

PAGE 263, VOL. I.

The severe wound received by the commander-in-chief, at the glorious expedition of the Abisbal, having since assumed a still more dangerous character, he was under the necessity of transferring the command of the army and of the province to general Yranzo, after adopting the most prompt measures for relieving Tortosa. It was naturally expected, considering its strong garrison, and its abundant supply of provisions, that it would maintain a protracted defence, so as to afford us the means of coming to its assistance. He accordingly despatched brigadier-generals Santa-Cruz and Santo-Gildès, to Arragon, Valencia, and Murcia, in order to make with the troops in those provinces a simultaneous movement, for the purpose of relieving the place and raising the siege.

The maréchal-de-camp, Carvajal, who commanded in Arragon, and general Bassecourt who was at the head of the troops in Valencia, immediately conformed to his views, and began to operate in furtherance of them; but their efforts proved unavailing; for the town of Tortosa, disappointing our expectations, surrendered to the enemy on the 2nd of January, a few days only after the siege had been regularly commenced. This loss was a dreadful blow to the army and to the province of Catalonia, owing to the situation of Tortosa, at the mouth of the Ebro, and the wealth and resources which it contained. Its fall had the effect of altering the aspect of affairs, as our troops were to unite at Tarragona, the fortifications of which were not yet terminated, and as the kingdom of Valencia remained exposed to an invasion, and was laid open, as it were, to the enemy's inroads.

(Extract from the report of general Wimpfen.)

NOTE 13.

PAGE 302, VOL I.

Those refugees elected a king to govern them; apprehending, however, the evils that result from absolute power, they drew up a constitution known under the name of *Fuero de Sobrarve*, the principal articles of which are subjoined.

1° *In pace et justicid regnum regito, nobis que foros meliores irrogato.*

2° *Jura dicere regi nefas esto, nisi seniorum annuente consilio.*

3° *Bellum aggredi, pacem inire, inducias facere, rem ve aliam magni momenti pertractare caveto rex, nisi subditorum annuente consensu.*

4° *E Mauris vindicabunda dividuntor inter ricos homines non modo, sed etiam inter milites et infanctiones; peregrinus autem homo nihil inde capito.*

5° *Ne quid autem damni, detrimenti ve leges nostræ libertates que capiant, judex quidam medius adesto, ad quem à rege provocare fas sit, si aliquem lacesserit.*

The best laws, however, are soon ineffectual and forgotten, unless in the outset they are guarded by powerful institutions framed for the purpose of being put in practice in cases of emergency. For this object was *the union* created, a kind of popular privilege, in virtue of which permanent deputies were appointed by the cortes to reside in the capital, and were enjoined, whenever the king refused to attend to the remonstrances made to him, to unfurl a standard, round which all the people of Arragon, even those on duty about the king's person, were bound to rally under pain of death. Those deputies were also intrusted with the custody of the seal or stamp of *the union*, upon which was engraved the figure of the king, seated on his throne, and another figure in a kneeling attitude before him, representing the people, and presenting a petition with one hand, whilst it directed his attention with the other to the

point of a sword. Every year, or at least every two years, the cortes were convoked in the capital. The nobility, the clergy, and the deputies of communes, were assembled on the occasion. Laws were enacted in these assemblies, and proclaimed with this formula: "*Su Alteza, de voluntad de la Corte, estatue y ordena, &c.*" (His highness by the will of the cortes, decrees and ordains, &c.)

As long as the army possessed a national character, the laws were duly respected; but Charles V and his successors, had no sooner surrounded themselves with a guard, consisting of Germans, Flemings, Italians, and soldiers from all the provinces in Spain, than power ceased to go hand in hand with the laws. Under the reign of Philip II the privilege of the union was destroyed, and its members were beheaded for attempting to defend the minister, Antonio Perez, against the arbitrary acts of the sovereign. Nevertheless, the cortes and many other political establishments were preserved until the conquest of Arragon by Philip V. On that occasion, the conqueror stripped the province of all its remaining franchises, and subjected it to the Castillian laws, as a punishment for its warm adherence to the party of the archduke of Austria.

(Extract from a Notice concerning Arragon, written by an Arragonese.)

NOTE 14.

PAGE 324, VOL. I

There existed at Saragossa a society called *Academy of the friends of the country*, whose object was to encourage agriculture and the fine arts. The revolution and the war had interrupted its labours; one of general Suchet's first cares was to restore and patronise it. The society appointed him its honorary president. On the day of its restoration, he made a speech, from which we select the following extract, as a proof of the progress of improvement, within a twelvemonth, in a province where national animosity, and a war of extermination, had hitherto held paramount sway.

"Never since its primitive institution, has your society met at a more important moment than the present. What anticipations are we not to form of the utility of your labours, if we estimate them by the evils that preceded the period of your revival! Scarcely a year has elapsed since you were a prey to the horrors of a siege; religion, justice, civil liberty had fled, or were deafened by popular clamour, and the bursting of shells in the midst of your city; each man's residence, his family, his life, were at the mercy of any infuriated being; sickness, desolation, want, were dwelling within your walls; beyond them, numerous armies were scattered over your fields, consumed your harvests, and spread in all directions the unavoidable horrors of war. What Arragonese could be so far destitute of reason, as to regret that calamitous period, now that the very traces of it are disappearing from his view? At the present day, religion and its ministers find protection, respect, and provision for their mutual wants; the tribunals have resumed the interrupted course of justice; regular administrations succeed the

revolutionary chaos; abundance and prosperity are again springing up in your city, and cultivation and labour in the fields; security and repose are held out to every submissive and peaceable inhabitant. How favorable is the present moment for the meeting of the enlightened friends of their country, when they are enabled to proclaim useful truths, and to set a salutary example? Over how many branches of prosperity have you not now to exercise your influence! How happy is the disposition of the public mind, which is prepared to welcome all sound ideas and to pay attention to the lessons of experience! We must frankly acknowledge it, gentlemen, Spain, that splendid portion of Europe, which holds so bright a place in the pages of history, had greatly relapsed from its former glory, owing to the weakness of its government; the population, industry, fine arts, commerce, instruction, laws, and the public administration, were visibly on the decline in the midst of an enlightened age; all intelligent minds loudly called for a reform in their native country. Violent and unexpected causes have accelerated the period of such a reform. But the first shock has been given; the old edifice has sunk under it: and strangers are coming forward to extricate you from your ruins, and fill up the abyss. Could any one be so blind as to rush into it, and attempt to arrest the arm extended to save Spain and by no means to destroy it. No man of sense, no true friend of his country, ought to hesitate any longer in coming to a determination; passions should make way for prudence and calm reflection. *Salus populi suprema lex*, such is at the present day the only rallying cry of true Spaniards. Let factious men still persist in the struggle; let them be still unsparing of the blood and the fortunes of their fellow countrymen, with a view to prolong the calamities of war in some of the provinces; this frenzy cannot long resist the evidence of facts. As for you, proud and honest Arragonese, you will find glory in repairing evils which can no longer be averted. You have already signalized your courage; you will now call wisdom to your councils; following the example of the capital, you will say *hemos cumplido*, and will assist me in giving prosperity to a province hitherto a perfect stranger to it, though so highly favored by Providence. Your useful labours are the more entitled to my attention, and to all the interest I can bestow upon them, as your present efforts already afford me an anticipation of their proximate success. Previously to your re-organization, and when you were still as it were in a state of war, and exposed to the consequences of a siege, you began to collect the scattered fragments of this society. I have

seen the good effects of your endeavours to revive your schools of painting and sculpture, your cabinets of history, and your public establishments; I hastened to give them every encouragement in my power; and when your operations shall have acquired more harmony and assumed a more general and more efficient purpose, my duty, as the governor and friend of the people of Arragon, will be to ensure you the support of my authority and the benevolence of the monarch."

NOTE 15.

PAGE 330, VOL. I.

ARTICLE I.

(Extract from the Emperor's Decree, dated at the Palace of the Tuileries, the 8th of February, 1810.*)*

Of the government of Arragon (2nd government.)

" Arragon shall form a separate government, under the title of government of Arragon.

ARTICLE II.

" General Suchet is appointed governor; he will unite in his person the civil and military powers.

ARTICLE III.

" The governor is entrusted with the administration of the police, of justice, and of the finances. He will nominate to official situations and employments, and issue all the regulations he may deem requisite.

ARTICLE IV.

" All the revenues of Arragon, whether arising from ordinary or extraordinary contributions, shall be lodged in the chest of the French paymaster, with a view to meet the pay of the troops, and the expenses of their maintenance; accordingly, from the 1st of March next, the public treasury shall no longer send any funds for the service of the troops stationed within the limits of that government."

A true copy.

Signed, ALEXANDER.

(Letter from the Major-General to General Suchet, dated Rambouillet, the 22nd of February, 1811.)

" General Suchet—I have sent you the emperor's orders, in virtue of which you are appointed governor of Arragon, which is placed in a state of siege. This act invests you with all the necessary powers, whether for the command of the province, or for its administration; and you are only to correspond with me on this subject. The intercourse you had to keep up with the general staff of the army of Spain, merely relates to the movements of troops and to military matters. In conformity with what I have already communicated to you, all the resources of the province must be applied to pay the troops, to keep them properly supplied with provisions and clothing, taking care, at the same time, that the utmost order and economy be introduced in the administration of the province while in a state of siege.

Signed, ALEXANDER.

END OF VOLUME I.

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